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Much of public economics research examines the public sector’s use of policy
to influence the behavior of individuals to achieve societal goals. Because there
may be many different policies to achieve the same societal goal, public economists
are generally concerned with policy efficiency: Which policy among many will yield
the desired result with the least amount of distortion or welfare loss? The aim of
these three essays is to contribute to this discussion by examining the intended and
unintended consequences of contemporary social policy.
The first essay estimates the elasticity of taxable earnings to taxation. Tax-
ation may improve social welfare by redistributing income and to support public
infrastructure. However, taxation may also generate disincentives to work; so as
tax rates rise, the amount of income subject to taxation plausibly declines. Because
the net effect of proposed tax reform on government revenue depends on how elastic
taxable earnings are to taxation, the response of earnings to taxation is fundamental
in assessing the efficiency of the US tax code.
The second essay examines the impact of increasing the Social Security nor-
mal retirement age from 65 to 67 on the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI)
rolls. Although increasing the full retirement age was intended to decrease program
expenditures by providing incentives to delay the transition to retirement, the pol-
icy simultaneously increased the incentive to receive DI benefits. DI benefits are
are generally more generous and received over a longer period of time relative to
retirement benefits; so the effect of increasing the normal retirement age on program
expenditures may be overstated if the rise in the DI rolls is not taken into account.
The third and final essay examines a recent policy change to Title 38 which
granted disability benefits to Vietnam veterans for diabetes considered presumptively
related to herbicide exposure during military service. In this essay, we explore the
impact of this policy on the rolls and expenditures of the VA disability compensation
program.
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Chapter 1
The Effect of Taxes on Taxable Earnings: Evidence from
the 2002-2004 US Federal Tax Acts
Abstract: I estimate the elasticity of taxable earnings to taxation among married
couples at the joint and individual levels, identified by changes in marginal tax
rates due to the implementation of marriage penalty relief provisions in 2003. The
main data source for the empirical analysis is unique to the taxation literature:
the 2002 and 2003 Current Population Surveys linked to individual level W-2 forms
submitted to the Internal Revenue Service. Similar to previous studies, I instrument
the observed change in the marginal tax price between 2002 and 2004 with the
predicted change in the marginal tax price based on real earnings in 2002. However,
there are two potential concerns for this strategy. First, as stressed in the literature,
earnings in 2002 may be correlated with systemic movements in income that are
unrelated to the reform. And second, a single year of prereform earnings may be
a noisy measure of permanent income. To address these particular concerns, I
consider an alternative instrument constructed from the average of multiple years of
prereform earnings. Average taxable income, when taken as an estimate of the fixed
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effect on taxable income, is arguably better at identifying the effect of taxation on
earnings. I find that elasticity estimates increase considerably using these alternative
instrumental variables compared to using a single year of prereform earnings. For
example, the estimated elasticity of taxable earnings to taxation among married men
increases from .164 (.112) to .664 (.310) when one versus four years of prereform
earnings, respectively, are used to construct predicted changes in marginal tax prices.
Qualitatively, the results suggest that earnings of married, educated men are more
sensitive to taxation relative to their less educated counterparts and married women
when these alternative instruments are used.
1.1 Introduction
The elasticity of taxable income or earnings to taxation is fundamental in evalu-
ating the efficiency of the income tax code, having direct implications for efficient
revenue maximization and welfare loss. Unfortunately, economic theory provides
very few unambiguous predictions regarding the effects of taxation. Indeed, the
standard labor model with proportional taxation predicts that an increase in the
after-tax wage generates counteracting income and substitution effects, yielding an
ambiguous effect on labor hours and therefore gross income. Due to this theoretical
limitation, studies that examine the response of earnings to taxation are empirical.
However, empirically identifying the behavioral response is complicated by the fact
that theoretically important tax parameters are determined simultaneously with in-
come. This arises due to the progressive nature of the US income tax code where
2
marginal tax rates increase with income. To identify the response of earnings to
taxation, recent tax studies have examined the relationship between changes in in-
come to changes in marginal tax rates induced by reforms to the tax code. Among
the class of studies that use this quasi-experimental approach, elasticity estimates
of income to taxation range from zero to three (Gruber and Saez, 2002).
The objective of this paper is to estimate the effect of taxation on taxable
earnings by exploiting differential changes in marginal tax rates generated by the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (EGTRRA) of 2001. The
EGTRRA, estimated to cost more than $1.35 trillion over the first ten years of its
enactment, was the largest tax reform in over 20 years. To my knowledge, there
has been no systematic analysis of the EGTRRA regarding the behavioral response
of earnings to taxation. Unlike variation in marginal tax rates considered in many
quasi-experimental tax studies, the EGTRRA differentially affected marginal tax
rates at very dense segments of the income distribution. Thus, elasticity estimates
are derived for a segment of the income distribution which are generally difficult to
identify using quasi-experimental methods.
The cleanest experiment, and the focus of this paper, occurs at taxable incomes
(TIs) around $46,700 (in 2002 dollars), the TI threshold that defines the 15% income
tax bracket from the 27% bracket for joint filers.1 According to the EGTRRA,
this threshold for joint filers was scheduled to increase relative to the threshold
for single filers, reaching twice the threshold faced by single filers by 2008 (prior
1Taxable income is the definition of income applied to the income tax rate schedule, defined as
adjusted gross income (a comprehensive measure of income subject to taxation) minus personal
exemptions and deductions.
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to EGTRRA, the threshold for married couples was just 67% larger than those
faced by single filers). The Jobs Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003,
however, fully implemented this change in tax year 2003. As a result, couples with
TIs roughly between $46,700 and $54,194 (the new threshold in 2004 expressed in
2002 dollars) would have experienced a decline in the marginal tax rate from 27%
to 15% from tax year 2002 to 2004 if real taxable income had remained constant.
According to the 2001 version of the Statistics of Income (SOI) Public Use Tax File,
a data set compiled from tax returns filed with the Internal Revenue Service, this
provision affected approximately 3.2 million (8.2%) married couples. If the decline
in marginal tax rates had an effect on income through, for example, labor supply
or 401(k) contributions, then the change in income among these affected couples
should reflect to some degree the behavioral response of income to taxation. There
was little to no predicted change in marginal tax rates for couples with joint TIs just
below $46,700 and above $54,194, so these couples serve as an obvious comparison
group.
The data source for this study - the 2002 and 2003 March Supplements of the
Current Population Survey (CPS) linked to the Social Security Administration’s De-
tailed Earnings Record (DER) file - is unique to the taxation literature. The DER is
compiled from individual level W-2 forms submitted to the Internal Revenue Service.
For each person matched to the CPS, the DER provides longitudinal information
on total wage income, taxable wage income, Social Security and Medicare taxable
wages, and Social Security and Medicare taxable self-employment income. These
income measures are available annually from 1978 to 2004.
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The CPS-DER matched data has several advantages compared to other data
previously used in quasi-experimental tax studies. First, unlike earnings data com-
piled from multiple cross-sections, earnings of treated and comparison couples may
be examined before and after a tax law change. Second, the link of the DER and
the CPS provides rich demographic information which is typically unavailable in
administrative data alone. This allows, for example, the ability to assess whether
treatment and comparison groups in quasi-experimental tax studies are indeed com-
parable and to examine heterogeneous responses to taxation across demographic di-
mensions. Third, the CPS-DER matched data allows for the examination of income
among married couples at the individual rather than couple level. Studies that use
data compiled from federal tax returns have been limited in this regard since most
married couples file, and therefore report income, jointly.
There are two main limitations of the CPS-DER for computing TI required
to assign couples into treated and comparison groups: the CPS-DER does not con-
tain (1) other sources of income, in addition to taxable wage income and positive
self-employment income, subject to taxation and (2) deduction amounts, whether
standard or itemized. These issues are examined and addressed using the SOI.
The empirical strategy consists of regressing the change in log taxable earnings
between 2002 and 2004 on the actual, observed change in the log marginal tax price
(one minus the marginal tax rate) over the same period. However, as Gruber and
Saez (2002) and others have mentioned, taxable earnings and the marginal tax
price are determined simultaneously, so shocks to earnings that are unrelated to the
reform may affect the observed change in the tax price. As a result, the estimated
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elasticity of income to taxation may be biased when using an ordinary least squares
estimator.
To isolate variation in tax prices due to the reform, studies generally instru-
ment the observed change in the marginal tax price with the predicted change in the
marginal tax price based on a single year of prereform earnings, i.e. the marginal tax
price after the reform had real prereform earnings remained constant. This method
too has been called into question since a single year of prereform earnings may be
differentially correlated with systemic movements in earnings before and after the
reform which are not related to the reform itself. Futhermore, if earnings are consid-
ered to reflect transitory shocks or measurement error, then another concern with
this instrument is that assignment of couples into treatment and comparison groups
may be imperfect.2
In this study, I address these particular concerns by considering alternative
instrumental variables constructed from the average of multiple years of prereform
earnings. Intuitively, average prereform earnings presumably isolates the effect of
time-invariant factors on earnings. The instrument is the predicted change in the
marginal tax price based on average prereform earnings. If this alternative instru-
ment, constructed from estimated fixed effects, is less correlated with transitory
movements in income before and after the reform, then any insinuating bias that
may arise from constructing an instrument based on a single year of earnings would
be attenuated when these alternative instruments are used. Additionally, averaging
2Empirically, contaminated treatment and comparison groups implies non-classical measure-
ment error predicted change in marginal tax prices. This point is discussed in more detail in the
estimation strategy section.
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several years of prereform earnings plausibly nets out measurement error in earnings,
so assignment of couples into treatment and control groups based on average prere-
form earnings reduces the degree of cross-contaminated treatment and comparison
groups.
In the Results section, I first present elasticity estimates using the estimation
strategy considered in much of the previous tax literature. In particular, I instru-
ment the observed change in the marginal tax price between 2002 and 2004 using the
the predicted change in marginal tax price based on 2002 earnings singly. The esti-
mated, joint earnings elasticity is .063 (.063), which is comparable to the joint broad
income elasticity estimate of .071 (.130) in Gruber and Saez (2002).3 Additionally,
elasticity estimates appear similar when estimated among husbands and wives sep-
arately: .164 (.112) and .135 (.179) for husbands and wives, respectively. This is
consistent with comparable, individual estimates in Looney and Singhal (2004), but
the estimates differ in magnitude: .411 (.464) and .360 (.665) for husbands and
wives, respectively.
I then estimate earnings elasticities using the proposed instrument, calculated
as the predicted change in the marginal tax price from 2002 to 2004 based on the
average of multiple years of prereform earnings. I consider up to three lags of
annual earnings; from 2002 back to and including 1999. Elasticity estimates for
married men increase considerably when using these alternative instruments. For
example, constructing the instrument using a single lag of earnings increases the
3Gruber and Saez define broad income as total income minus capital gains and social security
benefits.
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elasticity estimate from .164 (.112) to .421 (.175). Averaging prereform earnings
back to 1999 further increases the estimate to .664 (.310). Additionally, when these
alternative instruments are used, the response of earnings to marginal tax prices
appears to be greater among educated men compared to less educated men. Among
husbands with some college and beyond, the estimated elasticity increases from .138
(.114) to .657 (.388), compared to an increase from .175 (.183) to .468 (.695) among
husbands with no college experience. In contrast to husbands, there is no patterned
increase in elasticity estimates among wives. Taken together, the results suggest
that earnings among educated, married men are more responsive to taxation than
their less educated counterparts and married women.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Source of Identification
The EGTRRA of 2001, estimated to cost $1.35 trillion over the first ten years of
its enactment, was the largest tax reform in 20 years (Steurle, 2004).4 In antici-
pation of continued budget surplus, the EGTRRA reduced marginal tax rates for
approximately 62 percent of taxpayers and reduced average tax rates for all tax
payers (Kiefer et al., 2002). Many provisions of EGTRRA were designed to phase in
slowly over time and would become inapplicable after 2010, the Act’s sunset year.
However, the Jobs Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003
4Relative to the size of the economy, the 1981 tax cut was about twice as large as the EGTRRA
(Steurle, 2004).
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and the Working Family Tax Relief Act (WFTRA) of 2004 expedited the phase
in of many EGTRRA provisions (effective dates of select EGTRRA provisions and
estimated costs are provided in appendix tables A.1 and A.2, respectively).
The implementation of the EGTRRA and related Acts generated consider-
able shifts in federal marginal tax rates which can be used to identify the effect
of taxation on income. The cleanest tax experiment, and the focus of this paper,
results from a provision designed to ameliorate marriage penalties in the tax code.
A marriage penalty occurs when, holding individual incomes constant, a couple’s
joint tax liability increases upon marriage.5 To see how marriage penalties arise,
consider a couple who is contemplating marriage in 2000. If each individual files
singly, both may claim the standard deduction of $4,400 (the standard deduction
amount in 2001 for an individual who files singly). Upon marriage, if the couple
files jointly, they may claim the standard deduction of $7,350, resulting in a loss
of $1,450 in deductions. Since deductions serve to reduce the amount of income
subject to taxation, the resulting increase in taxes owed depends on the couple’s
marginal tax rate. If the marginal tax rate for this couple is 28%, the couple faces
a marriage penalty of $406.6
A second marriage penalty results from the tax rate schedule because the TI
thresholds that define income tax brackets for married, joint filers are less than twice
the thresholds for single filers. For example, the TI thresholds that define the 15%
5Conversely, a marriage subsidy occurs when a couple’s tax liability declines upon marriage.
See Alm, Dickert-Conlin, and Wittington (1999) for an analysis of marriage penalties in the US
tax code.
6In 2000, the marginal tax rate was 28 percent for joint taxable income between $43,850 and
$105,950 for married couples and individual taxable income between $26,250 and $63,500 for single
filers.
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tax bracket from the 28% tax bracket were $26,250 and $43,850 for single and joint
filers, respectively, in 2000. To see how this feature of the tax schedule generates a
marriage penalty, assume each individual in the example above each have $30,000
in TI. In 2000, prior to marriage, each individual owes $4,987.50 (15% rate up to
$26,250 and 28% for the remainder); but upon marriage, the couple is liable for an
additional $1,124.50 in taxes (15% rate up to $43,850 and 28% for the remainder,
totaling $11,099.5 in tax liability).7
The EGTRRA was designed to eliminate these marriage penalties by gradually
increasing both the standard deduction and the upper bound of the 15% tax bracket
for joint filers to twice those faced by single filers. Although the standard deduction
and upper bound of the 15% tax bracket for married, joint filers were not originally
scheduled to reach twice the bound and bracket faced by single filers until 2009 and
2008, respectively, the JGTRRA fully implemented both of these increases in tax
year 2003. The exact tax code parameters are provided in Table 1.1: Panel A reflects
tax parameters according to EGTRRA and Panel B reflects additional changes due
to the JGTRRA and the WFTRA. The values of the standard deduction amount
and the taxable income threshold in 2003 with and without the passing of JGTRRA
are underlined in Panels A and B.
As a result, absent any change in real TI, couples whose 2002 joint TI was
roughly between $46,700 and $54,194 (the new threshold in 2004 expressed in 2002
dollars) would have experienced a decline in their marginal tax rates from 27% to
7The size of marriage penalty due to this feature of the tax rate schedule depends on the
composition of joint earnings. This is not a cause for concern in this study since the sample is
conditioned on those already married, and the provisions used for identification affected all married
couples similarly.
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15% by tax year 2004.8 If taxation does affect earnings through, for example, hours
worked and 401(k) contributions, then the change in earnings between 2002 and
2004 among these couples should reflect the effect of taxation on earnings. Couples
whose joint TI was just below $46,700 serve as a comparison group as marginal tax
rates for these couples would have remained constant at 15% from 2002 to 2004
(henceforth referred to as comparison group one). Additionally, couples with TIs
just above $54,194 would have experienced a decline in marginal tax rates of just 2
percentage points (from 27% to 25%), so these households serve as an appropriate
comparison group as well (henceforth referred to as comparison group two).
To illustrate this quasi-experiment, I plot federal marginal tax rates in 2002
and 2004 by adjusted gross income (AGI) (in 2002 dollars) and family size (Fig-
ure 1.1).9 Since AGI in 2004 is expressed in 2002 dollars, these marginal tax rate
changes reflect real changes that result from the tax reform rather than changes
that result from nominal wage growth. I plot these rates against AGI because AGI
is a more comprehensive measure of income than TI. To calculate TI, which is the
definition of income that determines the marginal tax rate, personal exemptions
(based on family size) and the standard deduction amount for married, joint filers
were substracted from AGI.
In the top-left panel of Figure 1.1, comparison group one, the treated group,
and comparison group two are respectively labeled C1, T, and C2. Although the TI
8To be more precise, the range is more accurately between $47,900 and $55,394 if the couple
uses the standard deduction since the standard deduction for married, joint filers increased in real
terms from $7,850 to $9,050 (2002 dollars) from 2002 to 2004. In the empirical analysis, the treated
and comparison groups are identified by the predicted change in federal marginal tax rate.
9Adjusted gross income is defined as the sum of income subject to taxes minus certain statutory
adjustments (e.g. IRA contributions).
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thresholds that define the treated from comparison groups is the same for all mar-
ried couples, Figure 1.1 shows that the corresponding thresholds in terms of AGI
depend on family size. This is because a couple is entitled to an additional personal
exemption for each additional dependent.10 The assignment of couples into treat-
ment and control groups also depends on the amount of deductions claimed since
deductions are subtracted from AGI to determine TI. In Figure 1.1, the standard
deduction was assumed for all; but in reality, couples may either claim the standard
deduction or choose to itemize their deductions. The lower (upper) bound of AGI
used to define comprison group one (two) in the empirical analysis is illustrated
by the vertical line at $55,000 ($95,000). To be shown, when itemized deductions
are taken into account, the $55k-$95k range adequately spans the treatment and
comparison groups.
Unlike variation in marginal tax rates considered in many tax studies, the
EGTRRA differentially affected marginal tax rates at very dense segments of the
income distribution. This is important because, as Gruber and Saez (2002) show,
the negative behavioral response among taxpayers whose marginal tax rate increased
is proportional to the share of taxpayers in that bracket. To illustrate the number
couples presumably affected by these provisions, I use the 2001 version of the SOI
(Statistics of Income) to plot the distribution of AGI among married, joint filers
along with the percent of couples whose predicted federal marginal tax rate was
expected to decline from 27% to 15% from 2002 to 2004.11 The 2001 version of the
10For couples with two children, the TI thresholds that define the treated group ($46,700 and
$54,194 in 2002 dollars) correspond to AGI levels of $66,550 and $74,044; compared to $60,550
and $68,044 for couples with no children.
11TI is reported separately from AGI in the SOI, so it is not assumed that all households choose
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SOI, constructed from tax returns filed with the IRS, represents the 130.6 million
federal tax returns filed in 2001. Sample exclusion restrictions in addition to being
married were chosen to mimic the CPS-DER sample examined in the empirical
section (see appendix for more details on the SOI and sample selection).12
The distribution of AGI among married, joint filers (up to $200,000 in 2002
dollars, which excludes 5.4% of the weighted sample) and the percent of treated
couples within each AGI class are illustrated in Figure 1.2. There are two notable
features of this graph. First, the effect of increasing the upper bound of the 15%
tax bracket affected a significant number of married, joint filers. In fact, according
to calculations from the SOI, approximately 3.2 million (8.2%) of these married
couples would have experienced the 44.4% decline in federal marginal tax rates if
income had remained constant between 2001 (the tax year of the survey) and 2003
(the year when the provision was fully implemented). And second, the graph for
the treatment group is skewed to the right when plotted against AGI. This occurs
because many couples with relatively high AGIs also have considerable amounts of
personal exemptions and deductions, reducing TI enough to be affected by these
marriage penalty relief provisions.
1.2.2 Previous Literature
Previous empirical work suggests that taxation has small effects on hours worked
among primary earners but may have relatively larger effects on other margins of
the standard deduction.
12Sample is selected to include married, joint filers (1) who file a form 1040, (2) whose tax form
pertains to the 2001 tax year, (3) who have zero farm income, (4) who either standardize or itemize
their deductions, and (4) whose only dependents are own children (residing at home or not).
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behavior. In a recent review of the labor supply and taxation literature, Blundell
and MaCurdy (1999) conclude that labor hours of married men are rather inelastic
to changes in the net-of-tax wage. However, as Feldstein (1995) and others have
noted, the focus on labor hours ignores several other margins of behavior that may
respond to income taxation. For example, expenditures on certain types of goods
may be diverted from income taxation, so taxation may not only affect labor supply
but also the allocation of gross income to tax favored and non-favored goods. Other
margins of behavioral response, including charitable contributions and forms of com-
pensation, appear to be relatively more responsive to taxation (Slemrod, 1990), so
ignoring these margins may lead to misleading calculations of welfare loss (Feldstein,
1999).
In a seminal paper, Feldstein (1995) examined the effect of taxation on taxable
income by exploiting variation in tax prices generated by the Tax Reform Act of
1986. He argued that the response of taxable income to taxation reflects other
margins of behavioral response in addition to labor hours alone; labor intensity,
types of compensation, willingness to report income, and shifts in expenditures
between tax favored and non-favored goods. Perhaps the most novel aspect of his
analysis was the use of a Treasury Department panel of tax returns filed in 1985
and 1988 which allowed him to follow treatment and comparison groups before and
after the tax law change. This identification strategy contrasts with earlier studies
which compare static income distributions over time (Lindsey, 1987; Feenberg and
Poterba, 1993). Using difference-in-differences estimators, Felstein’s estimates of
the elasticity of taxable income to taxation range from 1 to over 3.
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Feldstein’s study generated considerable interest in the response of income to
taxation and gave rise to the “New Tax Responsiveness” literature (Goolsbee, 2000a)
- a class of studies that estimate the elasticity of income to taxation using quasi-
experimental methods. Similar to Feldstein (1995), most of these studies rely on
reforms to the tax code for identification; the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981
(Lindsey, 1987; Navratil, 1995), the Tax Relief Act of 1986 (Auten and Carroll,
1999; Moffitt and Wilhelm, 2000), the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993
(Sammartino and Wiener, 1997; Carroll, 1998; Goolsbee, 2000b), and various state
and federal tax law changes during the 1980’s (Gruber and Saez, 2002). Elasticity
estimates from these other studies range from zero to one (see Gruber and Saez,
2002 for a review).
The general identification problem in the new tax responsiveness literature is
that even though a reform to the tax code generates variation in marginal tax prices;
the actual, observed change in the marginal tax price also reflects changes in income
that are unrelated to the reform. Since unrelated changes in income also affect the
observed change in the marginal tax price, the endogeneity of the tax price may bias
elasticity estimates of income to taxation. Therefore, to identify the structural effect
of taxation on income, an instrument is required to isolate the variation in observed
changes in marginal tax prices which is plausibly attributable to the reform.
The general strategy is to instrument the observed change in the marginal
tax price with the predicted change in the marginal tax price. In most studies,
the predicted change comes from computing the marginal tax price after the reform
based on a single year of prereform earnings (Auten and Carroll, 1999; Gruber
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and Saez, 2002; Saez, 2003; and Looney and Singhal, 2004). The most notable
concern with this method, however, is that the instrument, based on a single year
of prereform earnings, may still be correlated with systemic movements in income
that are unrelated to the reform. In the next section, I discuss this concern in more




The empirical objective is to estimate the effect of taxation on earnings using vari-
ation in marginal tax prices resulting from the implementation of the EGTRRA’s
marriage penalty relief provisions. Consistent with a large class of empirical stud-
ies13, I consider a linear equation which relates changes in earnings to changes in
marginal tax prices. In log form, this equation is given by:
log(yt+1/yt) = α0 + α1log[dt+1(zt+1)/dt(zt)] + (εt+1 − εt). (1.1)
The terms yτ and dt(zτ ) are earnings and the marginal tax price, respectively, in
period τ . The marginal tax price is defined by both the tax law in period τ , dτ (.),
and taxable income, zτ . While yτ may be earnings at either the couple or individual
level, the marginal tax price is determined by combined income among married, joint
13For examples, see Feldstein, 1995; Sammartino and Weiner, 1997; Moffit and Wilhelm, 2000;
Saez, 2003; Gruber and Saez, 2002; and Looney and Singhal, 2004.
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filers. The parameter of interest, α1, is the uncompensated elasticity of earnings to
the marginal tax price. Typically, studies consider two to three year windows when
calculating changes in earnings and marginal tax prices. In this case, the marriage
pentalty relief provisions were implemented in 2003, so periods t and t+1 correspond
to 2002 and 2004, respectively.14
Quasi-experimental variation in the tax policy variable is derived by pooling
treatment and comparison groups into a single sample. In this manner, some of the
variation in the observed change in the marginal tax price reflects the differential ef-
fects of the reform on the function d(.). However, as mentioned above, this variation
in the marginal tax price may also reflect movements in earnings that are unrelated
to the reform; so the actual change in marginal tax prices log[dt+1(zt+1)/dt(zt)]
(henceforth denoted ∆Ad) is likely correlated with unrelated movements in taxable
earnings (εt+1 − εt) (henceforth denoted ∆ε). Therefore, the ordinary least squares
estimate of α1 from equation (1.1) would be biased.
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To consistently estimate α1, an instrumental variable is needed to plausibly
isolate the variation in the observed change in marginal tax price that can be at-
tributable to the reform. A valid instrument must be correlated with ∆Ad, uncorre-
lated with ∆ε, and excludable from equation (1.1). In this study, I use an instrument
that addresses particular concerns with the instrument considered in much of the
14Typically, studies consider two to three year windows when calculating changes in earnings
and marginal tax prices. Feldstein’s (1995) estimates were based on a three year window: 1985
to 1988. Gruber and Saez (2002) vary the difference window from one to three years and find
that their initial estimates are robust to differing window lengths. The administrative data is not
available after 2004, so considering 2005 earnings or after is not possible.
15With a progressive tax schedule, positive shocks to income (∆ε) would be associated with a
decrease of the marginal tax price (∆Ad), resulting in a downward biased OLS estimate of α1.
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tax literature: the predicted change in the marginal tax price based on the average
of multiple years of prereform taxable incomes.
Intuitively, the average of prereform taxable income isolates the effect of time-
invariant factors (at least in the short run) on taxable income. To see this, and to
explicitly outline the assumptions required for this identification strategy, consider
the following model for taxable income,
zτ = β0,τ + β1dτ (xτ ) + β2xτ + φτ , (1.2)
which is the linear form of equation (1.1) with the outcome variable replaced with
taxable income.16 In this model, taxable income is determined by the set of couple
characteristics, xτ , which have a direct effect on taxable income (β2) as well as an
indirect effect through determining the marginal tax price (β1). Assuming xτ , dτ (.),
their effects on taxable income, and the per period fixed effect β0,τ remain constant
during the years considered, equation (1.2) can be expressed as,
zτ = γ + φτ , (1.3)
where γ is the effect of time-invariant factors on joint taxable income. Using multiple
years of prereform earnings, which strengthens the assumption that dτ (.) has not
changed, the estimate of γ is taken as z̄t,m = mean{zt, z̃t−1, ..., z̃t−m}. The subscript
m indicates the number of lags of prereform taxable income used to estimate the
fixed effect, and the tilde above zt−m implies that taxable income in year t −m is
16This is precisely the model considered in Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000).
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indexed to t dollars.
The instrument, which is the predicted change in marginal tax price based on
the average of multiple years of prereform taxable incomes, is expressed as ∆mP d ≡
log[dt+1(z̄t,m)/dt(z̄t,m)]. Since z̄t,m is interpreted as the fixed component of income
prior to the reform, the instrument measures the predicted change in the marginal
tax price sans a behavioral response to the reform.
As mentioned, other quasi-experimental tax studies instrument the observed
change in the marginal tax price with the predicted change in marginal tax price
based on a single year of prereform earnings (i.e. m = 0). In this case, the instrument
would be ∆0P d ≡ log[dt+1(zt)/dt(zt)], which is the predicted change in the marginal
tax price if real taxable income in period t had remained constant through period
t + 1.
The most notable concern with this strategy is that an instrument based on
a single year of prereform earnings (∆0P d) may be correlated with movements in
income that are unrelated to the reform (∆ε). In the case of quasi-experimental tax
studies, where treated and comparison groups are defined by distinct segments of the
income distribution, the concern is that one income segment may exhibit differential
movements in income relative to another even in the absence of a tax reform (e.g.
systemic mean reversion or changing income inequality). To illustrate how unrelated
movements in income may affect the IV estimate of α1 in equation (1.1), consider
the case where ∆ε = γT (zt) + υ, where γ 6= 0 and Cov(T (zt), υ) = 0 (T(.) is an
indicator function which equals one if treated). Then if ∆0P d = κT (zt) (where κ 6= 0)
19
















. Thus, the IV estimator is inconsistent
- the direction and magnitude of the bias depend on the sign and size of γκ and
the magnitude increases as the correlation between the instrument ∆0P d and the
endogenous variable ∆Ad declines.
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Another concern with this strategy is that observed income in period t is
assumed to be equal to income in period t+1 in the absence of the reform. Implicitly
then, in addition to the assumptions made for the alternative identification strategy
described above, this strategy further assumes that φτ = 0 in equation (1.2). But
if observed income in any given year is recognized to reflect temporaneous shocks
or measurement error, then assignment of couples into treatment and comparison
groups may be imprecise.18 In practice, contaminated treatment and comparison
groups implies mismeasurement of ∆0P d; and since the value of ∆
0
P d is bounded (i.e.
∆0P d equals either 0 or κ), the measurement error is non-classical.
19 Non-classical
measurement error in ∆0P d conceivably decreases cov(∆Ad, ∆
0
P d), magnifying the






There are three methods considered in the quasi-experimental tax literature
to address the omitted variable bias. First, some studies control for mean rever-
17It may be of interest to note that T̄ is depends on the prespecified range of income that defines
the sample of interest. So in this case, the expression for plim α̂1,IV suggests that IV estimates
may be particularly sensitive to sample specification.
18If individuals respond to tax changes associated with their fixed component of taxable income
γ, then contemporaneous shocks and measurement error are synonymous.
19To see this, consider the following model: ∆0P d = ∆T d + u
0
P , where ∆T d is the true indicator
of treatment and u0P is measurement error. Since, u
0
P equals 0 or κ when ∆T d = 0 and equals 0
or −κ when ∆T d = κ, u0P and ∆0P d are likely negatively correlated. See Aigner (1973); Freeman
(1984); and Black, Berger and Scott (2000) for a discussion on non-classical measurement error.
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sion by including base year taxable income, zt, in equation (1.1) (see Gruber and
Saez, 2002; and Looney and Singhal, 2004). However, in quasi-experiments with
only one reform, changes in income due to mean reversion may not be separately
identifed from the response of earnings to the tax reform since both mean reversion
and the predicted change in the marginal tax price are modeled as functions of base
year taxable income (Moffitt and Wilhelm, 2000).20 A second strategy considered
by Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000) is to construct instruments based on specific, time-
invariant factors such as education.21 If these factors are considered exogenous and
time-invariant, at least in the short run, then they are less arguably correlated with
the mean reverting trends in earnings and thus serve as the strongest instruments
(Moffitt and Wilhelm, 2000). And finally, two studies assign observations into treat-
ment and comparison groups based on average prereform and postreform earnings;
Goolsbee (2000b) and Liebman and Saez (2006). But, if there is a behavioral re-
sponse to taxation, postreform earnings would reflect the effect of the reform. As
argued, earnings should be averaged over prereform years only to more convincingly
estimate the fixed effect on taxable income.
The motivation for the identification strategy considered here is similar in spirit
to the latter two strategies outlined above; estimate a couple’s fixed effect on taxable
income by averaging several years of prereform earnings. But given the assumptions
above, the estimated fixed effect reflects the effect of all short-run, time-invariant
factors on taxable income and, in contrast to the strategy considered by Moffitt and
20Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000) also note that the inclusion of base year taxable income changes
the interpretation of α1.
21The consideration of education as exogenous to tax reforms has also been considered in Bludell,
Duncan, and Meghir (1998) and Bernheim, Lemke, and Scholz (2004).
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Wilhelm (2000), is not limited to a particular factor like education. Additionally,
if the model implied by equation (1.3) is correct, then an instrument constructed
from average prereform earnings contains less measurement error compared to an
instrument based on a single year of earnings.
However, there is an inherent trade-off to increasing the number of lags in
prereform taxable income used to estimate the fixed effect z̄t,m. On one hand,
increasing the number of lags may yield a more precise estimate of the fixed effect on
taxable income. On the other hand, factors such as marital status and the number of
dependents, and their effects on taxable earnings, may change over longer periods
of time. Additionally, this strategy is most credible if there were no major tax
law changes which may cause structural shifts in taxable earnings during the years
considered in averaging. Notable changes due to the EGTRRA include the increase
of the child tax credit amount from $500 to $600 (which increased after-tax income
by $100 for each dependent child under age 17) and the introduction of the new
10% tax bracket (which increased after-tax income by $600 for married, joint filers),
both of which were implemented in 2001 (see Table 1.1). In the Results section, I
first present elasticity estimates using an instrument constructed from 2002 taxable
income only. I then consider up to three annual lags of taxable income (the average
of taxable incomes in 2002 through 1999) to construct the instrumental variable. In




For the empirical analysis, I employ a data set unique to the taxation literature:
the 2002 and 2003 March Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS)
linked to the Detailed Earnings Record (DER). The DER is an administrative data
file compiled from individual W-2s submitted to the Internal Revenue Service and
maintained by the Social Security Administration. The DER contains several mea-
sures of income annually from 1978 and 2004, including total wage income, taxable
wage income, Social Security and Medicare taxable wages, and Social Security and
Medicare taxable self-employment income. The disparity between total wage income
and taxable wage income occurs when a portion of total wage income is deferred
from income taxation into 401(k) accounts.22
1.3.3 Definition of Variables
In contrast to previous empirical tax studies, I define the outcome variable as tax-
able earnings (TE) reported in the DER rather than TI. TE is defined as the sum
of taxable wage income plus positive amounts of self-employment income which,
discussed in more detail below, is a fairly accurate approximation of AGI. Thus,
changes in taxable earnings potentially reflect the amount and intensity of work,
the type compensation received, the willingness to report income, and changes in
income deferred into 401(k) accounts. Other margins of response measured by TI
22Since 401(k) contributions are subject to payroll taxation, total wage income generally equals
Social Security and Medicare taxable wages. These definitions may be different if (1) total wage
income exceeds the Social Security tax base or (2) the employee’s job is not covered by Social
Security.
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(i.e. other sources of income, personal exemptions, and deductions) are not reflected
in TE.
Although the outcome measure is TE, a measure of TI is still required to deter-
mine marginal tax rates. There are two limitations of the CPS-DER matched data
regarding the imputation of TI. First, taxable wage income and self-employment
income (Schedule C income) are just two of several sources of income subject to
taxation. Other sources of income that would otherwise increase TI are not con-
tained in the CPS-DER. Additionally, the DER only reports positive values of self-
employment income.23 This is potentially problematic since self-employment income
losses can be claimed to reduce TI.
The second limitation is that the CPS-DER does not indicate whether the cou-
ple claims the standard deduction or itemizes their deductions and, in the latter case,
the precise deduction amount. One option is to assign the standard deduction to all
households. But a significant number of joint filers itemize their deductions, achiev-
ing considerably larger deductions compared to the standard deduction amount.
Therefore, arbitrary assignment of the standard deduction to all households may
severely bias the assignment of couples into treatment and comparison groups.
To examine further the prevalence and amounts of itemized deductions, as
well as the performance of the other variable specifications, I examine the 2001
version of the Statistics of Income (SOI) Public Use Tax File. The SOI, compiled
from tax returns filed with the Internal Revenue Service, contains 143,221 records
23The omission of negative self employment income occurs because only self-employment income
above $400 is subject to the self-employment tax (the self-employment tax is the self-employment
income equivalent to the Social Security tax levied on wage and salary income).
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representing the 130.6 million tax returns filed for tax year 2001. Using the SOI,
I can compare actual income variables to income variables computed using only
the information that would be available had it been the CPS-DER (e.g. actual
AGI versus taxable earnings). Restricting the sample to incomes that adequately
span the treated and comparison groups, analysis of the Statistics of Income sample
reveals two potential concerns (details are provided in appendix).24 First, among the
range of treated and comparison couples, taxable earnings captures 95.1% of actual
AGI (taxable earnings is referred to as AGI-DER in appendix). The disparity arises
most notably from pension income, IRA disbursements and taxable social security
benefits, which cumulatively represent 3.6% of AGI. Thus, the CPS-DER sample
used in the empirical analysis are restricted to ages that are less likely to receive
these alternative sources of income.25
The second, more acute issue is that approximately 81.0% of couples within
this income range itemized their deductions, receiving $15,262 (in 2002 dollars) in
deductions compared to the standard deduction amount of $7,850 in 2002.26 There-
fore, I assign the average standard deduction by state calculated from the Statistics
of Income to couples in the CPS-DER by state of residence.27 Generally, when a
precise measure of taxable income is not available, many studies neglect itemized
24The SOI sample is restricted to couples whose AGI-DER fall between $55k and $95k. I further
restrict the sample to joint filers (1) who file a 1040 for tax year 2001, (2) who do not have farm
income, (3) whose dependents are exclusively own children (whether living at home or not), (4)
who either standardize or itemize their deductions, and (5) whose state of residence is reported.
25The SOI does not contain age, so checking the performance of a sample selection criterion
based on age is not possible.
26According to the SOI 2001, approximately two-thirds of all married, joint filers itemize their
deductions.
27Sincere mortgage interest payments are tax deductible, home ownership reported in the CPS
may be used to improve the imputation of deductions. However, in the income range considered,
nearly all couples in the CPS own or are paying a mortgage on their residence.
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deductions (Looney and Singhal, 2004; Dokko, (2005). Other studies assign aver-
age deductions by adjusted gross income class (for example, Moffitt and Wilhelm,
2000). However, I impute deductions by adjusted gross income class and state of
residence given the strong correlation between state of residence and average de-
ductions, which is associated with differing state income tax laws and prevalence of
home ownership.28
1.3.4 CPS-DER Sample Selection
Because the marriage penalty relief provisions differentially affected joint filers, the
specified population of interest is married couples. I first restrict the sample to
single family households where only the married couple and (if applicable) own
child dependents reside in the home.29 I also delete couples who report positive farm
income in the CPS since farm income may receive special tax treatment. Among
the 156,575 interviewed households, 75,333 households remain after these selection
criteria are imposed (a complete list of criteria and sample counts are provided in
Table 1.2).
Because the DER is the primary source of income data examined in the anal-
ysis, the sample is further restricted to couples which both husband and wife are
matched to the DER.30 Of the 75,333 remaining households, 6.2% of married cou-
28State income taxes paid and mortgage interest payments are related to itemization since these
expenditures may be deducted from taxable income. In the appendix, I present auxiliary analysis
on the relationship between the prevalence of deduction itemization by state (estimated from the
SOI) with both average state income tax liability and home ownership.
29I assume all children in the household under age 17 are claimed for the child tax credit and
all children in the household under age 19 or under age 24 and attending school are claimed as
dependents.
30A match is determined by whether the couple reported social security numbers at the time
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ples were excluded because just one spouse was linked to administrative data, and
another 22.0% were excluded because neither spouse was linked. Thus, 71.8% of
couples remain after this selection criterion is imposed.
Sample summary statistics by whether both spouses are linked to adminis-
trative data are presented in Table 1.3. In general, matched couples seem to be
more educated, younger, employed, and have children. To plausibly preserve the
representation of the CPS-DER matched sample to the original CPS sample of mar-
ried couples, I divide the sample into cells with respect to the husband’s education,
wife’s education, and number of children. The sample weights within each cell
among CPS-DER matched couples were then rescaled to sum to the sum of weights
within each corresponding cell among the full sample of CPS couples. Assuming
that matched and non-matched couples are similar conditional on educational at-
tainment and number of children, this method preserves the representation of the
CPS-DER sample relative to the full CPS sample of married couples. The reported
results reflect the use of these rescaled weights and are not substantively different
than the results using the original sampling weights.
The sample is further restricted to couples whose joint taxable earnings is
between $55k and $95k in 2002. This range of AGI-DER adequately spans the
treated and comparison groups because TI is much less than AGI on average (see
of the CPS interview. The DER file only contains observations of individuals who have at least
one W-2 issued between 1978 and 2004. Therefore, it may be the case that a survey respondent
provided the necessary information for an administrative match but is not observed in the DER.
To identify those who provide information for a match regardless of previous earnings, I merge
the CPS to the Summary Earnings Record, a separate data source that contains information such
as dates of birth and death. Since a Summary Earnings Record exists for all those with social
security numbers regardless of one’s earnings history, I define an administrative match according
to a match to the Summary Earnings Record.
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Treated (%) in appendix Table B.2). To plausibly increase the accuracy of the
CPS-DER measure of TI, I restrict the sample to couples where at least one of
the members are between the ages of 24 and 50. This restriction not only reduces
the likelihood that the couple receives other sources of income but also reduces the
potential for retirement behavior to confound the empirical results.
Based on this sample, I calculate marginal tax rates which reflect federal, state,
and payroll taxes using NBER’s TAXSIM model (see appendix for details on the
computation of tax parameters). Because the DER data is confidential, I can not
remotely submit the data to the TAXSIM model. Thus, I first calculate marginal
tax rates for hypothetical data of married couples that contains all combinations
of (1) $100 increments of joint taxable earnings from $100 to $200,000, (2) zero to
seven children satisfying the dependent exemption criteria, (3) zero to seven children
satisfying the child tax credit criteria, and (4) state of residence. I then merge these
tax parameters to the CPS-DER based on these four dimensions. Eight observations
were dropped because the number of dependent children exceeded seven.
The next sample selection criterion arises because the outcome variable in
equation (1.1) is not defined for individuals with zero TE. I restrict the sample to
couples where the husband has non-zero taxable earnings in 2002 and 2004, which
is the case for 96.3% (96.7% weighted) of all couples. In this manner, the number of
household and husband observations are the same, but the sample is reduced when
examining changes in taxable earnings among wives.31 From the remaining couples,
31There may be responses at the extensive margin due to EGTRRA. However, since labor force
participation is theoretically predicated on average tax rates, measuring these extensive-margin
effects requires informed imputations of counterfactual average tax rates which is beyond the
scope of the study here.
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fifty four observations were deleted because their 2004 taxable earnings rounded to
$100 was $0 or greater than $200,000.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Source of Variation and Preliminary Results
Summary statistics for the remaining sample are provided in Table 1.4. I first divide
the remaining 12,721 couples into three groups - comparison group one (49.8%),
treated (19.6%), and comparison group two (30.6%) - identified by the predicted
change in federal marginal tax prices based on 2002 earnings only.
Presented in panel A, the average predicted change in the log marginal tax
price is .190 for treated couples which implies that, on average, treated couples would
have experienced a 19.0% increase in marginal, after-tax wages had income remained
constant from 2002 to 2004. This compares to an average change of -.001 and .039
for couples in comparison groups one and two, respectively. These predicted changes
are strongly correlated with realized changes in marginal tax prices, which are also
presented in panel A of Table 1.4. Regressing the observed change in the marginal
tax price between 2002 and 2004 on the instrument constructed based on 2002
earnings singly yields a first-stage estimate of .893 (.009) (F-statistic: 8501). When
average earnings from 2002 through 1999 are used to construct the instrument, the
first-stage estimate declines to .262 (.014) (F-statistic: 375), which is expected since
the instrument is defined as the predicted change in the marginal tax price between
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2002 and 2004 based on average, prereform earnings in both years.32
In panel B, I report average nominal changes in log taxable earnings between
2002 and 2004. At both the joint and individual levels, the average change in
earnings are greater among the treated group relative to both comparison groups.
The average increase in log taxable income among husbands in the treated group is
.025, compared to .004 and .010 among husbands in comparison groups one and two,
respectively. The average increase in log taxable income among wives in comparison
group one, the treated group, and comparison group two is .051, .080, and .033,
respectively.
One important aspect of this quasi-experiment that requires mention is the
differential effects of the reform on couples in comparison group one relative to
comparison group two. Although there were no substantial differences in the pre-
dicted change in the marginal tax price, indicated in panel A, there is a difference in
the predicted change in average tax rates between these two groups. In particular,
comparison group two couples would have approximately $7,500 ($54,194-$46,700)
more in pre-tax income shifted from the the 27% tax bracket to the 15% bracket,
generating a possible income effect among comparison group two couples relative to
comparison group one couples. However, the change in marginal tax rates generates
a substitution effect among comparison group two couples as well, and whether the
income or substitution dominates is theoretically ambiguous.
There are two measures of labor supply to consider when evaluating this in-
32The sample is restricted from 12,721 observations to 9,914 observations when the instrument
is constructed from four years of prereform earnings. Details on this restriction is given in the
Results section.
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come effect; labor force participation and taxable earnings. A priori, one would
predict a relative decline in labor force participation and taxable earnings among
comparison group two relative to comparison group one. These predictions are most
evident among wives. First, there was a relative decline in wife labor force partici-
pation of -1.6% points (t-stat: -2.58) among comparison group two couples relative
to comparison group one. And second, there is a difference of -.018 (t-stat: -1.24)
in the average change in log taxable earnings among wives in comparison group two
couples relative to comparison group one. While these figures suggest that labor
force participation and earnings are sensitive to changes in after-tax income among
wives, these results may simply reflect reversion to the mean. In the empirical sec-
tion, I first estimate equation (1.1) ignoring differential changes in after-tax income
between the two comparison groups. I then control for systemic differences between
the two comparison groups by including an indicator variable signifying comparison
group two.33
In panel F, I provide basic demographic information to assess whether treat-
ment and comparison groups are indeed comparable. First, the average age of both
husbands and wives does not vary substantially across these groups. But surpris-
ingly, given the narrow range of incomes considered, educational attainment of both
husband and wife and the probability of having a child do differ considerably across
these groups. In the specification check section, I estimate alternatives to the base-
33In theory, one should include a measure of virtual income in the baseline specification to control
for differential changes in after-tax income. However, the calculation of virtual income requires
longitudinal information on gross wages which, without imposing fairly restrictive assumptions on
the data, are not available. Furthermore, changes to virtual income is not a smooth function of
changes in after-tax income, so including after-tax income explicitly is not considered.
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line specification which controls for these factors. I then consider heterogeneous
effects of taxation along these dimensions.
1.4.2 Baseline Results
I first present estimation results using the estimation strategy used in much of the
quasi-experimental tax literature: instrument the actual, observed change in the log
marginal tax price using an instrument constructed from 2002 income singly. The
baseline elasticity estimates, at both the joint and individual levels, are presented
in Table 1.5.
The elasticity estimate of joint earnings is most directly comparable to other
estimates in the tax literature. This is because, as mentioned, tax studies that use
tax return data are limited to estimating the response of income or earnings at the
joint level. As indicated in Table 1.5, the magnitude of the estimated elasticity of
joint taxable earnings is .063 (.063) and statistically insignificant. This estimate falls
among the low end of estimates in this literature and is comparable to the estimated
elasticity of joint broad income of .071 (.130) reported in Gruber and Saez (2002).34
Using the same identification strategy, I consider heterogeneous effects of tax-
ation among husbands and wives separately. To estimate the response among hus-
bands, I replace the outcome variable with the earnings of the husband only. For
wives, I first condition the sample on wives who have positive earnings in both 2002
and 2004, decreasing the sample from 12,721 to 10,353. I then estimate equation
34The empirical strategy in Gruber and Saez (2002) is similar to the one employed here. The
identification comes from various state and federal tax studies from 1979 and 1990 using a panel
of tax returns filed over the same period. The estimate cited corresponds to married filers with
incomes above $10k in 1992 dollars where observations are weighted by income.
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(1.1) with changes in wive’s earnings as the outcome variable. Because of this sam-
ple respecification for wives, and since all outcome variables are specified in logs,
the joint elasticity estimate is not linear in the individual level elasticity estimates.
As indicated, the resulting elasticity estimates for husbands and wives are fairly
comparable: .164 (.112) and .135 (.179) among husbands and wives, respectively.
Neither estimate is statistically significant. Comparable, individual elasticity esti-
mates between husbands and wives is consistent with individual elasticity estimates
reported in Looney and Singhal (2004): .411 (.464) and .360 (.665) among husbands
and wives, respectively. However, the point estimates of Looney and Singhal are
larger in magnitude.35
1.4.3 Elasticity Estimates Using Alternative Instrumental
Variables
I next consider the same estimation equation (1.1) but instead calculate the pre-
dicted change in the marginal tax price based on average earnings from 2002 back to
1999. As argued, instruments based on average prereform earnings serve to attenu-
ate the plausible bias that may arise when the instrument is based on 2002 earnings
singly.
A series of joint earnings elasticity estimates are presented in Table 1.6. The
baseline estimate is located in the first row and first specification column. Each other
35A notable difference between their quasi-experiment and the one considered here is that the
marginal tax rate changes they consider are anticipated. Thus, the theoretical response of taxable
earnings may be larger in their case since the response is not confounded by lifetime wealth effects.
MaCurdy (1981) discusses this point in detail.
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cell represents an estimate from a single regression and corresponds to changes to
the empirical specification along two dimensions. The first dimension, which varies
by row, is the number of lag years used to construct the instrumental variable. The
number of years of prereform earnings used is indicated in the first column: the
expression ∆mP d implies that the instrument is calculated using m lags of annual
prereform earnings. Thus, the entire first row corresponds to a series of estimates
when the instrumental variable is constructed from 2002 earnings only.
The second dimension, which varies by column, is different sample specifica-
tions. When using the alternative instruments, which are based on average earnings,
I drop observations whose average earnings also fall outside the earnings range of
interest; $55k through $95k. Arguably, if the average earnings falls outside of this
range, the couple is less likely to be treated or, if previously in a comparison group,
less comparable to treated couples. Sample specification (2) consists of all couples
in specification (1) less couples whose average earnings in 2002 and 2001 is less than
$55k or greater than $95k. In specifications (3) and (4), the sample is further re-
stricted to couples whose average earnings from 2002 to 2000 (and average earnings
from 2002 to 1999 for specification (4)) also lies within the income range.
When using the alternative instruments, I first consider the cases where the
instrumental variable and the sample specifications align. Estimates in these cases
are located along the the diagonal in Table 1.6. When average earnings in 2002 and
2001 are used to estimate the predicted effect of the reform on marginal tax prices,
the joint taxable earnings elasticity increases from .063 (.063) to .140 (.087). And
when the instrument is constructed from average earnings in 2002 through 2000 and
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2002 through 1999, the estimate increases to .164 (.139) and .206 (.177), respec-
tively. Thus, the point estimate appears to increase monotonically as the number
of lags used in the computing the instrumental variable increases and, in the final
specification, is over three times the estimate when a single year of prereform earn-
ings are used. However, all estimates remain rather imprecise and not statistically
significant.
To suggest that the new elasticity estimates in row (2), specification (2); row
(3), specification (3); and row (4), specification (4) are not driven by sample selection
bias, I reestimate the elasticity using the baseline instruments among the new sample
specifications (2) through (4). These estimates are presented in the off diagonal of
Table 1.6. Generally, the elasticity estimates do not vary considerably across the
different sample specifications when the instrumental variable specification is held
fixed.
I next estimate the elasticity of taxable earnings for husbands and wives sepa-
rately. Again, these estimates are generally not estimable using administrative tax
return data since most married couples file, and therefore report income, jointly.
Elasticity estimates for husbands and wives are presented in panels A and B in
Table 1.7, respectively. For husbands, constructing the instrument using average
earnings in 2002 and 2001 rather than 2002 earnings singly increases the point es-
timate from .164 (.112) to .421 (.175) and becomes significant at the 5% level of
confidence (row (1), specification (1) compared to row (2), specification(2)). The
estimate using 2002 through 2000 earnings further increases the estimate to .618
(.248), but averaging back to 1999 increases the estimate slightly to .664 (.310). As
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with the joint earnings elasticities, these elasticity estimates appear robust to the
different sample specifications when the instrumental variable specification remains
fixed.
In contrast to husbands, there is no discernable pattern in elasticity estimates
among married wives when the instrument is constructed from multiple years of
prereform earnings relative to using a single year of earnings. In Table B of Ta-
ble (1.7), the estimated elasticities using one, two, three, and four year averages are
.135 (.179), -.205 (.213), .208 (.286), and .211 (.443), respectively. Although the
subsequent point estimates are considerable compared to the baseline estimate of
.135, all estimates are highly imprecise.
1.4.4 Specification Checks
I next a consider set of specification checks relevant to the empirical analysis thus
far. These checks and the corresponding elasticity estimates are presented in Ta-
ble 1.8. Because the previous results indicate that much of the behavioral response
of earnings among married couples is driven by husbands, the subsequent analysis
considers earnings of married men only. Unless otherwise noted, sample specification
(4) from the previous analysis is the population of interest.36
I first consider whether the baseline elasticity estimates are robust to the
inclusion of additional controls. The set of observable characteristics include the
educational attainment of both the husband and wife, labor force participation of
36Similar to the baseline results, estimates from the specification checks are robust to the different
sample specifications; so the estimates from these other sample specifications are supressed for
brevity.
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the wife, number of dependent children, and state fixed effects. As indicated in
Table 1.8, estimates after the inclusion of these additional variables are very similar
to the baseline estimates.
I next consider including an indicator variable signifying control group two.
As mentioned, the predicted change in after-tax income for comparison group two is
somewhat larger relative to comparison group one and the treatment group. Thus,
the inclusion of a comparision group fixed effect serves to control for this systemic
difference among comparison group two couples. As indicated in Table 1.8, the
inclusion of this control variable has little effect on the baseline estimates.
Another deviation from the baseline specifications is to use the alternative
instruments on the full sample without dropping observations based on average
earnings. The estimates among the unadulterated sample are presented in row four
of Table 1.8. Although the elasticity estimates among the constant sample are
generally smaller than the baseline estimates, the elasticity estimates do increase
monotically and become statistically significant as additional years of lagged earn-
ings are used to construct the instrument variable.
The final specification check arises because the change in the marginal tax
price may reflect a change in the dependent status of a child. Since this source of
change to tax prices is largely anticipated, so that the response is not confounded
by a lifetime wealth effect, the baseline elasticity estimates may be biased upward.37
The distinction between anticipated and unanticipated changes in marginal tax rates
37See MaCurdy (1981) for a discusssion on the labor supply response to either anticipated or
unanticipated changes to wages.
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has been the focus of recent tax studies (Looney and Singhal, 2004; Dokko, 2005).
To suggest that the elasticity estimates largely reflect the effect of the reform
and not a result of anticipated changes in dependency status of children, I restrict the
sample to the 9,381 couples whose number of eligible dependents remains constant
from 2002 and 2004. These estimates are presented in the last row of Table 1.8.
As suggest by theory, the elasticity estimates are somewhat smaller than when the
sample is restricted to couples whose predicted change in marginal tax rates do
not reflect a change in dependency status. But the estimates are not considerably
different from the baseline elasticity estimates among the full sample of married
men.
1.4.5 Heterogeneous Effects
Using the detailed demographic data contained in CPS, the sample of married men
can be split across certain demographic dimensions to estimates heterogeneous re-
sponses of earnings to taxation. Estimated elasticities among subgroups of married
men, along with the baseline estimates among all married men, are presented in
Table 1.9.
According to Table 1.4, educational attainment of husbands differs consider-
ably across the treatment and comparison groups; however, there is also considerable
variation in educational attainment within groups. Thus, I first consider whether
estimated elasticities for married men with some college experience or beyond are
substantively different than men with no college experience. According to Table 1.9,
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the estimate elasticity among uneducated versus educated married men are similar
when the instrument is constructed from 2002 earnings only: .175 (.196) and .216
(.111) among the uneducated and educated, respectively. However, constructing the
instrument based on average earnings increases the estimated elasticities consider-
ably among married men with some college relative to married men with no college.
In particular, by using average earnings from 2002 through 1999, the estimated
elasticity increases to .657 (.338) compared to the baseline estimate of .138. The
elasticity estimates among married men with no college experience, on the other
hand, increases to just .468 (.695).
Also in Table 1.4, the percent married couples with a child in the household
also varies across the treatment and comparison groups. However, nearly three
fourths of the total sample (approximately 85% of the unweighted sample) has a
child; so splitting the sample based on the presence of a child would yield a small
sample of households without children. Nevertheless, I consider estimating the re-
sponse of husbands’ earnings separately for those who have a child residing in the
household and those who do not. These estimates are presented in the last two rows
of Table 1.9. Using the alternative instruments (i.e. column (4)), the results suggest
that the elasticity among households without a child is nearly twice as large as that
of households with at least one child: 1.22 (1.11) and .581 (.304) among the former
and latter, respectively.
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1.5 Discussion and Conclusion
The empirical objective of this study is to estimate the elasticity of taxable earnings
to taxation. There are a few substantive contributions of this paper to the existing
“New Tax Responsiveness” literature. First, to my knowledge, no other tax study
has considered identifying the effect of taxation from the implementation of the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001. Additionally, the
data used in the analysis - the March CPS linked to the Detailed Earnings Record
- is unique to the taxation literature.
Second, the identification strategy considered in this study addresses a key
concern for the identification strategy considered in much of the taxation literature.
In particular, I construct instrumental variables that are the predicted change in
marginal tax prices based on the average of multiple years of pre-reform earnings.
Authors of previous tax studies construct instruments using only one year of pre-
reform earnings to construct instruments. The concern with this instrument is that
systemic mean reversion to or measurement error in earnings may generate biased
elasticity estimates of earnings to taxation. These concern are arguably address
by constructing instruments based on the average of multiple years of pre-reform
earnings, which essentially serves as an estimate of an couple’s fixed effect.
The use of these alternative instruments appear to considerably increase the
estimated elasticities of taxable earnings at the joint and husband earnings levels
compared to elasticity estimate derived from instruments based on a single year of
pre-reform earnings. The estimated elasticities among married women using these
40
alternative instruments, however, appear mixed.
And finally, the response of earnings to taxation may be examined at the in-
dividual level among married couples and across different demographic dimensions.
Generally, tax studies conducted using administrative tax return data are limited
in both regards. The results suggest that the elasticity of earnings to taxation are
greater among married men than women; changes in earnings at the joint level may
mask important behavioral variation in taxable earnings at the individual level. Fur-
thermore, the response of taxable earnings appear larger among educated, married
men. This suggests that married, educated men may simply be more sensitive to
changes in marginal tax prices or that they have more discretion in the determining
taxable earnings through 401(k) contributions or types and amounts of compen-
sation. Examining these particular margins of behavioral response is a promising
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Figure 1.1: Federal marginal tax rate by adjusted gross income (2002 dollars) for
married couples in tax years 2002 and 2004. The standard deduction was assigned
for all households and children were assumed to satisfy the eligibility criteria for
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Figure 1.2: Distribution of Adjusted Gross Income for married couples and percent
of couples whose taxable income was between $47,900 and $55,394 (in 2002 dollars).
This taxable income range defines the couples whose predicted federal marginal
tax rate would decline from 27% to 15% from 2002 and 2004 due to the marriage
penalty relief provisions (increase in the standard deduction and 15% tax bracket for
married, joint filers). Couples with adjusted gross incomes above $200,000 are not
shown which represent 5.4% of the weighted sample. Data for this figure come from
the 2001 version of the Statistics of Income. Refer to appendix for a description of






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 1.2: Sample Selection: Married Couples
CPS-DER Match Data: 2003
Survey Year 2002 2003 Total
Primary Family Husband/Wife* 40,839 40,603 81442
Farm Income, Delete 37,737 37,596 75,333
Couple DER Match 27,663 26,389 54,052
Joint Taxable Earnings: $55k-$95k 8,089 7,623 15,712
Age: 25-49 6,810 6,440 13,250
Dependent Children>7 6,807 6,435 13,242
Husband LFP: 2002 and 2004 6,574 6,201 12,775
$0=Round(Actual 2004 Income)>$200k 6,548 6,173 12,721
Final Sample 6,548 6,173 12,721
There were 156,575 households interviewed in the 2002 and 2003 March Supplement of the Current Population
Survey. * includes single family households headed by husband and wife, excluding armed service members.
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics on CPS-DER Match among Married Couples: 2003
Husband Wife
No Match Match t-stat No Match Match t-stat
Education (%)
Less than HS 15.2 12.2 7.7 13.3 9.5 10.9
HS 30.8 28.4 4.8 34.8 31.9 5.5
Some College/Associate 22.8 25.2 -5.0 24.8 27.9 -6.4
College and Beyond 31.2 34.1 -5.6 27.1 30.6 -6.8
Age Distribution (%)
<25 1.6 1.7 -0.6 3.2 3.3 -0.5
25-34 15.6 15.7 -0.2 18.0 19.1 -2.5
35-44 22.2 25.1 -6.2 23.4 26.1 -5.5
45-54 21.6 24.5 -6.3 21.8 23.9 -4.6
55-64 18.4 16.1 5.7 16.9 14.5 6.1
>65 20.7 16.9 8.7 16.7 13.1 9.2
White (%) 87.9 87.8 0.3 87.4 87.4 0.0
Labor Force Status (%)
Working 71.1 75.0 -7.8 55.5 61.9 -11.6
Unemployed 3.1 3.3 -1.2 1.8 2.4 -3.4
Not in Labor Force 25.8 21.7 8.7 42.6 35.7 12.8
Earnings by Labor Status ($)
Working 55,248 58,543 -3.6 31,248 30,255 1.7
Unemployed 30,219 31,392 -0.3 21,869 12,641 1.4
Not in Labor Force 3,817 3,826 0.0 1,427 1,508 -0.5
Children (%)
0 52.9 42.4 18.9
1 18.4 20.6 -4.8
2 17.8 24.0 -13.2
>3 10.8 13.0 -5.9
Figures were estimated from the remaining CPS-DER sample up to and including the sample restriction regarding
positive farm income (see Table 1.2). Thus, statistics are calculated based on 75,333 couples; 54,052 of which
provided the necessary information required to link both husband and wife to administrative data.
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Table 1.4: Summary Statistics
Group Comparison 1 Treated Comparison 2 Total
Observations (unweighted) 6,468 2,501 3,752 12,721
Distribution (%) 49.8 19.6 30.6 100.0
A. Avg. change in marginal
tax prices (2002 to 2004):
Predicted -0.001 0.190 0.039 0.049
(0.004) (0.017) (0.043) (0.076)
Actual 0.000 0.179 0.058 0.053
(0.065) (0.073) (0.114) (0.108)
B. Avg. taxable earnings (2002) ($):
Household 63,460 74,915 85,989 72,604
(5505) (4486) (5316) (11189)
Husband 43,798 50,162 57,197 49,148
(14978) (17040) (18683) (17598)
Wife* 23,155 28,283 32,416 27,079
(12663) (13900) (15828) (14556)
C. Avg. change in log taxable
earnings (2002 to 2004):
Household 0.030 0.036 0.022 0.029
(0.345) (0.292) (0.302) (0.322)
Husband 0.004 0.025 0.010 0.010
(0.571) (0.499) (0.476) (0.530)
Wife* 0.051 0.080 0.033 0.051
(0.785) (0.679) (0.656) (0.726)
D. Labor force participation
of wife (%):
2002 84.9 87.5 88.8 86.6
(35.8) (33.1) (31.5) (34.0)
2004 83.5 85.6 85.8 84.6
(37.1) (35.1) (34.9) (36.1)
2002 and 2004 79.2 82.3 83.0 81.0
(40.6) (38.1) (37.5) (39.2)
E. 401(k) contributions:
Contributors (%) 62.9 69.1 75.9 68.1
(48.3) (46.2) (42.8) (46.6)
Amount Contributing* ($) 3,040 4,044 4,834 3,853
(2540) (3142) (3579) (3153)
F. Demographic characteristics:
Some college, husband (%) 62.8 67.2 73.6 66.9
(48.3) (47.0) (44.1) (47.0)
Some college, wife (%) 63.9 71.0 75.4 68.8
(48.0) (45.4) (43.1) (46.3)
Age, husband 39.7 40.5 40.9 40.2
(7.5) (7.7) (7.7) (7.7)
Age, wife 37.6 38.3 38.9 38.1
(7.2) (7.1) (7.4) (7.2)
Children (%) 81.1 70.8 66.9 74.8
(39.1) (45.5) (47.1) (43.4)
Statistics calculated among the 12,721 couples retained for the empirical analysis. Unless otherwise noted, all
figures are weighted. Couples are assigned into groups by their predicted change in federal marginal tax prices
between 2002 and 2004 based on 2002 earnings only. * Average earnings and contributions are conditional on
working and contributing, respectively.
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Table 1.5: Taxable Earnings Elasticities by Earnings Level
IV Estimates: Instrument based on 2002 earnings only
Earnings Level Joint Husband Wife
∆Ad 0.063 0.164 0.135
[0.063] [0.112] [0.179]
Constant 0.026 0.001 0.044
[0.008]** [0.009] [0.013]**
Observations 12721 12721 10353
Estimation equation: ∆y = α0 + α1∆Ad + ∆ε. ∆y is the log change in taxable earnings and ∆Ad is the change in log marginal tax
price, both between 2002 and 2004. Robust standard errors are clustered by state. * and ** imply significance at the 5% and 1%
levels, respectively.
Table 1.6: Taxable Earnings Elasticities - Joint Earnings
IV Estimates: Alternative Instrumental Variables
Sample Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Instrument for ∆Ad:
∆0P d 0.063 0.063 0.051 0.064
[0.063] [0.069] [0.070] [0.077]
∆1P d 0.14 0.106 0.12
[0.087] [0.092] [0.101]




Observations 12721 11386 10534 9914
Estimation equation: ∆y = α0 + α1∆Ad + ∆ε. ∆y is the log change in taxable earnings and ∆Ad is the change in log marginal tax
price, both between 2002 and 2004. The latter is instrumented with ∆mP d - the predicted change based averaged real earnings over
m lags. Observations decline across columns because real average earnings falls outside the earnings range of interest; $55k to $95k.
Robust standard errors are clustered by state. * and ** imply significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.7: Taxable Earnings Elasticities - Individual Earnings
IV Estimates: Alternative Instrumental Variables
Sample Specification (1) (2) (3) (4)
Instrument for ∆Ad:
A. Husbands
∆0P d 0.164 0.206 0.177 0.204
[0.112] [0.123] [0.112] [0.114]
∆1P d 0.421 0.361 0.427
[0.175]* [0.187] [0.219]




Observations 12721 11386 10534 9914
B. Wives
∆0P d 0.135 0.094 0.165 0.081
[0.179] [0.167] [0.157] [0.141]
∆1P d -0.205 -0.165 -0.226
[0.213] [0.202] [0.193]




Observations 10353 9309 8645 8163
Estimation equation: ∆y = α0 + α1∆Ad + ∆ε. ∆y is the log change in taxable earnings and ∆Ad is the change in log marginal tax
price, both between 2002 and 2004. The latter is instrumented with ∆mP d - the predicted change based averaged real earnings over
m lags. Observations decline across columns because real average earnings falls outside the earnings range of interest; $55k to $95k.
Robust standard errors are clustered by state. * and ** imply significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.8: Taxable Earnings Elasticities -Husband Earnings
Specification Checks








Baseline Estimates 0.204 0.427 0.646 0.664
(N=9914) [0.114] [0.219] [0.274]* [0.310]*
Inclusion of Covariates 0.192 0.378 0.615 0.632
(N=9914) [0.114] [0.216] [0.291]* [0.311]*
Group 2 Control 0.202 0.424 0.65 0.685
(N=9914) [0.114] [0.219] [0.274]* [0.309]*
Non-Restricted Sample 0.164 0.364 0.446 0.444
(N=12721) [0.112] [0.148]* [0.222]* [0.322]
Change in Dependency Status 0.185 0.411 0.550 0.602
(N=9381) [0.117] [0.221] [0.270]* [0.296]*
Estimation equation: ∆y = α0 + α1∆Ad + ∆ε. ∆y is the log change in taxable earnings and ∆Ad is the change in log marginal tax
price, both between 2002 and 2004. The latter is instrumented with ∆mP d - the predicted change based averaged real earnings over
m lags. Observations decline across columns because real average earnings falls outside the earnings range of interest; $55k to $95k.
Robust standard errors are clustered by state. * and ** imply significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 1.9: Taxable Earnings Elasticities -Husband Earnings
Heterogeneous Effects








Baseline Estimates 0.204 0.427 0.646 0.664
(N=9914) [0.114] [0.219] [0.274]* [0.310]*
No College Experience 0.175 0.183 0.475 0.493
(N=3167) [0.196] [0.420] [0.499] [0.557]
College Experience 0.216 0.554 0.723 0.697
(N=6747) [0.111] [0.217]* [0.263]** [0.373]
No Child in Household 0.804 0.814 1.327 1.221
(N=1556) [0.482] [0.563] [0.905] [1.107]
Child in Household 0.041 0.351 0.533 0.581
(N=8358) [0.111] [0.184] [0.270] [0.304]
Estimation equation: ∆y = α0 + α1∆Ad + ∆ε. ∆y is the log change in taxable earnings and ∆Ad is the change in log marginal tax
price, both between 2002 and 2004. The latter is instrumented with ∆mP d - the predicted change based averaged real earnings over
m lags. Observations decline across columns because real average earnings falls outside the earnings range of interest; $55k to $95k.
Robust standard errors are clustered by state. * and ** imply significance at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Chapter 2
Aching to Retire? The Rise in the Full Retirement Age and
its Impact on the Disability Rolls (with Mark Duggan and
Jae Song)
Abstract: The Social Security Amendments of 1983 reduced the generosity of So-
cial Security retired worker benefits in the U.S. by increasing the program’s full
retirement age from 65 to 67 and increasing the penalty for claiming benefits at
the early retirement age of 62. These changes were phased in gradually, so that
individuals born in or before 1937 were unaffected and those born in 1960 or later
were fully affected. No corresponding changes were made to the program’s disabled
worker benefits, and thus the relative generosity of Social Security Disability In-
surance (SSDI) benefits increased. In this paper, we investigate the effect of the
Amendments on SSDI enrollment by exploiting variation across birth cohorts in the
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policy-induced reduction in the present value of retired worker benefits. Our find-
ings indicate that the Amendments significantly increased SSDI enrollment since
1983, with an additional 0.6 percent of men and 0.9 percent of women between the
ages of 45 and 64 receiving SSDI benefits in 2005 as a result of the changes. Our
results further indicate that these effects will continue to increase during the next
two decades, as those fully exposed to the reduction in retirement benefit generosity
reach their fifties and early sixties.
2.1 Introduction
During the last two decades, the fraction of adults in the U.S. receiving benefits from
the Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program has steadily increased. For
example, among individuals between the ages of 45 and 64, the rate of SSDI en-
rollment rose from 4.5 percent in 1983 to 6.7 percent by 2005. A similarly striking
increase occurred for younger workers, with the fraction of 25 to 44-year old workers
on SSDI rising from 0.7 to 1.6 percent during this same period. A number of ex-
planations have been advanced for the growth in SSDI enrollment, including a 1984
policy change that liberalized the program’s medical eligibility criteria, the aging of
the“baby boom” population, and an increase in female labor force attachment that
resulted in more women being insured for SSDI (Autor and Duggan, 2006).
In this paper, we investigate whether and to what extent a policy-induced re-
duction in the generosity of Social Security retired worker benefits also contributed
to the increase in SSDI enrollment. The Social Security Amendments of 1983, which
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were signed into law on April 20th of that year, increased the age at which individu-
als were eligible for their full retirement benefits from 65 to 67 while simultaneously
increasing the penalty for claiming benefits at the early retirement age of 62. Com-
bined with an increase in the payroll tax rate and several other provisions,1 the main
goal of this legislation was to improve the short and long-term fiscal health of Social
Security, also known as the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI)
program.
As Figure 2.1 demonstrates, the increase in the full retirement age and in the
early retirement penalty were phased in gradually and occurred in two main stages.
Individuals born in 1937 or earlier were unaffected by the change, their counterparts
born between 1938 and 1959 were partially affected, and those born in 1960 or later
were fully affected. The first half of the policy change was phased in from the 1938
to 1943 birth cohorts while the second was phased in from the 1955 to 1960 birth
cohorts. In each year of the phase-in, the full retirement age was increased in two-
month increments and the fraction of full benefits that individuals could receive at
the early retirement age of 62 fell by 0.833 percentage points. This latter change
implied that the penalty for claiming at 62 increased from 20 to 30 percent of full
benefits.
While the generosity of retired worker benefits declined as a result of the
Amendments, no corresponding changes were made to SSDI benefits. Theoretically,
it is plausible that some individuals who would have otherwise claimed retired worker
1For a full description of the 1983 Social Security Amendments, see
http://www.ssa.gov/history/1983amend.html.
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benefits responded to this change by applying for and perhaps ultimately receiving
SSDI benefits. All else equal, one would expect the incentive to do this to be
significantly greater for those born in more recent years and for those closer to the
age of claiming retired worker benefits. This is because year-of-birth and age are
the key determinants of the decline in the value of retired worker benefits induced
by the policy.2 As Figure 2.2 demonstrates, the decline at each age was three times
larger for those born in 1943 than for their counterparts born in 1939. Similarly,
the decline was almost twice as large in dollar terms for 62-year olds as it was for
45-year olds ($8900 versus $4700 for a man born in 1943).
To estimate the effect of the policy on SSDI enrollment, we exploit variation by
cohort3 and by age in the change in the present value of retired worker benefits. More
specifically, we estimate first difference models that control for age-specific trends
in SSDI enrollment and for common changes in each year in SSDI enrollment. Our
key explanatory variable is the change in the present value of retired worker benefits
from one year to the next at a certain age. We focus primarily on estimating the
effect of the first half of the policy described above, which was phased in from the
1938 to the 1943 birth cohorts, as those affected by the second half were relatively
young and thus less likely to be affected in our most recent year of data.
We utilize aggregate data on SSDI enrollment rates by age, gender, and year-
of-birth in each year from 1983 to 2005 and restrict attention to individuals between
2It is worth noting that the present value of retired worker benefits for the average individual
has been steadily increasing over time, both because of the increase in life expectancy and because
of the indexation of social security benefits to average wages. But we only consider the change in
the present value that is caused by the policy, essentially assuming that these other changes are
relatively smooth over time.
3Here and elsewhere in the paper we use the term cohort to refer to a specific year-of-birth.
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the ages of 45 and 64. We essentially test whether SSDI enrollment increases more
rapidly at each age when the present value of retired worker benefits at that age is
declining. If the Amendments did affect SSDI enrollment through the mechanism
described above, then one would expect SSDI enrollment rates at a certain age to
increase more rapidly when cohorts born between 1938 and 1943 reach that age.
Using data for the 1934 through 1946 cohorts, our estimates strongly suggest
that the decline in the generosity of Social Security retired worker benefits led to a
significant increase in SSDI enrollment among both women and men. For each $5,000
decline in the average present value of OA benefits, we estimate that SSDI enrollment
increased by 0.6 percentage points, with the estimated effects approximately twice
as large for women as for men (0.8 versus 0.4 percentage points). We obtain similar
estimates if we restrict attention to those between the ages of 45 and 54 or between
the ages of 55 and 64, though because the change in the present value increases with
age, the effect on SSDI enrollment does as well. We also obtain similar estimates
when we expand our analysis sample to consider individuals born between 1920 and
1960, with these estimates incorporating the effect of the second phase of the policy
change described above.
In the final section of our paper, we calculate how much of the increase in SSDI
enrollment from 1983 to 2005 can be explained by the reduction in the generosity
of retired worker benefits. Our point estimates suggest that SSDI enrollment was
0.58 percentage points higher among men between the ages of 45 and 64 and 0.89
percentage points higher among women in this same age range in December of 2005
than it otherwise would have been. Given that the actual increases during this same
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period were 1.64 and 3.41 percentage points for men and women, respectively, our
findings suggest that this policy change was an important contributor to the rise in
SSDI enrollment. Our estimates further suggest that the effect on SSDI enrollment
twenty years from now, when those who received the maximum reduction in retired
worker benefits will have aged into their fifties and early sixties, will be almost twice
as large than at present.
2.2 Background on the OASDI Program and the
1983 Amendments
2.2.1 Retired Worker and Disabled Worker Benefits Prior
to the Amendments
The Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) program currently pro-
vides retirement, disability, and survivor benefits to more than 48 million U.S. resi-
dents. Payments to retired workers and their dependents accounted for more than
70 percent of program spending during the 2004 calendar year. To be eligible for
retired worker benefits, an individual must be at least 62 years old and must have
accumulated at least forty quarters of coverage during his or her working years.
The amount of earnings necessary for each quarter of coverage is generally increas-
ing over time, with $3680 or more sufficient to earn four quarters during the 2005
calendar year. Thus a person with a significant amount of earnings in ten or more
years would generally be eligible for retired worker benefits upon reaching the age
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of 62.
The eligibility criteria are somewhat different for Social Security Disability
Insurance benefits. First, a person younger than 18 or older than the full retire-
ment age at the time she became disabled would not be eligible for disabled worker
benefits. Second, the individual must have accumulated at least twenty quarters
of coverage during the ten years leading up to the onset of the disability.4 Third,
the person must not be engaging in substantial gainful activity, which is currently
defined to be earnings in excess of $860 per month. And finally, the individual must
apply for SSDI benefits at a local Social Security Administration (SSA) field office.
If the SSA determines that the individual is unable to work, then an SSDI award is
made.
To determine an individual’s retired worker or disabled worker benefits, the
SSA first calculates her average indexed monthly earnings (AIME). For a retired
worker, this is equal to the average of her 35 highest years of indexed earnings.5
The number of years used in the AIME calculation for a disabled worker is lower
given that she would have fewer possible work years. For example, the SSA would
use the highest 21 years of indexed earnings for an SSDI recipient disabled at the
age of 47 versus 34 years for someone disabled at the age of 60.6 The AIME is then
4The number of quarters of coverage needed to be SSDI-insured is lower for younger workers.
5Taxable earnings are indexed in each year using an indexing factor, which is equal to the ratio
of average wages in the year that the person reaches the age of 60 to average wages in the year
considered. Earnings at ages 61 and up are not indexed. For a list of indexing factors used for each
year of earnings by year-of-birth, see Table 2.A.8 in the Social Security Administration’s Annual
Statistical Supplement (2006).
6For SSDI recipients disabled at the age of 47 or later, the number of years used is equal to ”the
number of full calendar years elapsing between the age 21 and the year of first eligibility, usually
excluding the lowest 5 years. Workers disabled before the age of 47 have 0 to 4 years excluded.”
(SSA, 2006).
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used to compute the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), which is the monthly Social
Security benefit payable to a retired worker if they first claim benefits at the full
retirement age or to a disabled worker when they begin receiving benefits at any
age. The PIA formula is progressive, so that the fraction of earnings replaced by
social security benefits declines as one’s AIME increases.7
Upon reaching the early retirement age of 62, insured persons have the option
to claim retired worker benefits, though at a reduced rate. For individuals born
in 1937 or earlier, the penalty for claiming in the month of attaining the age of
62 is 20 percent, so that the person’s monthly benefit would be just 80 percent of
the PIA. For each month that the person chooses to delay claiming, the penalty
declines by 5/9 of a percentage point, with this penalty reaching zero at the full
retirement age of 65. This adjustment to benefits for claiming early was designed
to be approximately actuarially fair for a person with average mortality.
The monthly Social Security benefit for an SSDI recipient is equal to 100
percent of the PIA when they are first awarded benefits and, like retired worker
benefits, this benefit is indexed to inflation in subsequent years. SSDI recipients are
converted to Social Security’s retirement program (with the same monthly benefit)
upon reaching the full retirement age.
7More specifically, in 2005 the first $627 of the AIME is replaced at 90 percent, the next $3152
is replaced at 32 percent, and any remaining AIME is replaced at 15 percent. Only earnings that
were subject to OASDI payroll taxes are considered when calculating the AIME.
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2.2.2 The Social Security Amendments of 1983
On April 20, 1983, the Social Security Amendments of 1983 were signed into law.
The main motivation for this legislation was to improve both the short and the
long-term fiscal health of the OASDI program. Included in these Amendments
were a number of significant changes to social security, including an increase in the
payroll tax rate, an expansion in the number of individuals covered by the program,
and an increase in the actuarial adjustment factors beyond the full retirement age.
Perhaps the most significant change of all, however, was a two-year increase in the
full retirement age and a corresponding increase from 20 to 30 percent in the penalty
for claiming retired worker benefits at the early retirement age of 62.
These reductions in the generosity of Social Security retired worker benefits
were phased in gradually and occurred in two main stages. Individuals born in 1937
or earlier were unaffected by the change. The full retirement age then increased in
two-month increments by subsequent birth cohort until reaching 66 for those born
in 1943, where it remained until again increasing in two-month increments from
the 1955 to 1960 cohorts. Along with this change, the fraction of full benefits that
individuals could receive at the early retirement age of 62 fell from 80 percent for
those born in 1937, to 75 percent for those born between 1943 and 1954, and to 70
percent for those born in 1960 or later.8 The changes in the full retirement age and
8This policy also changed the actuarial adjustment factors beyond the age of 62 from 5/9 of a
percentage point per month to 5/12 of a percentage point per month. This converted back to 5/9
of a percentage point 36 months before the full retirement age. Thus a person born in 1943 could
receive 75 percent of his or her PIA at the age of 62, 80 percent at the age of 63, 86.67 percent
at the age of 64, 93.33 percent at the age of 65, and 100 percent at age 66. For more details, see
Table 2.A.17.1 in the 2005 Annual Statistical Supplement (SSA, 2006).
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in the fraction of the PIA available at the early retirement age of 62 are summarized
in Figure 1.
As a result of this legislation, the generosity of OASDI retired worker benefits
for individuals born in 1938 or later declined relative to what they otherwise would
have been. To estimate the average impact of this policy change on retired worker
benefits, we consider the case of an individual age 62 or younger who is planning to
claim retirement benefits at the early retirement age of 62, the most common age
of claiming retired worker benefits in every year of our study period. The average
change in the present value of retirement benefits for an individual at age A born
in year B is as follows:





with SX,Y equal to the probability of surviving from age X to age Y (note that
S62,62 = 1 and the assumption that S62,120 = 0), RB equal to the percentage point
reduction in early retirement benefits for individuals born in year B, r equal to
the interest rate used to discount future benefits, and PIA is equal to the average
primary insurance amount upon reaching the age of 62.9 For this same person at age
A beyond the age of 62, the change in the present value of benefits can be written
as:
9This formula does not account for variation over time in an individual’s PIA. More specifically,
the PIA depends partially on the age at which it is computed because, for example, different years
of earnings may be used in the calculation. But this was true before and after the policy change







The key source of variation for our purposes in equations 2.1 and 2.2arises through
RB, which represents the change in the generosity of retired worker benefits caused
by the 1983 amendments. This ranges from a low of 0 for those born in 1937 or earlier
to a high of 10 percentage points for those born in 1960 or later. As described above
and in Figure 2.1, these increases in the penalty for claiming at the early retirement
age were made in increments of 0.833 percentage points from 1938 to 1943, then
remained at 5 percentage points from 1943 to 1954, and again increased in 0.833
percentage point increments from 1955 to 1960.
Of course, the average present value of retired worker benefits will vary across
cohorts not only because of the 1983 Amendments. For example, mortality rates
have generally been declining over time and this will tend to increase the value of
benefits from one cohort to the next. Similarly the program’s benefit formula is
indexed to average wage growth, and thus the real value of the average PIA tends
to increase over time. But to the extent that these changes produce a smooth trend
in the value of retired worker benefits, the policy induced a decline in this trend
relative to what it would have otherwise been.10
In Figure 2.2, we plot the average policy-induced decline in the present value
of retired worker benefits as a function of age for men between the ages of 45 and 64
10For example, suppose that the present value was increasing by an average of 1 percent per year
up through and including the 1937 cohort. The policy will reduce this to essentially zero, given
that the present value is declining more than one percent per year as a result of the policy (0.833
percentage points divided by 80 percentage points).
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who were born in 1939, 1941, and 1943. For these calculations, we use age-specific
mortality rates for men from the SSA’s Office of the Actuary, assume an annual
discount rate of 3 percent, and set PIAB equal to the average primary insurance
amount for men claiming retired worker benefits in 1999, the last year in which
no retired workers would have been affected by the Amendments. As the figure
demonstrates, the impact of the policy was significantly lower for cohorts born
in 1939 than those born in 1941 or 1943. Additionally, the impact of the policy
increased with age, both because of time discounting and because of the non-trivial
probability that an individual would die before reaching his or her early retirement
age. The effect of the policy then declines following the 62nd birthday, reflecting
the fact that one or two years of reduced benefits would already have been received.
The variation in the policy’s effect summarized in this Figure and in Table 2.1
increases by a factor of almost two from a 45-year old male to a 62-year old male.11
More specifically, among men born in 1943, the decline in the present value of retired
worker benefits for 45-year olds is $4716 versus $8878 for 62-year olds. These declines
are one-third as large for the 1939 cohort and two-thirds as large for the 1941 cohort.
And though their changes are not summarized in this Figure, the effect of the policy
for individuals born in 1960 or later would be twice as large as for those born between
1943 and 1954. To calculate these same changes for women, we use female-specific
mortality rates and the average PIA for women claiming retired worker benefits in
1999. At each age these declines are approximately one-third lower for women than
11Of course the effect of the 1983 Amendments likely varied not only across cohorts but also
within cohorts. One might expect, for example, high income individuals to be less responsive than
their low income counterparts to the change given that social security accounts for a much smaller
share of their income (Mitchell and Phillips, 2000).
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for men. Thus despite the fact that mortality rates for women are much lower than
those for men, the fact that their average PIA in 1999 is 40 percent lower more than
offsets this.
2.2.3 Previous Research
Previous work for other government programs has suggested that reductions in the
generosity of one program can lead to increases in enrollment in other programs.12
In this case, Social Security retired worker benefits were reduced while no corre-
sponding changes were made to SSDI benefit generosity. Thus, to the extent that
individuals can potentially substitute disability for retirement benefits, a policy
designed to reduce spending on retired worker benefits may have inadvertently in-
creased SSDI applications and enrollment. Since social security benefits are the
major source of income for 65 percent of elderly recipients and account for more
than 90 percent of income for one-third of those individuals (SSA, 2006), it seems
plausible that the significant decline in the generosity of retirement benefits due to
the 1983 Amendments influenced individual behavior. Policymakers did recognize
that the Amendments could lead to an increase in disability enrollment, with a U.S.
General Accounting Office report stating that the magnitude of this increase would
depend on the responsiveness of individuals to the increased incentive to apply for
SSDI (GAO, 1998).13
Recent studies, however, find little evidence to suggest that SSDI enrollment
12See Garrett and Glied (2001), Kubik (2003), Schmidt and Sevak (2004), and Duggan and
Kearney (2005).
13See Benitez-Silva et al (1999) and Hausman and Halpern (1986) for an examination of the
determinants of the SSDI application decision.
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should increase significantly as a result of the 1983 Social Security Amendments.
For example, Mitchell and Phillips (2000) use data from the Health and Retirement
Study to estimate a choice model with three potential retirement pathways: claim
at the early retirement age, claim at the full retirement age, or apply for SSDI
benefits. Their parameter estimates suggest that a $25,000 cut in the present value
of Social Security retired worker benefits14 would increase SSDI enrollment by 0.6
percentage points. They argue that this effect is small given that three times as many
individuals would delay claiming Social Security retirement benefits as a result of
the benefit cut. Additionally, Bound, Stinebrickner, and Waidman (2004) estimate
a structural model of retirement to consider the impact of changes in the OASDI
program on labor market behavior. Their simulations suggest an even smaller effect
of the increase in the normal retirement on SSDI applications and enrollment.
While both of these studies make important contributions to knowledge, they
do have some limitations. For example, both studies apply parameter estimates from
their models to simulate the effects of reducing retirement benefits rather than using
the actual changes in SSDI enrollment by birth cohort to estimate these effects. To
the extent that the models do not fully capture key aspects of individual behavior,
the results from these simulations could be misleading.15 Additionally both studies
use a relatively small sample of individuals16 and thus even if the models were
properly specified, it would be difficult to obtain precise estimates. And finally, the
14Using the average monthly retired worker benefit in 1999, this is approximately 40 percent
larger than the average cut for a 62-year old even once the Amendment changes are fully phased
in, as shown in Table 1.
15Mitchell and Phillips that it is hard to know what to attribute differences to.”
16The sample sizes used to estimate the models are 196 for Bound et al and 1544 for Mitchell
and Phillips.
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studies use data up through just 1998 (M,P) or 2000 (B,W,S). They are therefore
unable to observe SSDI enrollment beyond the age of 60 or 62 for anyone affected
by the Amendments.17
In the sections that follow, we build on this previous work by utilizing admin-
istrative data on SSDI enrollment through 2005 for a ten percent sample of the U.S.
population along with an alternative identification strategy to investigate the effect
of the policy-induced reduction in the generosity of retired worker benefits on SSDI
enrollment.
2.3 The Rise in Disability Enrollment
The fraction of non-elderly adults receiving Social Security Disability Insurance
benefits has risen substantially since the 1983 Social Security Amendments. When
this legislation was enacted, 4.5 percent of those between the ages of 45 and 64 were
receiving benefits and enrollment had actually been declining. But since the passage
of the Amendments, the rate of SSDI enrollment in this age range has increased
by 50 percent, with 6.7 percent of adults aged 45 to 64 on SSDI in December of
2005. The enrollment growth has been similarly striking for younger workers, with
the fraction of individuals between the ages of 25 and 44 receiving SSDI benefits
increasing from 0.7 to 1.6 percent. As a result of these increases, the fraction of
Social Security spending accounted for by SSDI rose from 10 percent in 1983 to
17In related work, Gustman and Steinmeier (2005) estimate a structural model that considers
the effect of an increase in the early retirement age on behavior, including application for SSDI
benefits.
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more than 17 percent by 2005.
2.3.1 Why Has SSDI Enrollment Increased?
Several factors have contributed to the increase in SSDI receipt.18 First, because
the rate of SSDI receipt rises with age, the aging of the baby boom cohorts has con-
tributed to the growth. But as Figures 2.3 and 2.4 demonstrate, the fraction of both
men and women receiving SSDI has increased substantially at every age between 45
and 64. For example, in 1983 the fraction of 55-year old men receiving SSDI stood
at 5.8 percent, but this increased to 7.5 percent by 2005. The corresponding rise for
55-year old women was even more striking, with enrollment for them increasing from
2.6 to 6.2 percent. The larger growth in SSDI enrollment among women is partly
attributable to a second important contributing factor, the rise in female labor force
attachment, which has increased the fraction of women who are insured for SSDI
benefits.
A third factor that has contributed to the growth in SSDI enrollment was
a liberalization of the program’s medical eligibility criteria implemented in 1984,
which made it easier for individuals with more subjective conditions such as men-
tal disorders, back pain, and arthritis to qualify for the program. Perhaps partly
as a result, the number of awards per SSDI insured person with these diagnoses
more than tripled from 1983 to 2003 while there was no corresponding change for
conditions that are easier to verify such as cancer, heart attacks, and stroke. SSDI
18Most previous work on SSDI has examined the program’s effect on labor supply rather than
the determinants of its growth. See for example Parsons (1980, 1991), Bound (1989, 1991), and
Bound and Burkhauser (1999).
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enrollment also increased during this period because of an increase in the replace-
ment rate (the ratio of potential benefits to earnings) for low-skilled workers. This
resulted from the interaction between a rise in income inequality and the progressive
benefit formula described above. And finally, the recessions of both 1991 and 2001
led to a significant increase in the number applying for and ultimately receiving
SSDI benefits.19
2.3.2 Changes in SSDI Enrollment by Birth Cohort
The 1983 Social Security Amendments increased the incentive for individuals to
apply for the SSDI program by reducing the generosity of retired worker benefits.
Individuals born in 1937 or earlier were unaffected by these Amendments, with the
effect on an individual born later depending on her year-of-birth. The increase in the
full retirement age and in the penalty for claiming benefits at the early retirement
age of 62 for those born between 1943 and 1954 was twice as large as for their
counterparts born in 1940 and six times as large as for a person born in 1938.
If the declining generosity of retired worker benefits did influence SSDI enroll-
ment, one would expect - all else equal - individuals born in a year such as 1943 to
be significantly more likely to receive SSDI benefits than individuals born in earlier
years. To shed light on this issue, Figure 2.5 displays rates of SSDI enrollment for
men between the ages of 60 and 64 by birth cohort.20 As the figure shows, the rates
19See Rupp and Stapleton (1985), Gruber and Kubik (1997), Kreider (1997), Gruber (2000),
Black, Daniel, and Sanders (2002), Autor and Duggan (2003), and Duggan and Imberman (2006)
for an examination of the effect of screening stringency, the replacement rate, economic conditions,
or demographic factors on disability enrollment.
20Because 2005 is our most recent year of data, the rate at the ages of 63 and 64 are missing for
the 1943 cohort.
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in this age range are generally increasing with year-of-birth. For example, the rate
of SSDI enrollment increases from 12.7 percent among those born in 1937 to 13.6
percent for men born in 1943. The differences displayed in Figure 2.6 for 62-year
old women are even larger, with their enrollment rate increasing from 7.9 to 10.2
percent from the 1937 to the 1943 birth cohort.
Of course part of this increase could simply represent the continuation of a
pre-existing trend in SSDI enrollment. To explore this possibility, the top two graphs
of Figure 2.7 display rates of SSDI enrollment by birth cohort for 62-year old men
and women, respectively. The first of these figures shows that enrollment among
men was actually declining with year-of-birth prior to 1937. More specifically, the
fraction of 62-year old men on SSDI fell from 13.0 to 12.7 percent from 1934 to 1937.
And while for women there was a positive pre-existing trend prior to the 1938 birth
cohort, the annual increase of 0.38 percentage points from 1937 to 1943 was more
than twice as large as the corresponding increase of 0.17 percentage points from
1934 to 1937.
Thus the enrollment trends for both men and women at the age of 62 strongly
suggests that individuals born in 1938 and later were significantly more likely to
receive SSDI benefits than their counterparts born in earlier years and that this
effect steadily increased in each year through the 1943 cohort. But even these trends
do not rule out the possibility that some factor other than the 1983 Amendments is
the main explanation for the break in trend. For example, perhaps macroeconomic
conditions deteriorated sufficiently after 1999 to induce a rise in SSDI enrollment.
If this were true, then this could be at least partially responsible for the SSDI
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enrollment increase among 62-year olds that began in 2000.
But interestingly, as the bottom two graphs of Figure 2.7 show, the same
pattern with year-of-birth emerges for these cohorts a decade earlier. For example,
SSDI enrollment among 52-year old men declined from 4.5 to 4.3 percent from the
1934 to the 1937 cohort and then steadily increased to 5.5 percent for the 1943
cohort. The rate of SSDI enrollment for the 1946 cohort, whose retirement benefit
reduction was identical to the 1943 cohort’s, was also 5.5 percent. This figure and
the corresponding one for women are consistent with the hypothesis that the 1983
Social Security Amendments increased SSDI enrollment. In the next section we
outline our strategy for probing more systematically on the magnitude of this effect.
2.4 Identification Strategy
The 1983 Amendments reduced the present value of retired worker benefits for
individuals born in or after 1938. As Figure 2.2 demonstrates, the average dollar
impact of this change varied substantially with both age and year-of-birth. For
individuals choosing between alternative pathways to retirement, the Amendments
reduced the attractiveness of claiming retired worker benefits. Given that there were
no corresponding changes to SSDI benefits, some individuals may have responded to
the change by applying for SSDI, thereby pursuing an alternative path to retirement.
This change in behavior could occur long before the age of 62 if individuals were
forward-looking and recognized the increase in the relative attractiveness of SSDI
benefits. If instead individuals were myopic, they might only react to the policy
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once they were very close to or had already reached the early retirement age, when
they might be more likely to carefully compare the difference between retired and
disabled worker benefits.
If the Amendments did lead a substantial number of individuals to apply for
and ultimately enroll in the SSDI program, one would expect to observe an in-
crease in age-specific rates of enrollment as the 1938 and later birth cohorts reached
each age. To accurately measure this effect, it is important to control for trends in
SSDI enrollment, which could be changing for reasons unrelated to the Amendments.
These pre-existing trends were especially apparent for women in the two right graphs
in Figure 2.7, with this trend perhaps partly driven by the steady increase in female
labor force attachment that made more women potentially SSDI eligible. Addition-
ally, it is important to control for macroeconomic and other common factors that
could exert an effect on SSDI enrollment at all ages.
Given these issues, we estimate models of the following type when testing for
an effect of the 1983 Amendments on the fraction of individuals receiving SSDI
benefits:
4SSDIA,t = αt + β4PV RA,t + µt + εA,t (2.3)
In this equation, SSDIA,t is equal to the change in the fraction of individuals at
age A in year t receiving SSDI benefits. SSDI enrollment is reported by SSA as of
December in each year, and thus the year-of-birth for individuals of age A in year t
would be t-A. We use age and gender-specific population data from the U.S. Census
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Bureau and from the National Center for Health Statistics as the denominator when
calculating these rates.21 We include year effects in this model αt to control for
common factors such as changes in macroeconomic conditions that might influence
SSDI enrollment in each year and age effects µA to control for age-specific trends in
SSDI enrollment.22
Our key explanatory variable is4PV RA,t, which represents the average change
in the present value of Social Security retired worker benefits at age A in year t
induced by the Amendments. This is set equal to zero if birth cohorts t-A and t-A-1
have the same generosity of retired worker benefits. For example, in 1987 this first
difference would be equal to zero for 50-year olds because it would represent the
difference in generosity between the 1936 and 1937 cohorts, both of which had a full
retirement age of 65 and received 80 percent of full benefits when claiming at the
age of 62. However in 1988 it is negative, as the generosity of retired worker benefits
is significantly lower for the 1938 cohort than for their predecessors born in 1937.
More specifically, using equation 2.1 from above, the present value of retired worker
benefits is $786 lower for the 1938 cohort of men than for their 1937 counterparts
and $592 lower for women born in 1938 than those born in 1937.23 As Table 2.1
demonstrates, these amounts increase in magnitude with age until the age of 62,
21See the Data Appendix for a description of our data sources.
22Our approach is similar in spirit to Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003), who estimate the effect
of a change in Italy’s Social Security program on household savings. Like the 1983 Social Security
Amendments in the U.S., the magnitude of the change in Italy’s social security benefits depended
partially on individuals’ year-of-birth.
23Thus for 50-year olds the value of 4PV RA,t would be 0 in 1985, 1986, and 1987, would equal
-.932 for men and -.695 for women in each year between 1988 and 1993, and would then equal 0 in
1994, 1995, and 1996. The variable is defined similarly at other ages, though the size of PV RA,t
in the treatment years varies as shown in Table 1.
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at which point they decline somewhat in each year given that one or more year of
benefits would already have been received (assuming early claiming at the age of 62
as in equation 2.2 above).
If properly estimated, the parameter from equation 2.3 represents the average
effect of Social Security retired worker benefit generosity on SSDI enrollment. As
described above, the 1983 Amendments reduced the generosity of retired worker
benefits in two main stages. Because those affected by the latter set of changes were
relatively young in 2005, our most recent year of data, we begin by focusing on the
first set of changes, which were phased in from the 1938 to the 1943 birth cohorts.
To do this we restrict consideration to the 1934 to 1946 birth cohorts, which gives
us up to twelve first differences at every age. The first three of these are for the
1934 to 1937 cohorts and thus prior to the change in retired worker benefits and the
last three are for the 1943 to 1946 cohorts and thus after these changes have been
phased in.
The main advantage of considering a relatively small number of cohorts is that
in each year the ages that we consider are fairly similar. For example, as shown in
Table 2.2, in 1995 the treatment group consists of individuals between the ages of 52
and 57, while the control group includes people between the ages of 49 and 51 and
between 58 and 60. Our model essentially tests whether in this year and in the 21
other years after the 1983 Amendments, SSDI enrollment increases more rapidly for
those in the treatment group in each year than for their counterparts in the control
group. By considering a more homogeneous group in every year, it is more likely that
any unobserved factors that might influence SSDI enrollment would have a similar
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effect on our treatment and control groups, which is an important assumption of our
model. We later expand the size of our analysis sample by considering individuals
born as early as 1920 and as late as 1960.
We further restrict attention to individuals between the ages of 45 and 64.
Our primary reason for doing this is that, as Table 2.2 demonstrates, this restriction
ensures that we have at least four “treatment” changes at each age.24 It also seems
reasonable given both that the change in the present value of benefits was lower for
younger workers and that their baseline rates of SSDI enrollment were several times
lower as well.25
2.5 Empirical Results
Our first main set of results is summarized in Table 2.3, with columns 1 through
4 providing the results from specifications similar to 2.3 for men and the next four
columns displaying the analogous results for women. The unit of observation in every
case is the change in the fraction of either men or women receiving SSDI at a certain
age from one year to the next. All specifications include age effects to control for
different trends across age groups in SSDI enrollment. We also include year effects
to control for factors such as macroeconomic conditions that might influence SSDI
24If we included 40-year olds, for example, then there would be no treatment changes at this age
given our definition because the 1983 to 1984 change reflects the difference between the 1943 and
1944 birth cohorts, both of which had a full retirement age of 66 and an early retirement penalty
of 25 percent. Despite this, there may still have been a policy-induced increase at his age from
1983 to 1984 because of the lag in the SSDI application process.
25To the extent that the 1983 Social Security Amendments also influenced SSDI enrollment for
individuals between the ages of 18 and 44, we are likely to understate the overall effect of the
policy below.
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enrollment from one year to the next.
In this table, we report coefficient estimates for our key explanatory variable
4PV RA,t, which is equal to the average change (in thousands of dollars) in the
present value of retired worker benefits at each age. This variable has a mean of
-0.600 and a standard deviation of 0.579 for men in our analysis sample, with the
corresponding statistics for women at -0.440 and 0.422. The ages that serve as both
treatment and control groups in these regressions are listed in Table 2.2. As this
table shows, there are 215 first differences that we consider over a 22 year period,
with 116 of these in the treatment group and 99 in the control group. It is important
to emphasize that the intensity of treatment varies with age, with the change in the
present value being much larger for the average 62-year old than for the average
45-year old.
In column 1 of Table 2.3, we report results for the effect of changes in Social
Security retired worker benefits on SSDI enrollment among men between the ages of
45 and 64. The statistically significant estimate of -.0778 suggests that each $5000
reduction in the present value of Social Security retired worker benefits induces a 0.39
percentage point increase in SSDI enrollment.26 Given that the present value effects
of the policy are increasing with age, this implies a smaller increase in enrollment
at younger ages. For example, $5000 is approximately equal to the change in the
present value from the 1937 to the 1943 cohort for a 47-year old man. Thus if
26When estimating these models, we account for the fact that the policy’s effect varies with
year-of-birth by using the StataTM cluster command and clustering by year-of-birth. Recent
econometric evidence suggests that clustering may be problematic when the number of clusters is
smaller than approximately 50. In our final set of specifications we consider 41 birth cohorts and
obtain similar results.
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correct, our estimates imply a 0.39 percentage point increase from this first part of
the policy change. However, the implied effect in SSDI enrollment for 62-year olds
is almost twice as large.
In the specifications summarized in columns 2 through 4, we test whether
the effect of this policy varies by age. The estimated effect of -.1066 summarized in
column 2 for 45 to 54-year olds is slightly greater than the corresponding estimate of
-.0736 for 55 to 64 year old men in column 3. Both of these estimates are statistically
significant. In the fourth column we include all ages but interact PV RA, with an
indicator for whether this cell is between the ages of 55 and 64. While the estimate
for this interaction is positive, it is not statistically significant. Thus one cannot
conclude from these estimates that younger individuals are more or less responsive
to the policy change.
In the next four columns we present an analogous set of estimates for women.
The statistically significant coefficient estimate of -.1639 in column 5 is more than
twice as large as the corresponding estimate for men from column 1. But because
the effect of the Amendments on the average present value of retired worker benefits
was considerably lower for women than for men, the implied effect on overall SSDI
enrollment is not twice as large, as we show in the next section. One possible
explanation for the greater responsiveness among women is that their baseline rates
of labor force participation are significantly lower throughout our study period. This
would imply that more women than men could respond to the policy by applying
for SSDI without having to first leave their job. Interestingly, the results in columns
6 through 8 suggest that older women are somewhat more responsive to the policy
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change, though the difference is not statistically significant.27
We next pool rates of SSDI enrollment for men and women and present an
analogous set of specifications for all individuals in columns 1 through 3 of Table 2.4.
Our explanatory variable here is simply the average of the change in the present
value for women and men. Not surprisingly, our estimates in each case lie between
the estimates for men and women. For example, the estimated effect of -.1151 is
approximately the average of the corresponding estimates of -.0778 and -.1639 for
men and women, respectively. In this case the estimates for younger and older
individuals are almost identical, as shown in columns 2 and 3.
One possible concern with this first set of estimates is that they rely exclusively
on the first part of the Amendments, which were phased in across the 1938 to
1943 cohorts. In the next specification we present the results from an analogous
specification in which we consider only the second change, which was phased in
from 1954 to 1960.28 To preserve consistency with the first set of estimates, we
consider 13 birth cohorts, though in this case we use only ”pre-treatment” birth
cohorts (born from 1948 to 1954) given that no ”post-treatment” cohorts had yet
reached the age of 45 by 2005. Our estimated effect for this latter policy is similar to
those for the initial one, though the standard errors are considerably larger as well.
This is presumably because we have fewer observations and because the variation
27Our results are very similar if we instead use an annual discount rate of 2 or 4 percent when
calculating the present value of retired worker benefits. Of course they would also be very similar
if we used the average PIA from a different year (instead of 1999), as this would simply multiply
our current values of PVRT,A by a common factor.
28For this change, we observe 6 years of the treatment for 45 year olds (first differences from
2000 to 2005 for cohorts 1955-60), 5 years for 46 year olds (2001 to 2005), four years for 47 year
olds (2002 to 2005), three years for 48 year olds (2003 to 2005), two years for 49 year olds (2004
to 2005), and one year for 50 year olds (2005).
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in 4PV RA,t is smaller given that the treated individuals are relatively young. In
any case, this negative point estimate provides suggestive support for an effect of
retired worker benefit generosity on SSDI enrollment.
In the next three columns we merge these two groups (along with the 1946-
47 and 1947-48 first differences) and thus simultaneously consider 27 birth cohorts.
Our estimates for the effect of SSDI benefits are slightly smaller than are the ones
for the first part of the policy though they remain statistically significant. When we
differentiate between those between the ages of 45 and 54 and their counterparts aged
55 to 64, our estimates suggest an effect that is approximately 50 percent greater
for older workers. Estimates for both age groups remain statistically significant.
In the final specification, we consider individuals between the ages of 45 and
64 in every year between 1984 and 2005. By doing this, we consider 41 birth cohorts,
those born between 1920 and 1960. Our point estimate from column 5 is virtually
unchanged, though the standard error rises slightly and thus our estimates there are
significant at just the ten percent level.
It is worth emphasizing that our finding that individuals responded to the re-
duction in retirement benefits long before reaching the early retirement age strongly
suggests both that they are forward-looking and - if they left their jobs as a result
of the policy change to apply for SSDI - that they are not liquidity constrained.29
If individuals were forced to live on current income because they were liquidity
constrained, they would not have the flexibility to respond to the reduction in fu-
29It is of course possible that many of the individuals who applied for and ultimately received
SSDI as a result of the policy change were already unemployed or out of the labor force. In other
words, the finding that the policy increased SSDI enrollment does not necessarily imply that those
who responded would otherwise have been working.
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ture retirement benefits by leaving their job in order to apply for SSDI benefits.
An important avenue for future work would be to calibrate a life cycle model to
determine which individuals would be most likely to respond to the 1983 Social Se-
curity Amendments by applying for SSDI and at what point in their life cycle these
responses would be most likely to occur.30
Taken together, the results presented in this section combined with the graph-
ical evidence from the preceding section strongly suggest that the reduction in the
generosity of Social Security retired worker benefits caused by the 1983 Social Se-
curity Amendments led to a significant increase in SSDI enrollment. While the
confidence intervals surrounding our estimates are compatible with a wide range
of effects, this policy seems to have made an important contribution to the steady
growth in SSDI enrollment during the past two decades. In the next section, we
explore how much of the growth in enrollment can be explained by the Amendments
and what the long-run effect will be on the program given that its effects will not
be fully felt until those born in 1960 reach their full retirement age in 2027. At that
point, all adults between the ages of 18 and 66 would have a full retirement age of
67 and a maximum early retirement penalty of 30 percent.
30See Card, Chetty, and Weber (2006) for a recent example for the case of unemployment
insurance in Austria. In this paper the authors calibrate and test several different intertemporal
models.
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2.6 The Contribution of the 1983 Amendments
to the Rise in SSDI Enrollment
By December of 2005, the changes made by the 1983 Social Security Amendments
had reduced the present value of retired worker benefits for all non-elderly adults.
The magnitude of this change varied with age, with much of this variation at-
tributable to the policy not yet being fully phased in for older workers. For example,
individuals who were 62 years old in 2005 were born in 1943 and thus were exposed
to just the first half of the reduction in benefit generosity, with their early retire-
ment penalty and full retirement age at 25 percent and 66 years old, respectively.
However, their counterparts born in 1960 were fully affected by the Amendments,
with an early retirement penalty of 30 percent and a full retirement age of 67. Thus
as Table 2 demonstrates, the average reduction in retired worker benefits was larger
for 45 year olds ($9432 for men and $7104 for women) than for 62 year olds ($8878
for men and $6348 for women). The smallest changes in benefits were present for
64-year olds, who were exposed to just one-third of the eventual reduction in benefit
generosity because they were born in 1941.31
To estimate the contribution of the 1983 Social Security Amendments to the
rise in SSDI enrollment during our study period, we multiply these changes in retired
worker benefits at each age by our gender-specific point estimates for the effect of
these changes from Table 2.3.32 Specifically we use the estimate of -.0778 from
31The benefit reduction is also smaller for them than for 62-year olds because they would already
have received one or two years of benefits, which would thus not be included in the calculation.
32Here we neglect the mechanical effect of the Amendments on SSDI enrollment, which occurs
because there will now be some 65 and 66 year old individuals on the program. Absent the
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specification 1 for men and -.1639 from specification 5 for women. We report both
our estimates for the policy’s effect on age-specific SSDI enrollment and the actual
change in SSDI enrollment during our study period in the columns with the headings
FRA Impact and Actual 4, respectively.
The results presented in Table 2.5 suggest that the 1983 Social Security Amend-
ments had a substantial effect on SSDI enrollment. For example, our estimates
suggest that the policy increased enrollment by 0.52 percentage points among 55-
year old men versus an actual change of 1.77 percentage points. The corresponding
estimate for 55-year old women is 0.81 percent versus an actual change of 3.54 per-
centage points. In general, while the implied effects for women are larger than those
for men at every age, they explain a smaller share of the increase for women. For
55-year old adults, the effect of the reduction in retired worker benefits can explain
29 percent of the growth in SSDI enrollment for men versus 23 percent for women.
In the final row of this table, we estimate the impact of the policy change on
overall SSDI enrollment among 45 to 64-year old men and women. In doing this,
we use the age distribution for both genders in December of 2005. Our estimates
there suggest that the retired worker benefit changes caused by the 1983 Social
Security Amendments increased SSDI enrollment among men by 0.58 percentage
points and among women by 0.89 percentage points. When compared with the
actual increases, our estimate suggests that the policy change can explain 35 percent
of the increase in SSDI enrollment among men between the ages of 45 and 64 and
26 percent for women. Additionally, our findings suggest that the number of non-
Amendments, an SSDI recipient would shift to retired worker benefits on her 65th birthday.
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elderly individuals receiving SSDI benefits was 568,000 greater in late 2005 than it
would have been in the absence of the Amendments.
In the final column for both men and women, we estimate the long-run effect
of the reduction in retired worker benefits on SSDI enrollment. This represents our
estimate of the effect in 2024 and all subsequent years, when all individuals between
the ages of 45 and 64 would have a full retirement age of 67 and an early retirement
penalty of 30 percent. To do this we first calculate the change in the present value
of benefits assuming that the policy has been fully phased in. This was already true
for 45-year olds by 2005, but for all other ages the policy had been just partially
phased in. For example, those between the ages of 51 and 62 had been ”treated”
with just half of the policy by 2005 and 64-year olds had been ”treated” with just
one-third of the policy change. Thus our estimate of the long-run effect for 64-year
olds is three times greater than the estimated effect in 2005.
Our estimate for the long-run effect of the policy on SSDI enrollment for men
and women between the ages of 45 and 64 is reported in the final row of the Long-Run
columns. The estimates of 1.00 percentage points for men and 1.56 percentage points
for women are approximately 75 percent greater than the analogous estimated effects
as of 2005. It therefore appears that the reduction in the generosity of retired worker
benefits caused by the 1983 Social Security Amendments will contribute almost as




The primary goal of the 1983 Social Security Amendments was to increase the short
and long-term fiscal health of the OASDI program. Perhaps the most significant
change resulting from this legislation was a reduction in the generosity of Social
Security retired worker benefits. No corresponding changes were made to disabled
worker benefits. Our findings in this paper suggest that one important effect of this
legislation was an increase in the number receiving SSDI benefits. More specifically,
we find that the Amendments can explain more than one-third of the increase in
SSDI enrollment among men since 1983 and more than one-fourth of the increase
among women during this same period. Because the reductions in benefit generosity
have not yet been fully phased in, the long-run effect on SSDI enrollment will be
almost twice as large.
These results suggest that any changes to Social Security retired worker bene-
fits may have important spillover effects to the SSDI program. In the case considered
here, part of the reduction in spending for Social Security retired worker benefits
was offset by an increase in spending on disabled worker benefits. Recent proposals
to reform Social Security, such as those presented by the President’s Commission
in 2001, have largely ignored the SSDI program. The findings presented in this
paper suggest that policymakers may want to incorporate SSDI when considering
how optimally to reform the U.S. Social Security program.
In this paper we have explored just one response to the 1983 Social Security
Amendments, though this legislation may have had other important effects as well.
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For example, reductions in the actuarial adjustment factors beyond the age of 62
may have changed individuals’ optimal timing for claiming social security retired
worker benefits. Similarly, by reducing the present value of Social Security retire-
ment wealth, the legislation may have affected individuals’ optimal labor supply and
savings decisions. More work on the effect of this legislation, which represented one
of the most important set of changes to Social Security since its inception more than
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Federal Policy and the Rise in Disability Enrollment:
Evidence for the VA’s Disability Compensation Program
(with Mark Duggan and Robert Rosenheck)
Abstract: The US Department of Veterans’ Affairs (VA) currently provides disabil-
ity benefits to 2.72 million veterans of US military service through the Disability
Compensation (DC) program. Until recently, the medical eligibility criteria for this
program were the same across service eras, with the key condition being that the
disability was caused or aggravated by military service. But in July of 2001, the
VA relaxed the eligibility criteria for Vietnam veterans by including diabetes in
the list of conditions covered by DC. This change was motivated by an Institute
of Medicine report which linked exposure to Agent Orange and other herbicides to
onset of diabetes. In this paper, we investigate the impact of this policy change on
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DC enrollment and expenditures. Our findings demonstrate that the Agent Orange
decision increased DC enrollment by 7.6 percentage points among Vietnam veterans
and that an additional 2.5 percent enjoyed an increase in their DC benefits. Our
estimates further suggest that the policy change increased program expenditures by
$2.69 billion during the 2006 fiscal year and by $45 billion in present value terms.
Taken together, our results suggest that even a relatively narrow change in the med-
ical eligibility criteria for federal disability programs can have a powerful effect on
program enrollment and expenditures
3.1 Introduction
In August of 2006, the U.S. Department of Veterans’ Affairs (VA) provided cash
benefits to more than 11 percent of the nation’s 24 million military veterans through
the Disability Compensation (DC) program. Total program enrollment in that
month was 2.72 million and expenditures for the 2006 fiscal year were approximately
$25 billion. To qualify for DC benefits, a veteran must have one or more disabilities
that were caused or aggravated by his military service. The DC recipient then
receives a monthly benefit along with essentially free medical care for the treatment
of their disabilities through the Veterans Health Administration.
Until recently, the medical eligibility criteria for DC benefits have been essen-
tially the same for veterans from all service eras. The key requirement was that
a disability must have been caused or aggravated by military service. Thus indi-
viduals rarely qualified for DC because of conditions such as cancer and diabetes
98
that first affected people long after their period of military service and for which
service-connectedness would be difficult to prove. However in October of 2000 the
National Institute of Medicine issued a report that linked exposure to Agent Or-
ange, an herbicide used by the U.S. military in Vietnam, to the onset of diabetes.
In July of 2001, the VA responded to this report by adding diabetes to the list of
conditions for which a veteran who served in Vietnam during the war could qualify
for DC benefits. There was no corresponding change for veterans from other eras.1
In this paper we aim to estimate the impact of this policy change on DC en-
rollment and expenditures. Many previous authors have investigated these same
types of issues Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Se-
curity Income (SSI), the federal government’s two other major disability programs
(Autor and Duggan, 2003; Black, Daniel, and Sanders, 2002). However, virtually
no previous work has investigated the causes or consequences of DC enrollment.2
As Figure 3.1 demonstrates, this policy change coincided with a sharp break
in trend in DC enrollment. From 1996 to 2001, the number of DC beneficiaries grew
by less than 0.6 percent per year. But during the next five years, the annual growth
rate was five times greater at 3.3 percent. Of course, other factors may have been
at least partly responsible for this break in trend. We therefore use veterans from
peacetime eras, almost all of whom served shortly before or after the Vietnam era,
1Korean War veterans would also become eligible for DC benefits for diabetes, but their diabetes
would not be “presumptively” related to their military service.
2In Bound and Burkhauser’s 1999 Handbook of Labor Economics chapter on disability pro-
grams, 44 papers examine SSDI, 17 consider SSI, and just 1 studies DC. The one that considers
DC is a descriptive paper that compares the economic well-being of individuals who receive SSDI,
SSI, DC, or Workers’ Compensation benefits (Burkhauser and Daly, 1999) in the U.S. with those
who receive disability benefits in Germany.
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as our comparison group to estimate the effect of the policy. While this group of
veterans is clearly not a perfect control group, they had mortality rates and trends
in DC enrollment that were quite similar to those for Vietnam-era veterans prior to
the policy change as shown in Figure 3.2.
Using aggregate data by service era in each year, our differences-in-differences
estimates suggest that the expansion of the DC program’s eligibility criteria in-
creased the number of Vietnam veterans on the program in September of 2006 by
175,000 over what it would otherwise have been. This increase represents 2.3 per-
cent of all Vietnam-era veterans and 7.6 percent of those who actually served in
Vietnam during the conflict there, as the policy change applied only to this latter
group.
An additional possible effect of the Agent Orange decision was that Vietnam
veterans already on the program could increase their monthly benefits if they were
found to have diabetes. The DC program pays benefits that are an increasing func-
tion of the recipient’s combined disability rating (CDR). The CDR depends on the
ratings for all of a recipient’s rated disabilities, and thus a recipient who could ob-
tain a rating for another condition would typically experience an increase in monthly
benefits. Our results suggest that approximately 58,000 Vietnam veterans qualified
for an increase in their benefits because of the 2001 policy change. Combined with
the effect on enrollment, this suggests that 10.1 percent of the veterans who served
in Vietnam and were still alive in 2006 experienced an increase in their DC benefits
or became eligible for the program because of the less stringent medical eligibility
criteria.
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We next investigate the effect of the change in the DC program’s medical
eligibility criteria on short and long-term expenditures for the program. To do this
we estimate the impact of the policy change on the number of Vietnam-era DC
recipients with each of the eleven possible CDRs, and then multiply this by average
monthly benefits within each CDR. This algorithm captures the effect due to the
increase in the number of recipients as well as the increase in benefits for some
existing DC recipients. Our estimates suggest that DC expenditures during the
2006 fiscal year were $2.69 billion higher than they would have been in the absence
of the Agent Orange decision. Aggregating the effect across all years, our estimates
suggest that the present value of Disability Compensation spending increased by
more than $45 billion as a result of the policy change.
Finally, we examine the effect of the Agent Orange decision on outcomes as-
sociated with an increase in DC benefit receipt; labor force status, income from
various sources, health status, and health insurance status. The data come from
the Current Population Survey March Supplements for years 1998 through 2006.
Using a difference-in-differences type model, we first estimate the impact of the
Agent Orange decision DC receipt. Then, using a similar model, we estimate the
reduced-form effects of the policy change.
Using veterans who did not serve during the Vietnam Era as a comparison
group, we estimate that the Agent Orange decision increased DC receipt by 2.3%
points among Vietnam Era veterans - the precise estimate derived using aggregate
administrative data. Additionally, we find no effect of the Agent Orange decision
on VA pension receipt among Vietnam Era veterans, suggesting that the differential
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rise in DC receipt among Vietnam Era veterans is indeed a result of the policy
change.
We then estimate the effect of the Agent Orange decision on outcomes asso-
ciated with DC receipt. First, we find little to no differential change in labor force
participation among Vietnam Era veterans. However, we do estimate a differential
3.0% increase in the probability of reporting zero work hours in the previous week
and 2.1% point decline in the probability of having positive income from earnings
among Vietnam Era veterans after the policy change. We also find a decline in the
prevalence of health insurance through one’s employer and a comparable increase
in the prevalence of health insurance through the VA among Vietnam Era veterans.
Thus, it appears that a rise in DC receipt, and subsequent eligibility for VA health
care, may crowd out the private insurance market.
Taken together, our findings for the VA’s Disability Compensation program
suggest that changes in the medical eligibility criteria for disability programs can
have an important impact on program enrollment and expenditures. These findings
are consistent with the results from recent research on other federal disability pro-
grams such as SSDI (Autor and Duggan, 2003). But the main contribution of our
study relative to work for other disability programs is that, because the change to
DC applied only to Vietnam veterans, we can use other veterans as a comparison
group to obtain a more reliable estimate of the policy impact. Changes to the SSDI
and SSI programs have applied equally to essentially all potential applicants of those
programs, and it has therefore been difficult to disentangle the effect of changes to
these programs from the effect of other factors such as macroeconomic conditions.
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3.2 The Department of Veterans Affairs and the
Disability Compensation Program
The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) provides benefits to veterans of mili-
tary service and their families. At the end of the 2006 fiscal year, the VA estimated
that there were 24 million veterans residing in the U.S. and that an additional 45
million were potentially eligible for VA benefits as family members or survivors of
veterans. According to VA estimates, the number of living veterans fell by almost
10 percent from September of 2000 to September of 2006.3
As Table 3.1 demonstrates, this change in the veteran population has been
associated with a substantial change in its composition, both because of mortality
among veterans from earlier eras and because of entry by those serving during the
Gulf War era. Most strikingly, the number of veterans from the World War II era
declined by 44 percent (from 5.59 to 3.15 million) during this six-year period while
the number of veterans from the Gulf War era increased by 51 percent from to
2.84 to 4.30 million. Veterans from the Vietnam era were the largest group in both
years, with their ranks declining 8.01 to 7.63 million but their share of all veterans
increasing from 30 to 32 percent.4




4According to the VBA’s 2004 Annual Benefits Report, the approximate service dates by era
were: World War II (September 1940 - July 1947), Korea (June 1950 - January 1955), Vietnam
(August 1964 - May 1975), and Gulf War (August 1990 - present). Peacetime includes veterans
who served during all other periods. These population estimates assign veterans who served in
two or more eras to their earliest era of service. However a veteran who served during a conflict
and during peacetime would always be assigned to the conflict.
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It is worth noting that, while veterans are categorized based on their period
of service, the number serving in specific conflicts tend to be much lower than the
era-specific population data would suggest. For example, a recent estimate by the
VA suggests that just 2.3 million of the 7.7 million Vietnam-era veterans alive in
2005 actually served in Vietnam.
3.2.1 VA Programs and Expenditures
Despite the significant decline in the veteran population since 2000, total VA ex-
penditures have increased by an average of 6 percent per year during the same
period. Table 3.2 lists total VA spending by category for the 1998 through 2005
fiscal years. As Table 3.2 shows, Compensation and Pension (CP) was the largest
category of spending throughout this period, with the $32.1 billion in CP program
benefits representing 46 percent of total spending by the VA during the 2005 fiscal
year. The Veterans Health Administration (VHA) provided medical care to 4.96
million patients during this same year at a cost of $30.7 billion. The remaining
$7.5 billion in VA spending was spread across several categories, including operat-
ing expenses, construction, insurance, housing assistance, vocational rehabilitation,
training programs, and burial and memorial benefits.
CP benefits are paid through four main programs. The largest in terms of
both enrollment and expenditures is the Disability Compensation program, which
according to the data displayed in Tables 3.3 and 3.4, accounted for 75 percent of
CP enrollment and 74 percent of expenditures, respectively, during the 2005 fiscal
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year. The DC program pays benefits to disabled veterans of military service whose
conditions were caused or aggravated by their military service. The program is
not means-tested and an individual’s DC benefits are not directly affected by his
earnings. This is in contrast to the SSDI and SSI programs, which substantially
reduce recipients’ incentives to work.
The Disability Pension (DP) program is targeted at low-income wartime veter-
ans who either are age 65 or older or are permanently and totally disabled (regardless
of service-connectedness). This program accounted for just 10 percent of CP en-
rollment and 9 percent of CP spending during the 2005 fiscal year. Beneficiaries of
both the DC and DP programs are eligible for health care through the VHA and
their expenditures accounted for much of the $30.7 billion in VHA spending during
this same year.5 The VA also paid $4.5 billion in cash benefits to the survivors of
0.54 million deceased veterans through the Death Compensation and Death Pension
programs.
3.2.2 The Disability Compensation Program
To apply for Disability Compensation benefits, a veteran must submit an applica-
tion at one of 63 regional offices of the Veterans Benefit Administration (VBA).
At this stage, the ’authorization unit’ collects necessary information regarding the
claimant’s application. These would include military service records and medical
records from both VA medical facilities and private providers. The application is
5The VHA provides care to other veterans as well, with 4.96 million served by the VHA during
the 2004 fiscal year.
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then forwarded to a Rating Board, which determines whether each disability for
which an application is submitted is service connected and assigns an appropriate
degree of disability according to the Schedule for Rating Disabilities. These ratings
range from 0 to 100 percent (in 10 percent increments) depending on the type and
severity of the disability, with more severe conditions receiving a higher rating.6 The
recipient’s combined disability rating (CDR) is a function of the individual ratings.
If the award is made for just one condition then the CDR is equal to the rating
for that condition. If the award is made for multiple conditions then the CDR is
generally greater than any of the individual ratings, though the CDR is not simply
a sum of the remaining ratings.7
If a DC award is made, the CDR is used to determine the monthly cash benefit
amount, which is an increasing function of this rating.8 The monthly benefit can
increase beyond this base for DC recipients with a CDR of 30 percent or more and
who have dependent spouses, children, or parents. The benefit can also increase for
those with ratings of 60 percent or more and who are deemed unemployable. The
second column of Table 3.5 lists the baseline monthly benefit amounts for the 2006
fiscal year by disability rating. As the table shows, benefit amounts increase with
the CDR and the dollar increment from one category to the next also increases with
6The possible ratings depend on the disability. For example type II diabetes can have ratings of
10, 20, 40, 60, or 100 percent, whereas arthritis can only be assigned a rating of 10 or 20 percent.
For a list of conditions and possible ratings see http://www.warms.vba.va.gov/bookc.html.
7If a claimant has multiple disabilities, only the claimant’s residual ability is considered when
determining the impact of the next disability considered. For example, if a veteran has two
disabilities rated at 50%, then only 50% of his ability is considered when determining the impact
of the second disability. Therefore, his CDR would be 80%; the sum of 50% for the first and 25%
for the second (.5*(1-.5)) rounded to the nearest increment of 10%.
8The VBA considers the average reduction in earnings capacity to determine the benefit amount
associated with each value of the CDR.
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the CDR. For example the monthly payment rates for ratings of 10, 40, 70, and 100
percent are $112, $485, $1099, and $2393, respectively. The next three columns in
the table show the adjustments to these baseline amounts if the veteran has one or
more dependents.
The first three columns of Table 3.5 list the total number of recipients, the
total benefits paid, and the average monthly benefit in each CDR category in June
of 2006 (the most recent month available). The average payment to the 2.70 million
DC recipients in that month was $780 for a total of $2.11 billion in cash benefits.
Those with ratings between 0 and 20 percent accounted for 45 percent of recipients
but just 9 percent of dollars paid. The corresponding shares for those with ratings
at or above 70 percent were 21 and 62 percent, respectively.9
As the next several columns of this table demonstrate, there was considerable
variation across service eras in the distribution of the combined disability rating.10
For example, among Vietnam era DC recipients, 32 percent had CDRs of 70 percent
or more. The corresponding share for DC recipients who incurred their disabilities
during the Gulf War era was just 13 percent. Because of this, average monthly
benefits also varied widely by service era, from a low of $578 for Gulf War veterans
to a high of $1029 for veterans serving in Vietnam.
9The average amounts for those rated 60 percent and higher are much greater than the baseline
amounts because many of these recipients are eligible for the 100 percent payment amount because
they are deemed unemployable.
10DC recipients are assigned to eras based on where their most significant disability occurred.
This will introduce some measurement error in our estimates for era-specific DC enrollment rates
because the population data are constructed differently, though the importance of this should not
change significantly over short periods of time.
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3.2.3 The DC Program’s Medical Eligibility Criteria
In a typical year more than 70 percent of DC applicants apply for benefits for more
than one condition. One of three outcomes is possible - outright rejection, an award
for some but not all conditions, or an award for all conditions. During the 2000
fiscal year, 14 percent of applications considered were awarded for all conditions, 48
percent for some conditions, and 38 percent were outright rejected (VBA, 2001).11
During the course of the year a total of 83,159 DC awards were made, with the
average number of rated conditions among new recipients equal to 3.2.
Until July of 2001, the medical eligibility criteria for DC benefits were essen-
tially the same across service eras. Any veteran who was honorably discharged and
whose disability did not result from his willful misconduct could qualify for DC ben-
efits if his disability ”was a result of disease or injury incurred or aggravated during
active military service.” Many conditions would clearly have resulted from military
service. For example if a soldier lost one or more limbs during a battle then there
would be no uncertainty about whether the injury was service-connected. The same
would also be true for scars, the most commonly compensated condition among DC
recipients. The existence of such a causal link for the typical tinnitus (persistent
ringing in the ears) or post-traumatic stress disorder application might be somewhat
less clear cut, though still certainly plausible.12
11These decisions are frequently appealed. Existing DC recipients can also apply for an increase
in their benefit amount, either because of an increase in the severity of a rated condition or because
a new health problem arises.
12A listing of the top twenty impairments at the end of each fiscal year can be found in the
VBA’s annual report. In September of 2000 more than 12 percent of DC recipients had ”scars,
other” as one of their qualifying conditions. Next most common were skeletal conditions (10.6
percent), knee impairment (9.8 percent), and arthritis due to trauma (8.0 percent). Tinnitus (6.2
percent) and PTSD (5.8 percent) were the 6th and 9th most common conditions.
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Proving that such a link existed for a condition such as diabetes would un-
doubtedly be much more difficult. Indeed a 2000 report by the National Academy
of Sciences argued that the most important determinants of diabetes were physical
inactivity, family history, and obesity. The report further argued that any increased
risk posed by wartime exposure to herbicides appeared to be small or nonexistent
(NAS, 2000). Despite this, approximately 1.6 percent of DC recipients had diabetes
as one of their covered conditions in September of 2000. While this share is not
trivial, diabetes was not one of the twenty most common conditions among DC
recipients at that time, nor was it one of the ten most common conditions for DC
recipients from any of the five major service eras.
3.3 The Institute of Medicine Report on Agent
Orange Exposure
While the DC program’s medical eligibility criteria were essentially the same for all
military veterans up until July of 2001, the types of disabilities incurred undoubtedly
varied across service eras. For example, one might expect a significantly higher rate
of service-connected post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) among DC recipients
who served in the Vietnam War than among their counterparts from other eras
given the intensity of the conflict there. And this was indeed the case, with 13.3
percent of DC recipients from the Vietnam era receiving compensation for PTSD in
September of 2000 versus just 2.2 percent of all other DC recipients (VBA, 2001).
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Another reason that the disabilities incurred might vary across service areas
is that different weapons and techniques were used by the U.S. military and their
opponents over time. One notable example of this is the use of herbicides in the
Vietnam War. Agent Orange was one of fifteen herbicides used by the U.S. military
to defoliate trees that might otherwise provide cover to opposing forces. Although
the use of Agent Orange did not begin until 1965, it represented more than 80
percent of the 19 million gallons of herbicides sprayed in Vietnam (VA, 2003).
Soon after the war ended, many Vietnam veterans voiced concerns about the
possible long term effects of exposure to Agent Orange and other herbicides used
in Vietnam. In response to these concerns, the VA established the Agent Orange
Registry in 1978, which provided voluntary medical examinations to veterans who
served in Vietnam between 1962 and 1975. Thirteen years later, the Agent Orange
Act of 1991 was enacted, which charged the National Academy of Sciences’ Institute
of Medicine with conducting a review of the existing scientific literature regarding
the possibility of a link between Agent Orange exposure and the prevalence of certain
medical conditions.
In a series of five reports released between 1994 and 2003, the Institute of
Medicine (IOM) grouped forty different medical conditions into one of four categories
- (1) sufficient evidence of an association between Agent Orange and the condition
(2) limited or suggestive evidence of an association (3) inadequate or insufficient
evidence and (4) limited or suggestive evidence of no association. Interestingly,
none of the four categories required causal evidence. In the first three reports,
diabetes was placed in the third category, with the IOM concluding that there was
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insufficient evidence to establish an association between dioxin exposure and the
onset of diabetes.
But soon after the third IOM report was released in 1999, two new studies
were released that provided supporting evidence of an association between dioxin
exposure and diabetes (Calvert et. al., 1999; AFHS, 2000). In October of 2000, the
IOM evaluated the new studies in the context of previous research and concluded
that there was suggestive evidence of an association between Agent Orange exposure
and the onset of diabetes (IOM, 2000). This moved diabetes from category three
to category two. In response to this report, the Secretary of the VA announced
in November of 2000 that type II diabetes would be compensable under the DC
program and, more importantly, that diabetes would be ”presumptively” service-
connected among those veterans who served in Vietnam.13 Diabetes would not
become compensable, however, until July of 2001.
Shortly after this policy change, the growth in total DC enrollment increased
substantially, as shown in Figure 3.1. From September of 1996 to 2001, the number
of DC recipients increased by just 0.6 percent per year. But during the next five
years the annual growth rate was 3.3 percent, suggesting that the expansion in the
eligibility criteria for Vietnam veterans was the main cause.
However this was not the only possible explanation for the increase in the rate
of DC enrollment growth. For example, the Veterans Claim Assistance Act, which
was enacted in 2000, required the VA to provide more assistance to DC applicants
13No such presumption was made for other Vietnam-era veterans, with the exception of those
who served in Korea in either 1968 or 1969 because the U.S. military used herbicides there during
this period as well (VA, 2005).
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from all eras and to add more resources to the processing of DC applications (GAO,
2002). Similarly the economic downturn and the corresponding increase in the
unemployment rate may have caused some veterans to seek out alternative sources
of income. And finally, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq may have led to a significant
increase in the prevalence of disabilities among veterans serving in these conflicts.
In the next two sections we estimate the impact of the Agent Orange decision on
DC enrollment and expenditures while controlling for these and other potentially
confounding factors.
3.4 The Effect of the Agent Orange Decision on
Enrollment in the DC Program
Theoretically, one would expect the Agent Orange decision to have increased the
propensity of veterans who served in Vietnam to apply for DC benefits. As Parsons
(1980), Bound (1989), and others have noted, a key determinant of an individual’s
decision to apply for disability benefits is the probability that an award is made.
It seems likely that this award probability increased following the July 2001 policy
change, especially for Vietnam veterans who knew they had diabetes. But it may
also have increased the incentive for other Vietnam veterans. For example, a veteran
who thought there was some chance that he had diabetes might go for a medical
checkup.14 This medical checkup could identify other health problems, and thus he
14According to a CDC report (2003), approximately one third of diabetics in US are undiagnosed.
See Singleton (2006) for an analysis of self-reported rates of diagnosed diabetes among veterans
and non-veterans in response to the Agent Orange decision.
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could subsequently qualify for the DC program even if he did not have diabetes.
The policy change would also have increased the incentive for existing DC
recipients who served in Vietnam to apply for an increase in their monthly benefit.
As described above, a veteran’s DC benefit is a function of the combined disability
rating (CDR), which generally increases when an additional condition is rated at
10 percent or more. Thus the Agent Orange decision could have increased both DC
enrollment and the amount of benefits paid to existing DC recipients.
3.4.1 Differences-in-Differences Estimates of the Impact on
DC Enrollment
In its publication titled Annual Benefits Report, the Veterans Benefit Administra-
tion provides detailed information each year on the characteristics of individuals
receiving DC benefits at the end of the previous fiscal year. This information in-
cludes the number of DC recipients with certain diagnoses, the number with each
of the eleven possible combined disability ratings (0 to 100 percent), the average
monthly benefit received, and many other variables of interest. This data is further
broken down by service era, which can be used to estimate the impact of the policy
change described above on enrollment in the DC program.
Because the Agent Orange decision differentially affected veterans who served
in the Vietnam War, one can essentially use veterans from other eras to control
for other changes occurring at the same time that might also have affected DC
enrollment. For example, the Veterans Claim Assistance Act that was passed in
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the year 2000 influenced the DC application and award process for veterans from
all eras (GAO, 2002). To the extent that this policy, the economic downturn, and
other factors did not have a different effect on Vietnam veterans than on veterans
from other eras, their effects could be captured by the time effects t in the following
differences-in-differences model:
DCjt = β0 + β1Xjt + β2V ietnamj + β3(V ietnamj)(Postt) +
τ2∑
t=τ1
θt + εjt (3.1)
In this model, the outcome variable DCjt, is equal to one if individual j received
DC benefits in year t and zero otherwise. The variable Vietnamj is equal to one if
individual j is a Vietnam era veteran and zero otherwise. POSTt is set equal to one
after the policy takes effect, though to the extent that the impact is not immediate
it may be more appropriate to allow the policy’s impact to vary over time.15 The
parameter of particular interest in this model is 3, which is the coefficient on the
interaction between the Vietnamj and POSTt variables and represents the impact of
the policy change on the probability of DC enrollment among Vietnam era veterans.
The key assumption for reliable estimation of 3 is that there are not unobserved
factors that influence DC enrollment differentially for Vietnam era veterans following
the policy change.
Ideally when estimating a differences-in-differences model such as this one, the
treatment and comparison groups would be identical on background characteristics
15Note that the inclusion of year indicators in this model makes it unnecessary to add a POST
variable separately, as this would then be a linear function of certain year indicators.
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such as age, education, and other possible determinants of DC enrollment. Of course,
veterans who served in Vietnam will differ from other veterans in many respects.
For example, they are older on average than Gulf War veterans and younger than
veterans who served in Korea. But to the extent that the enrollment effect of these
differences does not change at the time of the policy change, it would be captured
by era-specific fixed effects and era-specific time trends.
3.4.2 Choosing the Comparison Group
The data summarized in Table 3.7 lists the number of veterans receiving DC benefits
by service era in September of each year from 1998 to 2006. This table also lists the
percentage change in this number from the previous year, the number of veterans
in each service era, and the fraction of veterans receiving DC benefits. Before
considering the effect of the 2001 policy change, three points are worth noting from
this table. First, the number of DC recipients who served in World War II is
declining steadily throughout this time period because of the high mortality rate
among this group. Second, the number of DC recipients who served in the Gulf War
era increased rapidly throughout this period. While this has largely been driven
by an increase in the number of Gulf War era veterans (those serving since August
1990), the increase in the fraction receiving benefits from 9.6 to 16.2 percent has been
nearly as important. And finally, the trends from 1997 to 2000 in DC enrollment
are fairly similar for the other three service eras. During this period, DC enrollment
increased by an average of 0.8 and 1.7 percent per year, respectively, among Vietnam
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and peacetime era veterans, while declining by an average of 2.2 percent per year
among those serving in the Korea conflict.
Given these trends, it seems clear that veterans from either the World War
II or Gulf War eras would not be an appropriate comparison group for estimating
the effect of the 2001 policy change on DC enrollment. Which of the other two
eras is more appropriate is not as obvious. On the one hand, just prior to the
Agent Orange decision, peacetime and Vietnam era veterans had similar rates of
DC enrollment at 8.6 and 9.3 percent, respectively. The corresponding rate among
Korean War era veterans was much lower at 4.9 percent. And in terms of average
age, those classified as peacetime were much more similar to Vietnam era veterans
because most served either shortly before or after the Vietnam War.16 But on the
other hand, many veterans from the Korean and Vietnam War eras incurred their
disabilities in a military conflict and thus their service-connected disabilities may
be more similar. But this seems unlikely to be as important as the age and DC
enrollment similarities, and we therefore use individuals who served in peacetime as
our comparison group.
16According to data from the VA, the average ages of Korea War, Vietnam War, and peacetime
era veterans in September of 2002 were 72, 57, and 53, respectively. Table 3.1 demonstrates that
veterans who served between the Korean and Vietnam War eras accounted for 53 percent of the
peacetime era veteran population in September of 2000, with those serving after Vietnam but
before the Gulf War era accounting for an additional 44 percent.
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3.4.3 The Impact of the Agent Orange Decision on DC En-
rollment Rates
Figure 3.2 displays the fraction of Vietnam and peacetime era veterans receiving DC
benefits in September of each year from 1998 through 2006.17 As is clear from the
figure, the trends for the two groups were fairly similar from 1998 to 2001, with the
rate of enrollment increasing from 9.0 to 9.4 percent among Vietnam veterans and
from 8.1 to 8.7 percent among peacetime veterans.18 The trend for the peacetime
group was quite similar during the next five years, with 9.7 percent of peacetime
veterans receiving DC benefits by the end of the 2006 fiscal year. But the 3.0
percentage point increase in DC enrollment among Vietnam era veterans was exactly
three times as large during this same five-year period, with their enrollment rising
from 9.4 to 12.4 percent. Our differences-in-differences estimate of the effect of the
Agent Orange decision on the change in DC enrollment from September of 2001 to
September of 2006 is therefore 2.0 percent.19
Our baseline estimate of 2.0 percentage points does not account for the fact
17As described above, the assignment of DC recipients to eras (the numerator) differs somewhat
from the assignment of veterans to eras for population estimates (the denominator). For example,
to be counted as peacetime in the population data a veteran must have served only in peacetime.
To be assigned to peacetime as a DC recipient the veteran must have incurred his most severe
disability during peacetime. This will introduce measurement error in our estimated enrollment
rates. But as long as the impact of this has a smooth trend over time, it should not bias this
comparison or the results that follow.
18The trends are similar through 2001 as well, though as our diagnosis data below demonstrates,
the policy change had already started to have an effect by the end of 2001 and thus we consider it
as post policy here.
19This estimate and the one in the next paragraph would be almost identical if we instead
used 2000 as the baseline. One possible source of bias in this estimate is that DC recipients who
served both in peacetime and in Vietnam could, after qualifying from diabetes, switch from being
classified as peacetime era to being classified as Vietnam era. While there is no way to rule out
this possibility, the fact that the trend in DC enrollment for peacetime era veterans did not change
significantly after 2001 suggests that it is not an important source of bias.
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that the pre-existing trends in DC enrollment were slightly different for veterans from
the Vietnam and peacetime eras. We next account for this by assuming that the
average annual increase for each group from 1998 to 2001 continued for the next five
years. Given this assumption, the predicted rates of DC enrollment in September of
2006 for peacetime and Vietnam era veterans were 9.6 and 10.1 percent, respectively.
The actual rate of 9.7 percent for our control group was almost identical to their
predicted rate. But the same was not true for veterans from the Vietnam era, whose
actual DC enrollment of 12.4 percent was 2.3 percentage points higher in 2006 than
predicted.
Given that there were approximately 7.6 million Vietnam-era veterans alive
in September of 2006, this latter estimate suggests that the Agent Orange decision
increased DC enrollment by 175,000 above what it otherwise would have been by
September of 2006. But this decision applied only to the 2.3 million veterans who
served in Vietnam. Thus the expanded eligibility criteria induced a 7.6 percent-
age point increase in DC enrollment among those veterans who actually served in
Vietnam. Furthermore, this increase can explain more than 53 percent of the accel-
eration in overall Disability Compensation enrollment since September of 2001 that
is apparent in Figure 3.2.20
20The number of DC recipients increased at a 0.64 percent annual rate from 1998 to 2001. Had
this growth continued during the next five years, the number of DC recipients would have been
329,044 lower in September of 2006. Thus the induced increase of 175,000 accounts for more than
53 percent of this. Essentially all of the remaining acceleration is attributable to the growing
importance of entry by Gulf War veterans and the declining importance of exits by World War II
DC recipients.
118
3.5 The Effect on Existing DC Recipients and on
Program Expenditures
The results in the previous section estimated the effect of the Agent Orange decision
on the number of veterans receiving DC benefits but this did not include any result-
ing increase in benefits for existing DC recipients. In this section, we estimate this
latter effect by using aggregate data from the VBA’s Annual Benefits Report on the
diagnoses of new and existing DC recipients in each year. We then investigate the
effect of the policy change on total DC expenditures, which incorporates both the
benefits paid to new recipients and the increase in benefits for existing recipients.
3.5.1 The Number of Vietnam Veterans Experiencing an
Increase in DC Benefits
The top two rows of Table 7 list the number and percentage, respectively, of DC
recipients receiving compensation for diabetes in each year. At the end of the 2000
fiscal year, just 1.6 percent of DC recipients were paid for this condition, with this
fraction unchanged from the previous year. But in the years following the 2001
policy change, this percentage increased consistently, reaching a peak of 8.4 percent
by the end of 2005 (the most recent year of this VBA data). This increase was driven
almost entirely by Vietnam era DC recipients, with 20.8 percent of them receiving
compensation for diabetes in September of 2005 versus just 1.8 percent of all other
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DC recipients.21 Just three years after the policy change, diabetes had become the
most frequently compensated condition among Vietnam era DC recipients after not
being in the top ten in September of 2001.
The number of Vietnam-era DC recipients compensated for diabetes increased
from 18,993 in September of 2000 to 190,199 by September of 2005, a difference
of 171,206 cases. This increase reflects the coverage of diabetes among both new
and existing DC recipients, though the VBA does not report how many of the
new diabetes cases were already receiving DC at the time of the policy change.
To estimate this, we first calculate how many new DC recipients would have been
covered for diabetes by September of 2005 if the number of new diabetes awards
in each year had remained at its 2000 level.22 Using the data listed in Appendix
Table 2, we estimate that the total number of new awards for diabetes after the
Agent Orange decision would have been lower by 122,796 during this period. If
one makes the conservative assumption that none of these awardees would have
exited the program by the end of 2005, then an additional 48,410 individuals who
were receiving DC benefits at the time of the 2001 Agent Orange decision enjoyed an
increase in their benefits by September of 2005 because their diabetes was covered.23
However, this estimate excludes the number enjoying an increase in benefits during
21Values in this table with an asterisk were imputed. See the notes to Appendix Tables E.1
and E.2 for a description of our imputation procedure.
22There were 125,756 new diabetes awards from 2001 to 2005 versus the 2,960 (= 592 * 5) that
we estimate would otherwise have been made. This is lower than the increase in the number of
Vietnam-era DC recipients by September of 2005, perhaps because many of the applications had
diabetes rejected but other conditions accepted. The most common outcome of a DC application
is to have one or more conditions accepted and others rejected.
23To calculate this, we subtract the increase in the number of Vietnam era veterans with diabetes
from 2000 to 2005 (171,206) from the increase in the number of new DC recipients with diabetes
as a covered condition (122,814).
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the 2006 fiscal year, and we therefore factor this estimate by 1.2 to arrive at our
estimate of 58,092 for the number of existing DC recipients who enjoyed an increase
in their monthly benefits because of the Agent Orange decision.24
When combined with the results from the previous section, our estimates sug-
gest that approximately 233,000 Vietnam veterans enrolled in DC or enjoyed an
increase in their DC benefits as a result of the Agent Orange decision by 2006.
This represents approximately 10.1 percent of the 2.3 million veterans who served
in Vietnam and were still living in September of 2006.
3.5.2 The Impact on Short and Long-Term Disability Com-
pensation Expenditures
The effect of the Agent Orange decision on Disability Compensation expenditures
depends on the characteristics of both those newly awarded DC benefits and of
their counterparts already on the program who enjoyed an increase in their DC
benefits. The main determinant of the short-term increase in spending is the CDR
of new recipients and the increase in the CDR for existing recipients. If the 175,000
Vietnam veterans awarded benefits all had a CDR of just 10 percent, for example,
then the effect on spending would be relatively modest. The same would be true if
the 58,000 enjoying an increase in their benefits rose from a CDR of 10 to just 20
percent.
24Some of those applying for an increase in benefits may have applied for multiple conditions or
for an increase in ratings for existing conditions. Even if their diabetes applications were turned
down, some recipients may have enjoyed an increase in benefits because of the application. This
is one reason that our estimate may be too low.
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To estimate the effect of the Agent Orange decision on benefits paid, one
would ideally use individual-level longitudinal data on DC enrollment and benefit
amounts for all veterans. This would allow us to estimate which new recipients
enrolled in the program because of the policy change and which existing recipients
enjoyed an increase in their benefits. Aggregating up the monthly benefits for these
individuals, we could then calculate the effect on DC spending. Unfortunately we
do not have this type of data. An (admittedly imperfect) alternative is to utilize
aggregate data on the distribution of CDRs by service era in the years leading up
to and following the policy change. As in the previous section, here we control for
pre-existing trends in DC spending among Vietnam-era veterans to estimate the
change that would have occurred in the absence of the Agent Orange decision if
the pre-2000 trends had continued through June of 2006 (the most recent month
available). Specifically we estimate the annual change from 1998 to 2000 in the
number of Vietnam era veterans with each CDR and use this to predict the number
with this CDR in 2006 as follows:25






with VDC,j,t equal to the number of Vietnam era DC recipients in CDR j in year t.
We attribute any difference between the actual and predicted number of recipients
within each CDR to the Agent Orange decision. To estimate the effect on spend-
ing we simply multiply these CDR-specific effects by the average monthly benefit
25We multiply by 5.75 because we are considering the change from September of 2000 to June
of 2006.
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amount for that CDR. If our assumptions are accurate, this estimate captures the
spending effect that is attributable both to new recipients and to existing recipients.
Of course, the trend in the number of Vietnam era DC recipients for each CDR
may have changed after 2000 even in the absence of the change in the program’s
medical eligibility criteria. For example, the Veterans Claim Assistance Act, the
economic downturn, and related factors could have induced a break in trend. We
therefore follow our approach from above and use veterans from the peacetime era
as a control group. If our algorithm does a reasonable job of predicting the actual
change in the number in each CDR bin for this group, it suggests that our estimates
for the effect of the Agent Orange decision are not biased significantly by potentially
confounding factors.
The results from this analysis are summarized in Table 3.8. The first and
second panels include data for Vietnam and peacetime era veterans, respectively.
The first three columns of the top panel list the number of Vietnam era veterans
on the DC program with each of the eleven possible CDRs in 1998, 2000, and 2006,
respectively. An examination of this data suggests that, despite the fact that the
number of DC recipients was not changing much from 1998 to 2000, the distribution
of the CDRs was. For example the number of DC recipients with ratings between
10 and 40 percent ratings declined by 3 percent, while the corresponding number
with ratings between 50 and 100 percent increased by 12 percent. A similar pattern
existed for peacetime era DC recipients from 1998 to 2000, with an increase of just
1 percent for ratings between 10 and 40 percent versus an increase of 13 percent for
ratings between 50 and 100 percent. These pre-existing trends suggest that, even
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in the absence of the policy change, the distribution of CDRs among Vietnam and
peacetime era DC recipients would have changed after the Agent Orange decision.
The fourth column lists the change in the number with each CDR that would
have occurred from 2000 to 2006 if these pre-existing trends had continued. To
calculate these predicted changes, we use equation 3.2 above. According to our
estimates, the number of Vietnam era veterans with a rating of 10 percent would
have fallen from 227,800 to 201,658 while the number with a rating of 100 percent
would have increased from 85,994 to 109,172 during this five year period. The first of
these two estimates is relatively accurate, as the number with a ten percent rating
in June of 2006 was 206,429. But the latter estimate is much too low, with the
actual number rated at 100 percent standing at 137,020 at the end of our period.
The discrepancy between our estimates and the actual change for all eleven
possible CDRs is listed in column seven. In every case our estimates are too low,
which is not so surprising given the substantial increase in DC enrollment among
Vietnam era veterans from 2000 to 2006. But in general the discrepancies are
greatest for the highest CDRs. For example, we predicted an increase of 38,752
in the number with ratings of 80 percent or more, but the actual increase was
substantially higher at 100,937.26 Multiplying these CDR-specific discrepancies by
the average monthly benefit in June of 2006 for each CDR, we estimate that DC
expenditures were $2.69 billion higher during the 2006 fiscal year than they would
have been if the pre-2000 trend had continued. This represents more than 23 percent
26This would be surprising if DC recipients with diabetes had low benefits on average. But in
December of 2004 the average benefit was 19 percent greater among Vietnam-era DC recipients
with diabetes than among their counterparts without diabetes. This is because recipients with
diabetes tend to also be covered for other conditions.
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of benefits paid for Vietnam-era DC recipients in the 2006 fiscal year.
The bottom panel repeats this exercise for veterans from the peacetime era.
In this case the discrepancies between our predictions and the actual number in
each CDR are much smaller. As was true for Vietnam era veterans, we tend to
underestimate more for the higher CDRs, though the total estimated dollar value of
our discrepancies is just $0.02 billion for the 2006 fiscal year, which is 99.4 percent
lower than the corresponding estimate of $2.69 billion for Vietnam era DC spend-
ing. Additionally, this represents just 0.4 percent of DC spending on peacetime
era DC recipients. The similarity between actual and predicted DC expenditures
for peacetime era veterans suggests that our estimate for the effect of the Agent
Orange decision on Vietnam era DC spending is not driven by other factors such as
macroeconomic conditions or the Veterans Claims Assistance Act.
Of course, the Agent Orange decision did not only affect expenditures during
the 2006 fiscal year, but in several previous years and in many future years as well.
To estimate the impact of the Agent Orange decision on the present value of DC
spending, we take the following simple approach. First, for the 2002 to 2005 fiscal
years, we simply linearly interpolate the 2006 estimate. This would, for example,
assume that 40 percent of the $2.69 billion expenditure effect had occurred by 2003.
For future years, we deflate the 2006 estimate by the VA’s estimated decline in the
Vietnam era veteran population. For example, the VA estimates that their ranks will
decline by 16.2 percent from 2006 to 2016, and we therefore assume an expenditure
effect of $2.26 billion in that latter year.27
27The VA indexes DC benefits to the Consumer Price Index and thus we do not scale for the
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Using this algorithm along with an annual real discount rate of 3 percent, we
estimate that the present value of DC spending increased by $45.1 billion dollars
(in 2006 dollars) as a result of the policy change. For two reasons, this estimate is
likely to understate the actual effect on the present value of VA spending. First, it
assumes that there is no effect beyond the 2006 fiscal year on the number of DC
recipients or on the benefits paid for existing DC recipients.28 Second, it does not
incorporate the effect on health care spending for DC recipients through the Veterans
Health Administration,, which we cannot reliably estimate with the available data.
On the other hand, the estimate may be biased upward given that mortality rates
of Vietnam-era DC recipients affected by the Agent Orange decision are likely to
be higher than for the average Vietnam era veteran. But even when we adjust
our present value calculations to account for the higher baseline mortality rates of
Vietnam era DC recipients,29 our estimated effect falls by just 19 percent to $36.7
billion.
3.6 Reduced-Form Effects of the Agent Orange
Decision
In the previous sections, we estimate the impact of the Agent Orange decision on
DC rolls and expenditures using aggregate enrollment and expenditure data. With
effect of inflation.
28It also neglects any effect beyond 2033, as the VA does not make population projections beyond
that year.
29The mortality rate in 2000 of Vietnam era DC recipients was 1.55% versus 0.71% for all
Vietnam era veterans. We therefore scale the estimated mortality rates for all Vietnam veterans
by 2.18 when calculating the present value.
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peacetime veterans as a comparison group, the Agent Orange decision increased DC
enrollment among Vietnam era veterans by an estimated 2.3 percentage points and
DC expenditures by$2.69 billion in 2006 fiscal year alone. We next consider other
possible effects associated with an increase in DC receipt and benefit amounts. For
example, the increased generosity of DC benefits may have discouraged Vietnam
veterans to work. If this were the case, we would expect a decline in labor force par-
ticipation among Vietnam veterans relative to comparable veterans or non-veterans
who were not affected by the policy. Since the effect of the Agent Orange decision
may indeed extend beyond just DC receipt and benefit generosity, estimating these
reduced-form effects are important for comprehensive policy evaluation. To estimate
these reduced-form effects of the Agent Orange decision, we employ micro-level data
from the March Supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS). By pooling
CPS surveys for years 1998 to 2006, we first replicate the first-stage results of the
effect of the Agent Orange decision on DC receipt. To do so, we derive and estimate
a difference-in-differences type model of DC receipt which reflects the aggregate
trends in DC receipt exhibited in Figure 3.2. Then, using a similar estimation equa-
tion, we estimate the effect of the Agent Orange decision on factors such as labor
supply and health insurance status.
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3.6.1 Sample Specification and Summary Statistics
The sample is constructed by pooling the March Supplement of the CPS for years
1998 through 2006 (reference years 1997 through 2005).30 The policy was imple-
mented in July 2001, so the sample spans four pre-reform years (1997 to 2000),
four post-reform years (2002 to 2005), and the year during which the policy was
implemented (2001).
In contrast to the aggregate data, these micro-level data provide the addi-
tional advantages of constructing more reliable comparison groups (for example, by
conditioning the sample on year-of-birth) and controlling for demographic factors
such as age, race, and educational attainment. One such comparison group, which
was not possible using aggregate data, is comparably aged non-veterans. However,
since veterans are predominately male, it would be circumspect to compare Vietnam
veterans to all comparably aged non-veterans. Thus, in the empirical analysis, we
restrict the sample to males.
Veteran status estimates by year-of-birth among males in the 2000 CPS are
provided in Table 3.10. As indicated, era of service is well defined by birth cohort.
For example, the prevalence of Vietnam veterans is highest among birth cohorts
1944 and 1948, peaking at 43.3% of males born in year 1947. Korean veterans, on
the other hand, are generally older than Vietnam veterans - approximately 50% of
individuals born between 1930 and 1933 are Korean War veterans. The prevalence
of peacetime veterans is highest among birth cohorts between those that define
30Prior to pooling, all person weights within a sample year were rescaled to sum to the number
of person observations within the same sample year.
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Korean War and Vietnam Era veterans and birth cohorts born shortly after those
that define Vietnam Era veterans.
Similar to the aggregate data analyses, we first consider using veterans who
did not serve during the Vietnam Era in comparison to Vietnam Era veterans;
however, in addition to peacetime veterans used in the aggregate analyses, we also
include Korean veterans in the comparison group. Conditioning the sample on males
born between 1930 and 1959, summary statistics among Vietnam Era veterans and
all other veterans (excluding the few World War II veterans born during these
years) are presented in Table 3.11. Naturally, these other veterans are slightly
older than Vietnam Era veterans (58.9 versus 52.5). This age disparity manifests
itself in other statistics associated with age; labor force non-participation (43.4%
versus 18.0%), any income from earnings (62.1% versus 85.0%), receipt of Social
Security benefits (42.8% versus 7.6%), and any disability (15.1% versus 12.5%).
In regards to VA benefits, Vietnam Era veterans relative to Other veterans are
more likely to receive DC benefits (7.1% versus 3.6%) and any VA benefits (9.3%
versus 5.6%), but the amount of VA benefits among those receiving benefits are
comparable among Vietnam Era veterans relative to Korean War and peacetime
veterans (11508versus12070).
To be consistent with the previous analyses, we first consider Korean War
and peacetime veterans as a comparison group to Vietnam veterans; but given
the age disparity among these two groups, we also consider comparably aged non-
veterans as a comparison group. Because there are a substantial number of non-
veterans in all birth years, we can constrict the birth cohorts under consideration
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from 1930 to 1959 to birth cohorts 1939 to 1954. Summary statistics among Vietnam
Era veterans and non-veterans born between 1940 and 1950 are also presented in
Table 3.11. As indicated, the average age among these two groups are similar: 52.3
and 51.0 among Vietnam Era veterans and non-veterans, respectively. Additionally,
labor force non-participation among Vietnam Era veterans is similar to non-veterans
(16.1% versus 14.6%), as well as any income from earnings (86.8% versus 85.9%),
receipt of Social Security benefits (4.8% versus 5.5%), and any disability (12.5%
versus 11.3%). However, demographics among these two groups differ in important
ways: Vietnam Era veterans are more likely to have completed high school and
attended college relative to non-veterans but are less likely to have completed college.
3.6.2 Equation Specification and First-Stage Results
Failure to replicate the previous first-stage estimates would cast doubt on subsequent
reduced-form results. Thus, we first consider estimating impact of the Agent Orange
decision on DC receipt among Vietnam Era veterans using other veterans as a
comparison group. To estimate the impact of the policy on DC receipt, we model
receipt according to the aggregate trends in Figure 3.2. The model considered is
given by
DCjt = α0 + α1V ietjPosttrendt + α2Trendt + α3Koreanj + α4Peacej
+α5KoreanjTrendt + α6PeacejTrendt + α7Xj + εjt
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In this estimation equation, we allow for era specific intercepts and trends in
DC receipt: Koreanj and Peacej are indicator variables for era status and Trendt
equals zero in reference year 1997 and increases by one for each year thereafter.
When indicated, fixed factors such as race (black, white, and other), educational at-
tainment (less than high school, high school, some college, and college and beyond),
and individual age effects are included, denoted by the vector Xj in the specification
equation above.
The coefficient of interest is α1 which corresponds to the interaction of an
indicator for Vietnam Era status V ietj and a post-trend variable Posttrendt. In
contrast to Trendt, Posttrendt is equal to zero during years 1997 to 2001 and
increases by one each year thereafter. In accord with aggregate trends in DC receipt
in Figure 3.2, this interaction term allows for a differential trend in DC receipt among
Vietnam Era veterans that begins after the Agent Orange decision was implemented.
Assuming that DC receipt among veterans from various eras would have followed
their preexisting linear trends in the absence of the policy, the coefficient α1 is the
percentage point increase in DC receipt among Vietnam Era veterans due to the
policy for each year after it was implemented.
The baseline estimate of α1; sans race, educational attainment, and age con-
trols and using veterans who did not serve during the Vietnam Era as a comparison
group; is .46 and statistically significant at the 5% level of confidence (Table 3.12).
The estimated effect of the policy on DC receipt among Vietnam Era veterans by
2006, calculated as .46 factored by 5, is 2.3 percentage points. This estimate corre-
sponds precisely with the estimated 2.3 percentage points obtained from aggregate
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administrative data.
As indicated in Table 3.11, Vietnam Era veterans more educated than other
veterans, a factor which may cast doubt on the identification assumptions outlined
above. Therefore, in the next specification, we include race and educational fixed
effects to the regression equation. When these effects are included, the estimate of
increases to .49, suggesting a 2.45 percentage point increase in DC receipt among
Vietnam Era veterans by 2006. Also indicated in Table 3.11, Vietnam Era veter-
ans are younger than other veterans, so in the third specification we include race,
educational attainment, and individual aged fixed effects. As shown, the estimate
of α1 is .48. Thus, the baseline estimate of 2.3 percentage points is robust to the
inclusion of race, educational attainment, and age fixed effects.
If unknown factors other than the Agent Orange decision generated a differen-
tial increase in DC receipt among Vietnam Era veterans, then it would be careless
to attribute the 2.3 percentage point increase in DC receipt among Vietnam Era
veterans to the policy. For example, according to Table 3.11, Vietnam Era veterans
are younger and substantially more likely to be in the labor force. So if Vietnam
Era veterans exhibit a greater incidence of retirement, and thus a greater propensity
to seek alternative sources of income, relative to other veterans then the differential
increase in DC receipt among Vietnam Era veterans cannot be entirely attributed
to the reform.
To explore this alternative explanation, we employ the same linear probability
specification to model VA pension receipt. Intuitively, if factors other than the
Agent Orange decision generated the differential rise in DC receipt among Vietnam
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Era veterans and if these other factors similarly increased the prevalence of VA
pension receipt, then we expect to reject the null hypothesis that α1 is zero.
Estimation results when the outcome of interest is VA pension receipt are pre-
sented in Table 3.12. As indicated, the estimate of α1 is negligible and statistically
insignificant. Since VA pension receipt did not rise in tandem with DC receipt, and
since the Agent Orange only affected DC eligibility, these results cast doubt that
factors unrelated to the Agent Orange decision generated the differential rise in DC
receipt among Vietnam Era veterans.
3.6.3 Reduced-Form Results
We next consider the effects of the Agent Orange decision on outcomes associated
with a rise in DC generosity. These outcomes include labor supply, sources of
income, poverty status, health status, and health insurance status. The preferred
linear probability model is given by,
Yjt = β0 + β1V ietjPosttrendt + β2V ietjPostt + β3Trendt + β4Koreanj + β5Peacej
+β6KoreanjTrendt + β7PeacejTrendt + β8Xj + υjt
where Yjt is the outcome of interest. The model is identical to the one con-
sidered above with one modification: the inclusion of V ietjPostt, where Postt is
equal to one in reference years 2001 to 2005 and zero otherwise. This interaction
term allows for a discreet change in the probability of Yjt among Vietnam Era vet-
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erans after the Agent Orange decision is implemented. (This term was suppressed
in the DC receipt model estimated above because, when included, it did not affect
the estimate of α1 and its associated coefficient was negligible and insignificant.)
This permits, for example, a discreet and permanent shift in the probability of work
among Vietnam Era veterans in anticipation of receiving DC benefits.
The first set of outcomes considered is labor supply. The CPS asks whether
a veteran is not participating in the labor force and, if not participation, asks for
one of three reasons why; retirement, disability, or other. Estimation results of
labor force non-participation are in Table 3.14. As indicated, there does not appear
to be a statistically significant shift or trend effect of the Agent Orange decision
on labor force non-participation among Vietnam Era veterans. However, when the
outcome variable is defined as not working in the past week, the policy appears to
have decreased the probability of working by 3.0 percentage points.
The second set of outcomes considered is income from various sources. Al-
though the results above do not suggest a decline in labor force non-participation,
there does appear to be a decrease in the probability of reporting positive income
from earnings during the reference year. According to the estimates from our model,
Vietnam Era veterans were 2.1% points less likely to report income from earnings
after the policy was implemented. Also, in accord with our DC receipt estimates,
the receipt of any VA benefits differentially trended upwards among Vietnam Era
veterans relative to other veterans, reaching a differential increase of 2.8% points
by 2006. And finally, the estimates suggest a 1.5% point increase in the receipt of
”other retirement benefits” which, according to the way the question was phrased,
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excludes retirement benefits from the SSA and the VA.
We next consider the effect of the Agent Orange decision on health status.
In particular, we estimate two probability models of whether a respondent reports
a disability and whether he reports being in poor health. As shown in previous
studies, the advent or receipt of disability benefits may influence the response to
such questions in a survey. However, our results, also presented in Table, suggest
that policy had no effect on prevalence of self-reported disability or poor health
among Vietnam Era veterans.
And finally, we estimate the effect of the policy on health insurance status.
As previously stated, Veterans may become eligible for VA health care upon receiv-
ing DC benefits for a service-related disability. Thus, if public provision of health
insurance crowds out the private health insurance market, it may be possible that
an increase in DC receipt may correspond to a decrease in insurance through one’s
employer. As shown in Table 3.14, the estimates suggest a 1.1 percentage point in-
crease in the probability of insurance through the VA among Vietnam Era veterans
per year after the policy was implemented. Additionally, there is a 1.4 percentage
point drop decline in the probability of insurance through one’s employer per year
after the policy was implemented. These estimates imply that by 2006 5.5 percent of
Vietnam Era veterans became insured through the VA and 7.0 percent discontinued
insurance through his employer. Thus, the results are consistent with the crowd-out
hypothesis: Vietnam Era veterans dropped health insurance through their employ-
ers after being newly eligible for DC benefits and corresponding health insurance
benefits through the VA.
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3.6.4 Results Using Non-Veterans as the Comparison Group
The results thus far reflect the use of veterans who did not serve during the Vietnam
Era as the comparison group; however, for reasons outlined above, these veterans
may not be ideal. Thus, we next consider using comparably aged non-veterans as
a comparison group to Vietnam Era veterans. Because there are is a substantial
number of non-veterans during all birth cohorts, we restrict the analysis to Vietnam
Era veterans and non-veterans born between 1939 and 1954. Naturally, the main
and interacted effects of Koreanj and Peacej are omitted from the equation above.
We first return to the first-stage regressions: the probability of DC receipt. As
indicated in Table 3.13, the estimated effects using non-veterans as a comparison
group are larger than those obtained using veterans who did not serve during the
Vietnam Era. The larger estimates are not surprising given that few non-veterans
receive DC benefits in any given year, so the variable Trendj imposed on both
Vietnam Era veterans and non-veterans alike is unfounded. Nonetheless, it is re-
assuring to confirm the qualitative result that DC receipt increases differentially
among Vietnam Era veterans after the policy was implemented.
Similar to the first-stage results, many of the reduced-form results are robust
to the use of non-veterans as a comparison group. First, Vietnam Era veterans were
2.4 percentage points less likely to be working in the past week after the policy
was implemented (Table 3.14). In terms of income, Vietnam Era veterans were
less likely to report positive income from earnings (1.6 percentage point decline
after the policy was implemented) and were more likely to receive any income from
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the VA (.56 percentage point increase per year after the policy was implemented).
Interestingly, the health insurance status results are also robust, further suggesting
that the increased eligibility of VA health insurance due to the Agent Orange decision
lead to a decline in insurance through one’s employer.
3.7 Discussion
The findings in this paper suggest that a change in the medical eligibility criteria for
the VA’s Disability Compensation program that applied only to Vietnam veterans
induced a 7.6 percentage point increase in disability enrollment among this group
and increased the monthly benefit amount for an additional 2.5 percent. The effects
of this change on VA expenditures were substantial, with our estimates suggest-
ing that DC spending during the 2006 fiscal year was $2.69 billion higher than it
otherwise would have been and that the present value increase in VA expenditures
was approximately $45 billion. These estimates for enrollment and expenditures
are likely to be conservative, as we have not considered any effect on veterans not
already affected by June of 2006 nor have we incorporated the resulting increase in
health care spending through the Veterans Health Administration.
What do these findings imply for other disability programs such as SSDI and
SSI? Because only the 2.3 million veterans who served in Vietnam were directly
affected by this policy change, it is clear that one cannot assume that a similar
change for those programs would have the same response. Additionally, because the
DC program is quite different from SSDI and SSI, which pay benefits on an all-or-
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nothing basis and do not allow recipients to have significant labor market earnings,
the effect of such a change for these other programs might be quite different. However
the findings do demonstrate that a relatively narrow change in the medical eligibility
criteria for the DC program led to an increase in disability benefits for 10.1 percent of
the individuals potentially affected by the policy. This makes it more plausible that
the 1984 reforms to SSDI and SSI, which expanded the medical eligibility criteria
for these programs, could have been largely responsible for the significant increase
in enrollment for these two programs during the past two decades.
A potentially important direction for future research would be to estimate the
effect of the induced increase in DC enrollment on the health, labor supply, and
material well-being of veterans who served in Vietnam. As a result of this policy
change, more Vietnam veterans received essentially free health care through the
Veterans Health Administration. This, along with the increase in benefits, could
plausibly have improved the health of Vietnam veterans. Similarly while the DC
program does not introduce a high marginal tax rate on earnings, it is plausible
that a DC award or an increase in DC benefits could reduce labor supply through
an income effect.
More generally, the VA’s Disability Compensation program is a large and
rapidly growing program that has essentially been ignored in prior economic re-
search. At present there are 2.72 million veterans receiving DC benefits with $25
billion paid in benefits during the 2005 fiscal year. More work on this program,
which is an increasingly important source of income and insurance for the nation’s

























































































































Table 3.1: Veteran Population Estimates by Era of Service in September of 2000
and 2006
Number in Millions Share
2000 2006 % Change 2000 2006
World War II Era 5.59 3.15 -43.6% 21.1% 13.1%
Between WWII and Korea 0.24 0.16 -33.3% 0.9% 0.7%
Korean War Era 3.50 2.76 -21.1% 13.2% 11.5%
Between Korea and Vietnam 2.88 2.54 -11.8% 10.8% 10.6%
Vietnam War Era 8.01 7.63 -4.7% 30.2% 31.8%
Between Vietnam and Gulf War 3.49 3.45 -1.1% 13.1% 14.4%
Gulf War Era 2.84 4.30 51.4% 10.7% 17.9%
Total # of Veterans 26.55 23.98 -9.7% 100.0% 100.0%
Data includes the number of veterans alive in September of 2000 and September of 2005 from each of seven different service eras.
Individuals who served during a conflict and during peacetime are assigned to the conflict. Individuals serving during two or more of
the four conflicts are assigned to the earliest conflict. Data were obtained from the VA’s VP04 Ver 1.0 population estimates, which
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.4: Compensation and Pension Expenditures by Program: 1999-2004
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Disability Compensation $16,298 $16,755 $17,430 $19,095 $20,736 $21,290
Disability Pension $2,520 $2,444 $2,396 $2,470 $2,530 $2,530
Death Compensation $3,897 $3,892 $3,926 $3,873 $4,027 $4,011
Death Pension $807 $750 $715 $705 $701 $692
Total Estimated $23,520 $23,842 $24,467 $26,274 $27,993 $28,523
Data represents the total estimated expenditure by program in each fiscal year (in millions of 2005 dollars). Data for the 1999-2004
fiscal years is available online from the VBA’s Annual Benefits Report publication at http://www.vba.va.gov/reports.htm. Totals
differ slightly from those listed in Table 2 because this data is estimated while the data in Table 2 represents actual spending.
Table 3.5: Monthly Disability Compensation Benefit Amounts During the 2006
Fiscal Year
1 child and Each Add Each Add
CDR Baseline 1 child 1 spouse 1 spouse Child < 18 In School 18+
10% $112 $112 $112 $112 $0 $0
20% $218 $218 $218 $218 $0 $0
30% $337 $364 $377 $406 $20 $64
40% $485 $521 $539 $578 $27 $86
50% $690 $735 $757 $806 $34 $107
60% $873 $927 $954 $1,012 $40 $129
70% $1,099 $1,162 $1,193 $1,262 $47 $150
80% $1,277 $1,349 $1,385 $1,463 $54 $172
90% $1,436 $1,517 $1,557 $1,645 $61 $193
100% $2,393 $2,484 $2,528 $2,626 $68 $215
Data represents the monthly benefit amount by combined disability rating (CDR) and presence of dependents for Disability


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 3.10: Veteran and Armed Service Status of Men by Year of Birth
Vietnam Korean WWII Other/ Armed Non veteran/
YOB Vietnam Korean WWII Peacetime Services armed services
1910-1919 0.0 0.4 20.2 0.8 0.0 78.6
1920-1929 0.4 5.9 23.4 0.9 0.0 69.4
1930 2.6 49.9 1.8 5.8 0.0 39.9
1931 2.0 55.6 0.0 4.8 0.0 37.6
1932 3.0 52.1 0.0 8.5 0.0 36.4
1933 3.2 45.2 0.0 8.8 0.0 42.8
1934 4.3 27.1 0.0 18.7 0.0 50.0
1935 6.8 21.7 0.0 23.2 0.0 48.3
1936 6.7 15.8 0.0 23.8 0.0 53.8
1937 8.8 8.7 0.0 28.1 0.0 54.4
1938 9.2 5.0 0.0 27.5 0.0 58.4
1939 11.4 0.0 0.0 23.1 0.0 65.5
1940 17.2 0.0 0.0 18.5 0.0 64.2
1941 22.5 0.0 0.0 15.3 0.1 62.2
1942 29.8 0.0 0.0 10.1 0.0 60.2
1943 29.9 0.0 0.0 9.4 0.4 60.4
1944 38.6 0.0 0.0 4.2 0.0 57.2
1945 41.1 0.0 0.0 3.4 0.0 55.5
1946 41.0 0.0 0.0 3.1 0.3 55.6
1947 43.4 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.2 54.1
1948 35.0 0.0 0.0 3.0 0.5 61.5
1949 27.6 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.0 69.5
1950 23.4 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.1 72.9
1951 18.1 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.2 78.9
1952 15.5 0.0 0.0 3.2 0.5 80.8
1953 11.5 0.0 0.0 4.5 0.3 83.7
1954 10.5 0.0 0.0 5.8 0.1 83.6
1955 7.8 0.0 0.0 5.4 0.8 86.0
1956 5.0 0.0 0.0 10.1 0.7 84.1
1957 2.8 0.0 0.0 10.7 1.4 85.0
1958 0.9 0.0 0.0 11.2 0.8 87.1
1959 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.5 0.6 88.9
1960-1969 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.1 0.7 93.2
1970-1979 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.8 0.7 96.4
Statistics were derived from males in the March Supplement of the 2000 Current Population Survey. Service era
among veterans is determined by the period during which the veteran served. Veterans who served during a
conflict and other/peacetime are assigned to the conflict era. Veterans who served in more than one conflict are
assigned to the most recent conflict. Year of birth is determined as 2000 - age - 1, where age is self-reported in the
CPS. Prevalence rates of veteran status were estimated using the March CPS person weights.
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Table 3.11: Summary Statistics of Males by Veteran Status and Year of Birth
Years of Birth 1930-1959 1939-1954
Veteran Status Vietnam Other Veterans Vietnam Non Veterans
Observations 3,555 3,149 3,169 8,337
Age 52.5 58.9 52.3 51.0
(4.9) (9.4) (3.7) (4.6)
Education (%)
Less than HS 4.3 10.5 4.1 14.8
(20.2) (30.7) (19.9) (35.5)
HS 33.0 38.4 32.7 29.4
(47.0) (48.6) (46.9) (45.6)
Some College 35.1 27.9 35.3 22.1
(47.8) (44.9) (47.8) (41.5)
College and Beyond 27.6 23.2 27.9 33.7
(44.7) (42.2) (44.8) (47.3)
Race (%)
White 88.6 87.7 88.9 84.1
(31.7) (32.8) (31.4) (36.6)
Black 9.1 10.2 8.9 10.4
(28.7) (30.3) (28.5) (30.6)
Other 2.3 2.1 2.2 5.5
(15.0) (14.2) (14.5) (22.8)
Health Status
Any Disability 12.5 15.1 12.5 11.3
(33.1) (35.8) (33.0) (31.6)
Bad Health 5.8 6.8 5.9 5.4
(23.4) (25.2) (23.5) (22.7)
Insurance Status
Employer 66.1 55.2 67.3 61.6
(47.3) (49.7) (46.9) (48.6)
Private 7.6 14.7 6.9 7.7
(26.5) (35.5) (25.4) (26.7)
VHA 5.2 4.0 5.0 0.1
(22.2) (19.6) (21.8) (3.3)
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Summary Statistics of Males by Veteran Status and Year of Birth (cont’d)
Labor Force Status (%)
Not in Labor Force 18.0 43.4 16.1 14.6
(38.5) (49.6) (36.8) (35.3)
NILF - Retired 8.2 35.4 6.0 4.3
(27.4) (47.8) (23.7) (20.2)
NILF - Disabled 7.4 5.7 7.7 7.5
(26.2) (23.2) (26.6) (26.4)
NILF - Other 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.8
VA Receipt (%)
Disability Compensation 7.1 3.6 6.9 0.4
(25.7) (18.6) (25.4) (6.1)
Veteran Pension 2.2 2.2 1.7 0.0
(14.8) (14.7) (12.8) (2.2)
(15.5) (14.9) (15.5) (16.5)
Sources of Income
Receipt (%)
Earnings 85.0 62.1 86.8 85.9
(35.7) (48.5) (33.9) (34.8)
VA Payments 9.3 5.6 8.7 0.4
(29.1) (23.1) (28.2) (6.6)
Social Security Benefits 7.6 42.8 4.8 5.5
(26.6) (49.5) (21.5) (22.8)
Other Retirement 11.8 30.5 9.5 4.4
(32.2) (46.1) (29.4) (20.5)
Other Disability 2.2 1.3 2.2 1.5
(14.6) (11.5) (14.6) (12.3)
Investment Income 65.9 65.7 65.7 59.8
(47.4) (47.5) (47.5) (49.0)
Public Assistance 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.4
(2.5) (5.0) (1.8) (6.1)
Sources of Income
Amount (2005$)*
Earnings 58613 45909 59156 61296
(49671) (45700) (48595) (55636)
VA Payments 11508 12070 11197 10103
(11641) (12363) (11363) (9621)
Social Security Benefits 11303 12218 11490 11492
(5444) (5208) (6031) (5203)
Other Retirement 21396 17122 20966 21004
(15229) (14858) (14536) (16172)
Other Disability 16396 14119 17293 11939
(17670) (18797) (18328) (17481)
Investment Income 3897 5188 3738 3945
(10832) (12307) (10526) (9861)
Public Assistance 1244 2037 304 4603
(1059) (1820) (8) (3596)
Statistics were constructed using the 2000 March Supplement of the Current Population Survey (reference year
1999). The sample was initially restricted to all civilian males. Statistics reflect the use of person sample weights.
Sample standard deviations are in parentheses. * Implies that zeroes amounts were excluded.
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Table 3.12: Linear Probability of DC and DP Receipt - March CPS Supplements
1998 through 2006
Dependent Variable Disability Compensation Disability Pension
Vietnam*Posttrend 0.46** 0.49** 0.48** 0.08 0.09 0.01
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Korean -2.15*** -2.15*** -1.40*** -0.08 -0.03 -1.87
(0.52) (0.52) (0.63) (0.38) (0.38) (0.49)
Peacetime -3.69*** -3.72*** -3.21*** -0.80 -0.81 -1.00
(0.42) (0.42) (0.46) (0.28) (0.28) (0.32)
Trend -0.04 -0.05 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.05
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Korean*Trend 0.00 0.02 -0.19 0.01 0.02 -0.12
(0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13)
Peacetime*Trend 0.19 0.21 0.11 0.09 0.10 -0.06
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
Education Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Race Fixed Effects No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Age Fixed Effects No No Yes No No Yes
Year Fixed Effects No No No No No No
Year/Era Fixed Effects No No No No No No
Observations 70451 70451 70451 70451 70451 70451
R-Square 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
The data are constructed by first pooling the March supplements of the CPS from years 1998 to 2006 (reference
years 1997 through 2005). Prior to pooling, family (individual) weights were rescaled to sum up to the total
number of family (individual) observations. The sample is then restricted to male veterans born between 1930 and
1959, excluding the few World War II veterans who were born during these years. Although the CPS
questionnaire explicitly asks whether one receives disability compensation benefits, the CPS questionnaire asks
whether one receives a veterans’ pension, which may not necessarily be interpreted as disability pension benefits.
The variable Trend increases by 1 for each reference year, starting at 0 for reference year 1997 and increasing to 8
in 2005. The variable Posttrend is equal to 0 for reference years 1997 to 2001 and increases by 1 for each year
thereafter, reaching 4 by reference year 2005. Education fixed effects (no high school, high school, some college,
and college and beyond), race fixed effects (white, black, and other), and individual age fixed effects may be




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Provisions and Estimated Costs of EGTRRA and Related
Acts
The increase and refunding of the child tax credit were the most notable EGTRRA
provisions relating to children. When first introduced in 1998, the child tax credit
equaled $400 per child. Unlike personal exemptions and deductions, which reduce
TI, the child tax credit reduced taxes owed. Thus, the value of the child tax credit
did not depend on a filer’s marginal tax rate, and the relative value of the child tax
credit declined as TI increased. Because of this, and since the child tax credit phased
out at very high levels of income, the child tax credit was originally considered
progressive. However, any child credit in excess of taxes owed was not refunded, so
individuals with no tax liability prior to EGTRRA did not benefit from the child
tax credit.
The EGTRRA provided a phase-in increase of the child tax credit amount and,
more importantly, made it partially refundable for some families with little or no tax
liability. According to the EGTRRA, the child tax credit was scheduled to increase
from $500 in 2000 to $600 in 2001 through 2004, $700 in 2005 through 2008, $800
in 2009, and $1,000 in 2010. However, the JGTRRA and WFTRA expedited the
increase of the child tax credit amount to $1,000 for tax years 2003 through 2009.
Also, in 2001, the EGTRRA made the child tax credit partially refundable for
couples with income TI above $10,000.1 The refund amount would equal 10 percent
1The correct definition for calculating the child tax refund is taxable earned income.
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of taxable income above $10,000 in excess of taxes owed.2 Thus, for example, a
couple in 2001 with $17,000 in TI, no tax liability and two children would receive
$700 (.1*($17,000-$10,000)) of its full $1,200 child tax credit amount (2 children
times $600). The $10,000 threshold was indexed for inflation in subsequent years;
and the refund rate, originally scheduled to increase from 10 to 15 percent in 2005,
increased to 15 percent in 2004 with the implementation of the WFTRA.
Another set of provisions discussed here changed the tax rate schedule. First,
the EGTRRA legislation replaced the lower portion of the preexisting 15 percent
tax bracket with a new 10 percent tax bracket at TI between $0 and $12,000 for
married, joint filers.3 The upper bound of this new 10 percent bracket was not
indexed for inflation, but it was scheduled to increase from $12,000 to $14,000 for
married, joint filers in tax years 2008 through 2010. The JGTRRA and WTFRA,
however, implemented this increase beginning in tax year 2003. And second, the
EGTRRA provided a gradual reduction of marginal tax rates for the remaining tax
brackets: the tax brackets in 2000 with marginal tax rates of 28%, 31%, 36%, and
39.6% were scheduled to decline to 25%, 28%, 33%, and 35%, respectively, by 2006.
The JGTRRA fully implemented both the increase in the upper bound of new 10
percent tax bracket and the reduction in marginal tax rates in 2003.
Appendix Table A2 provides net total cost estimates for each Act and select
provisions from the year of their enactment until 2011. The projected net cost of
EGTRRA from 2001 to 2011 was $1.35 trillion. The estimated cost of the three
sets of provisions discussed above - tax benefits relating to children, changes to the
income tax rate structure, and marriage penalty relief - account for 82.9% of net total
cost of the EGTRRA, with changes to the income tax rate structure alone accounting
for over two-thirds (64.9%). Tax provisions related to educational incentives; estate,
gift, and generation-skipping expenses; pension provisions; alternative minimum tax
relief; and a few other miscellaneous provisions account for the remaining 17.1% of
total costs.
The projected costs of the subsequent Acts from the year of their enactment
to 2011 - $349 billion and $146 billion for JGTRRA and WFTRA, respectively -
were modest relative to the ten year cost estimate of the EGTRRA. One reason is
that neither of the subsequent Acts repealed the EGTRRA’s sunset provision. Also,
many of the provisions of JGTRRA were temporary and became inapplicable after
tax year 2005. And finally, while the WFTRA accelerated the phase-in of many
of the original provisions, many of these provisions were already scheduled to be
partially phased in by 2005. Thus, the estimated cost of the WFTRA only reflects
the costs in addition to the those already accounted for by the EGTRRA.
2An alternative calculation of the child tax credit refund may be possible for families with three
or more children, are ineligible for EITC, and are low income.
3In 2001, the 10% tax rate was implemented through a rate reduction credit - the new bracket
does not appear in the income tax schedule until tax year 2002. Also, the upper bound of the 10










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2001 Statistics of Income
The Statistics of Income (SOI) is a public-use data file constructed from federal tax
returns filed with the Internal Revenue Service. The 2001 version contains 143,218
records representing the 130.6 million returns filed for that year.
The SOI sample is restricted to married, joint filers (1) who filed a Form 1040
for year 2001, (2) who did not receive farm income, (3) whose dependents are own
children only, (4) who claimed the itemized or standard deduction, and (5) whose
state of residence was reported. The last requirement, a state identifier, was not
imposed to construct Figure 1.2.
The table below contains details of this selection process. The first column
describes the sample selection criteria. The second column contains the percent of
total observations that satisfy the selection criteria with and without using sam-
ple weights. The third column is a running tally of observations remaining after
each additional criteria is imposed. The remaining 6,384 observations were used to
estimate average deductions by state.
I construct summary statistics from the SOI for married, joint filers whose
AGI-DER is between $55k and $95k in 2002 dollars by increments of $10k (Appendix
Table B1). Again, AGI-DER is defined as taxable wage income plus non-negative
values of self-employment income and is the approximation of actual AGI in the
CPS-DER. This range of AGI-DER was chosen to adequately span the treatment
and comparison groups of interest, evident by the reported estimate of the percent
“Treated” (equaling one if actual 2002 TI is between $47,900 and $55,394) which
across AGI-DER categories increases from 11.9% to 33.5% and 24.3% and then
declines to 10.9%. All dollar figures were adjusted from 2001 to 2002 dollars using
an average wage index.
I first compare AGI-DER to actual AGI reported in the SOI. According to
the SOI, taxable wage income and self-employment income (referred to as business
income in Appendix Table B1) represent 95.6% of total income, so AGI-DER appears
to be a relatively accurate measure of AGI. However, the omission of certain sources
of income results in AGI-DER underestimating AGI across all categories ($72,699
compared to $76,466), with the largest disparity occurring among lower levels of
AGI-DER.
I then examine average exemptions reported in the SOI. Again, personal ex-
emptions are based on family size and are subtracted from AGI to determine TI.
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Reported in Panels C and D, the average exemption was $9,506, which reflects
children living both at and away from home. I then calculate average exemptions
based only on children residing in the home, labeled Exemptions -DER, which is
$9,426.1 Comparison of Exemptions and Exemptions - DER suggests that the in-
ability to observe dependent children living away from home is not a major concern
for computing TI.
And finally, I examine the prevalence and amount of itemized deductions.
According to the SOI, approximately 81.0% of these filers had itemized their de-
ductions and claimed an average deduction of $15,262. Thus, as mentioned above,
assigning the standard deduction amount of $7,850 (in 2003) would severely bias
the assignment of couples into treatment and comparison groups. To address this
concern, I estimate average deduction amounts by state in the SOI and assign them
to households by state of residence in the CPS-DER (see Appendix C for details).
1The personal exemption amount inflated to 2002 dollars is $2,929 compared to the actual
exemption amount of $3,000 in 2002. For consistency, I calculate Exemptions -DER using $2,929.
Reported under Miscellaneous Statistics in Panel D, less than 1% of these couples claimed children
living away as dependents.
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Table B.1: Sample Selection Criteria, Statistics of Income 2001
Sample Criteria % of Total Sample Remaining
(Unwgt/Wgt) Observations
Total 100/100 143,218
Married, Filing Jointly 65.8/39.2 94,216
File 1040 89.0/62.0 91,216
Tax Year 201 95.4/97.2 87,348
No Farm Income 95.3/98.5 81,736
Dependent Children Only 99.0/97.8 81,387
Itemized or Standard Deduction 94.0/98.9 77,398
State Identifier 48.7/97.5 27,378
$55k<AGI-DER<$95k 9.35/13.67 6,384
Appendix C
Computation of Tax Parameters
Marginal and average tax rates were calculated using the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research’s TAXSIM model Version 7. Based on certain income and demo-
graphic parameters, the TAXSIM model calculates federal, state, and FICA tax
liability and marginal tax rates.
Data can be directly submitted to NBER’s TAXSIM model to compute tax
parameters. However, for confidentiality purposes, the CPS-DER could not be di-
rectly submitted to TAXSIM. Instead, artificial data were created that contained
all combinations of (1) integers of joint income of $100 from $100 to $200,000, (2)
number of eligible dependents for the personal exemption from zero to seven, (3)
number of eligible dependents for the child tax credit from zero to seven, and (4)
state of residence. Differentiating by state of residence is necessary because state
income tax systems vary across states and since deduction amounts were estimated
by state. The artificial data were then submitted to NBER’s TAXSIM model for
the computation of tax liability and marginal tax rates. The returned values were
then merged to the CPS-DER sample based on the four dimensions listed above.
According to the SOI, a significant number of married couples itemize their
deductions. To address this concern, I estimate average deduction amounts by
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Table B.2: Summary Statistics, Statistics of Income 2001
AGI - DER Category 55k-65k 65k-75k 75k-85k 85k-95k Total
Obs. 1,991 1,761 1,497 1,135 6,384
%, Weighted 30.25 28.58 23.93 17.24 100
Treated (%) 11.9 33.5 24.3 10.9 20.9
A. Income Subject to Taxation
Taxable Wage Income 57,698 67,454 76,732 86,608 70,024
Interest 676 711 775 783 728
Dividends 319 389 378 533 390
Business Income 1,998 2,198 2,520 2,754 2,310
Capital Gains 464 392 373 420 414
Other Gains -3 16 -20 -53 -10
Pensions 2,090 1,724 1,567 1,713 1,795
Schedule E 587 369 590 71 436
Other Income* 1,718 1,594 1,388 1,347 1,540
B. Survey of Income: Actual Values
AGI 64,546 73,726 83,017 92,831 76,466
Exemptions 9,408 9,459 9,551 9,693 9,506
Deductions 13,670 14,670 16,161 17,787 15,262
Taxable Income 42,152 50,363 58,177 66,367 52,507
C. Survey of Income: DER Comparison
AGI - DER 60,029 69,976 79,677 89,766 72,699
Exemptions - DER 9,325 9,380 9,476 9,612 9,426
Deductions - DER 14,291 14,829 15,317 16,155 15,012
Taxable Income - DER 36,187 45,540 54,655 63,767 48,033
D. Miscellaneous Statistics
Business Income +/- (%) 23.0 20.0 21.5 20.8 21.4
Business Income - (%) 7.0 5.7 6.5 6.1 6.4
Itemizers (%) 76.5 80.4 83.0 87.0 81.0
AMT (%) 0.3 0.3 1.0 1.1 0.6
Mortgage Interest Paid (%) 72.4 76.7 78.3 80.8 76.5
Child Away from Home (%) 0.8 0.7 1.3 0.7 0.8
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state in the SOI and assign them to households by state of residence in the CPS-
DER. Because deduction amounts generally increase with AGI-DER, I estimate
the average deduction amount only among the couples whose joint AGI-DER falls
between $55k and $95k. The accuracy of this imputation is improved by exploiting
state of residence given the strong correlation between state of residence and average
deduction amount. For example, among joint filers with AGI-DER between $55
and $95k, the average deduction for residents of Texas was $12,102 (57.9% of them
itemizing) compared to $17,336 (87.8% of them itemizing) in New York.
There are two reasons why the prevalence of deduction itemization varies by
state. First, differing state income tax codes generate variation in state taxes owed
which may be claimed as a deduction. To estimate the effect of state tax codes
on the prevalence of itemization, I regress the proportion of itemizers by state on
average state taxes owed among the restricted sample of 6,384 joint filers described
in Appendix Table B1. To plausibly surmount the inherent relationship between
income and itemization, I calculate the average state tax liability as if all 6,384
couples reside in that state. The estimate suggests that an additional $1,000 increase
in state taxes owed increases the probability of itemization by 5.6% points. Second,
the proportion of itemizers may correlated with the prevalence of home ownership
across states since mortgage interest payments are also deductible. A regression of
the proportion of itemizers by state on home ownership in the same state indicates
that home ownership is associated with a 18.5% point increase in the probability of
itemizing.
If the number of observations in a given state was less than 25, the standard
deduction was assigned to couples in the CPS-DER residing in that state. The
states with less than 25 observations include the Alaska, Delaware, the District of
Columbia, Montana, North Dakota, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, and
Wyoming. The standard deduction amount was assumed constant in real terms
from 2002 and 2004. Since the TAXSIM model uses its own calculated state income
tax liability to determine deductions, state income taxes paid were first subtracted
from itemized deductions prior to computing marginal tax rates. Comparison of
these imputed deductions, Deductions - DER, to actual deductions (Panels B and C
in Appendix Table B2) suggests that this imputation is fairly accurate on average.
All children residing in the home were considered eligible for the personal
exemption or the child tax credit if age appropriate. First, I calculated the children’s
ages in 2002 and 2004 by adding or subtracting the appropriate number of years to
or from the age reported in the CPS. If the child is less than 19 years of age or less
than 24 years of age and a student, the child is considered eligible for the personal
exemption. If the child is less than 17, then the child is considered eligible for the
child tax credit. Since children’s ages are adjusted by two years from 2002 to 2004,
a child may become newly eligible or ineligible for the personal exemption or the
child tax credit from 2002 to 2004. These changes in eligibility are reflected in the
165
actual and predicted changes in marginal and average tax rates.
Appendix D
Aching to Retire Data Appendix
SSDI Enrollment data by single year of age and gender for the 1983-2004 calendar
years were obtained from the Social Security Administration’s Annual Statistical
Supplement. In producing this data, the SSA uses a ten percent sample of the
Master Beneficiary Record (MBR). This same data was tabulated for December of
2005 using the full MBR. For the December 2004 data see
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/statcomps/supplement/2005/5a.pdf
Population data by single year of age and gender for the 1990-2005 calendar
years was obtained from the National Center for Health Statistics’ ”U.S. Census
Populations with Bridged Race Categories,” which can be found at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/major/dvs/popbridge/popbridge.htm
Population data by single year of age and gender for the 1983-1989 calendar
years was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau’s quarterly population estimates,
which can be found at
http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1980s/
Population data were reported as of July 1 in each year. We therefore took the
average of the values in year t and year t+1 to estimate the population in December
of year t. To estimate the population data in December of 2005, we multiplied the
July 1, 2005 estimate for age A by the ratio of the population at age A-1 on July 1,
2005 to the population at age A-1 on July 1, 2004.
Mortality rate estimates by gender and age were obtained from the Social
Security Administration’s Office of the Actuary. This data can be found at
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/STATS/table4c6.html


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































[1] Air Force Health Study (2000). Air Force Health Study: An Epidemiological
Investigation of Health Effect in Air Force Personnel Following Exposure to
Herbicides. 1997 Follow-up Examination Results. Brook Air Force Base: Air
Force Research Laboratory.
[2] Alm, J., S. Dickert-Conlin, and L. Whittington (1999). Policy Watch: The
Marriage Penalty. Journal of Economic Perspecives 13(3): 193:204.
[3] Attanasio, O. and A. Brugiavini (2003). Social Security and Households’ Saving.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(3): 1075-1119.
[4] Auten, G. and R. Carroll (1999). The Effect of Income Taxes on Household
Income. The Reveiw of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 681-693.
[5] Autor, D. and M. Duggan (2003). The Rise in the Disability Rolls and the
Decline in Unemployment. Quarter Journal of Economics 118(1): 157-205.
170
[6] Autor, D. and M. Duggan (2006). The Growth in the Social Security Disability
Rolls: A Fiscal Crisis Unfolding. Journal of Economics Perspectives 118(1):
157-205.
[7] Benitez-Silva, H., M. Buchinsky, H. Chan, J. Rust, and S. Sheidvasser (1999).
An Empirical Analysis of the Social Security Disability Application, Appeal,
and Award Process. Labour Economics 6: 147-178.
[8] Black, D., K. Daniel, and S. Sanders (2002). The Impact of Economics Condi-
tions on Participation in Disability Programs: Evidence from the Coal Boom
and Bust. American Economic Review 92(10): 27-50.
[9] Blank, R. (2001). What Causes Public Assistance Caseloads to Grow? Journal
of Human Resources 36(1): 85-118.
[10] Blundell, R. and T. MaCurdy (1999). Handbook of Labor Economics, v. 3.
[11] Bound, J. (1989). The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance
Applicants. American Economic Review 79(3): 482-503.
[12] Bound, J. (1991). The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance
Applicants: Reply. American Economic Review 81(5): 1427-1434.
[13] Bound, J. and R. Burkhauser (1999). Economic Analysis of Transer Programs
Targeted on People with Disabilities. In O. Ashenfelter and D. Card, eds.,
Handbook of Labor Economics, v. 3.
171
[14] Bound, J., T. Stinebrickner and T. Waidman (2004). Using a Structural Re-
tirement Model to Simulate the Effect of Changes to the OASDI and Medicare
Programs. University of Michigan Retirement Research Center Working Paper.
[15] Burkhauser, R. and M. Daly (1999). Disability and Work: The Experience of
American and German Men. Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Economic
Review 2: 17-29.
[16] Calvert, G., M. Sweeney, J. Deddens, and D. Wall (1999). An Evaluation of
Diabetes Mellitus Serum Glucose and Thyroid Function among US Workers
Exposured to 2,3,7,8-tetrachlorodibenzo-p-dioxin. Occupational and Environ-
mental Medicine 56: 270-276.
[17] Carroll, R. (1998). Tax Rates, Taxpayer Behavior, and the 1993 Tax Act. U.S.
Department of the Treasury, mimeo.
[18] Center for Disease Control (2003). Prevalence of Diabetes Impaired Fasting
Glucose in Adults - United States, 1999-2000. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
Report 52(35).
[19] Cromwell, J., S. Hurdle, and G. Wedig (1986). Impacts of Economics and Pro-
grammatic Changes on Medicaid Enrollments. Review of Economics and Statis-
tics 68(2): 232-240.
[20] Dokko, J. (2005). The Effect of Taxation on Labor Supply: Results from a
Quasi-Experiment. Unpublished University of Michigan thesis.
172
[21] Duggan, M. and S. Imberman (2006). Why are the DI Rolls Skyrocketing?
The Contribution of Population Characteristics, Economics Conditions, and
Program Generosity. Forthcoming in D. Cutler and D. Wise, eds., Health in
Older Ages: The Causes and Consequences of Declining Disability among the
Elderly.
[22] Duggan, M. and M. Kearney (2005). The Impact of Child SSI Enrollment on
Household Outcomes: Evidence from the SIPP. NBER Working Paper.
[23] Feenberg, D. and J. Poterba (1993). Income Inequality and the Incomes of
Very-High-Income Taxpayers. In Poterba, James, editor, Tax Policy and the
Economy. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[24] Feldstein, M. (1995). The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Taxable Income: A
Panel Study of the 1986 Tax Reform Act. Journal of Political Economy. MIT
Press, Cambridge, MA.
[25] Feldstein, M. (1999). Tax Avoidance and the Deadweight Loss of Income Tax-
tion. The Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4): 674-680.
[26] Garrett, B. and S. Glied (2000). Does State AFDC Generosity Affect Child SSI
Participation? Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 19(2): 275-295.
[27] Goolsbee, A. (2000a).It’s Not About the Money: Why Natural Experiments
Don’t Work on the Rich. In Slemrod, J., editor, Does Atlas Shrug? The Eco-
nomics Consequences of Taxing the Rich. Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA.
173
[28] Goolsbee, A.(2000b). What Happens When You Tax the Rich? Evidence from
Executive Compensation. Journal of Political Economy 108(2): 352-378.
[29] Gruber, J. (2000). Disability Insurance Benefits and Labor Supply. Journal of
Political Economy 108(6): 1162-1183.
[30] Gruber, J. and J. Kubik (1997). Disability Insurance Rejection Rates and the
Labor Supply of Older Workers. Journal of Public Economics 64(1): 1-23.
[31] Gruber, J. and E. Saez (2002). The Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence and
Implications. Journal of Public Economics 84(1): 1-32.
[32] Gustman, A. and T. Steinmeier (2005). The Social Security Early Entitlement
Age in a Structural Model of Retirement and Wealth (2005). Journal of Public
Economics 89(2-3): 441-463.
[33] Hausman, J. and J. Halpern (1986). Choice Under Undertainty: The Decision
to Apply for Disability Insurance. Journal of Public Economics 31(2): 131-161.
[34] Hoynes, H. (2000). Local Labor Markets and Welfare Spells: Do Demand Con-
ditions Matter? Review of Economics and Statistics 82(3): 351-368.
[35] Institute of Medicine (2000). Veterans and Agent Orange: Herbicide/Dioxin Ex-
posure and Type 2 Diabetes. Washington DC: The National Academies Press.
[36] Institute of Medicine (2003). Veterans and Agent Orange: Update 2002. Wash-
ington DC: The National Academies Press.
174
[37] Kessler, R. (2003). Prevalence and Treatment of Mental Disorders, 1990 to
2003. New England Journal of Medicine 352(24): 2515-2523.
[38] Kiefer, D., R. Carroll, J. Holtzblatt, and A. Lerman (2002). The Economic
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Acts of 2001. Overview and Assessment
of the Effects on Taxpayers. National Tax Journal 55(March): 89-117.
[39] Kreider, B. (1999). Social Security Disability Insurance: Applications, Awards,
and Lifetime Income Flows. Journal of Labor Economics 17(4); 784-827.
[40] Kubik, J. (1999). Incentives for the Identification and Treatment of Children
with Disability: The Supplement Security Income Program. Journal of Public
Economics 73(2): 187-215.
[41] Kubik, J. (2003). Fiscal Federalism and Welfare Policy: The Role of States in
the Growth of SSI. National Tax Journal 56(1): 61-79.
[42] . Lawrence, L. (1987). Individual Taxpayer Response to Tax Cuts:1982-1984,
with Implications for Revenue Maximizing Tax Rate. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics 33(2): 173-206.
[43] Looney, A. and M. Singhal (2004). The Effect of Anticipated Tax Changes on
Intertemporal Labor Supply and the Realization of Taxable Income. mimeo.
[44] MaCurdy, T. (1981). An Empirical Model of Labor Supply in a Life-Cycle
Setting. Journal of Political Economy 89(61): 1059-1085.
175
[45] Mitchell, O. and J. Phillips (2000). Retirement Responses to Early Social Se-
curity Benefit Reductions. NBER Working Paper.
[46] Moffitt, R. and M. Wilhelm (2000). Taxation and the Labor Supply Decisions
of the Affluent. In Slemrod, Joel, editor Does Atlas Shrug? The Economic
Consequences of Taxing the Rich. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA.
[47] Navratil, J. (1995). The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. Evidence on In-
dividual Taxpayer Behavior from Panel Tax Return Data. Unpublished Harvard
Thesis.
[48] Parsons, D. (1980). The Decline of Male Labor Force Participation. Journal of
Political Economy 88(1): 117-134.
[49] Parsons, D. (1991). The Health and Earnings of Rejected Disability Insurance
Applicants: Comment. American Economic Review 81(5):1419-1426.
[50] Rupp, K. and D. Stapleton (1995). Determinants of the Growth in the Social
Security Administration’s Disability Programs: An Overview. Social Security
Bulletin 43-70.
[51] Rupp, K. and D. Stapleton (1995). Growth in Disability Benefits: Explanation
and Policy Implications. Kalamazoo: WE Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research.
[52] Saez, E. (2003). The Effect of Marginal Tax Rates on Income: A Panel Study
of ’Bracket Creep’. Journal of Public Economics 87(5-6): 1231-1258.
176
[53] Sammartino, F. and D. Weiner (1997). Recent Evidence on Taxpayers’ Re-
sponse to the Rate Increases in the 1990’s. National Tax Journal 50(3): 683-
705.
[54] Schmidt, L. and P. Sevak (2004). AFDC, SSI, and Welfare Reform Aggressive-
ness: Caseload Reductions vs Caseload Shifting. Journal of Human Resources
39(3): 792-812.
[55] Singleton, P. (2006). The Effect of Disability Insurance on Health Investment.
University of Maryland, mimeo.
[56] Slemrod, J. (1990). Do Taxes Matter? MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
[57] Steurle, E. (2004). Contemporary US Tax Policy Urban Institute Press, Wash-
ington DC.
[58] US Department of Veterans Affairs (2003). Agent Orange Brief. Environmental
Agents Service (131) A1.
[59] US General Accounting Office (1998). Social Security Reform: Raising Re-
tirement Ages Improves Program Solvency but May Cause Hardship for Some.
Testimony before the Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate, Wash-
ington DC.
[60] US General Accounting Office (2002). Veterans Benefits: VBA’s Efforts to
Implement the Veterans Claims Assistance Act Need Further Monitoring. GAO-
02-412.
177
[61] US Social Security Administration. Annual Statistical Supplement to the Social
Security Bulletin. Various years, Office of Research, Evaluation, and Statistics.
[62] vba) Veterans Benefits Administration (selected years). VBA Annual Report.
Available online at http://www.vba.va.gov/reports.htm
[63] Ziliak, J., C. Gunderson, and D. Figlio (2003). Food Stamp Caseloads over the
Business Cycle. Southern Economics Journal 69(4): 903-919.
178
